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FOREWORD
Philippa Foot
It was with real pleasure that I heard that Julius Kovesi’s Moral Notions  
was to be reissued, and I felt honoured to be asked to write a preface for 
the new edition. I had known Julius when he was at Oxford when he and 
I were allies—members of a small band of guerrillas fi ghting the prevail-
ing orthodoxy of anti-naturalist emotivism and prescriptivism in ethics, 
and challenging the Humean doctrine of the gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ 
At that time we were rank outsiders and even in 1967 when Moral Notions 
was fi rst published it must have been hard to get recognition for such an 
iconoclastic approach.
Th is time round I hope it will be diff erent; though there will still be 
barriers to be overcome given the individuality of structure and even of 
terminology of Julius’s own theory of morals, which is radically diff erent 
from anything else on the scene, either then or now. What is the dif-
ference? First and foremost it is that where most contemporary moral 
philosophers have as their starting point an account of what an indi-
vidual speaker is doing (as, for example, expressing an attitude or issuing a 
prescription) when he or she praises or condemns an action, Julius starts 
much further back with an account of the formation of a particular kind 
of concept. He sees moral thinking as above all formation of concepts 
such as murder or stealing and distinguishes such concepts from those 
which bring together such familiar objects as tables or houses, the dis-
tinction depending on the diff erent place that operation with one kind 
of concept or the other has in our lives. We have the concept table on ac-
count of such activities as sitting down to eat, and its guiding principles 
(in Julius’s terminology, its form) depends also on myriad other things 
that we do, such as furnishing houses and fashioning and marketing ob-
jects. Similarly, moral concepts are rooted in activities—but this time ac-
tivities such as fault-fi nding and making decisions about behaviour—on 
account of which we fashion for ourselves classifi cations suited to these 
parts of human life.
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It would not be suitable even to try to summarize here the sometimes 
puzzling details of the structure that Julius builds on this base. Instead I 
would like to point out an affi  liation that seems to me to be very impor-
tant indeed. For while Moral Notions is like no other book of moral phi-
losophy, it seems to me to have much connexion with Wittgenstein’s phi-
losophy of language. Kovesi barely mentions Wittgenstein, but I would 
hazard a guess that he had deeply pondered Philosophical Investigations 
before he came to write the present book. Be this as it may, I think that 
Moral Notions will especially attract anyone interested in the philosophy 
of language considered from this point of view.
It is sad that we have a second chance to appreciate this remarkable 
book only after Kovesi’s death, and I myself much regret that I cannot 
discuss it with him. But we now have some further essays on moral phi-
losophy reprinted in the collection Values and Evaluations edited by Alan 
Tapper, and I hope that these volumes will be read together and read with 
the pleasure and profi t that this reading has given me.
xi
BIOGRAPHY OF JULIUS KOVESI
Janet Kovesi Watt and Alan Tapper
A brief biography is called for here, to give an outline of the experiences 
that helped to shape Julius Kovesi’s thinking.1 He was born in Budapest 
in 1930, and grew up in a country town in Western Hungary, Tata, a 
lakeside resort favoured by occupying powers of the past, including the 
Romans and the Turks. His brother Paul described their idyllic life in 
pre-war Hungary as ‘like growing up in the nineteenth century.’ Th e 
mid-twentieth century brought war, invasion, and occupation fi rst by 
German troops and then, after prolonged fi ghting in the countryside 
near their home, by the Russians.
At the time when a communist government was established in Hun-
gary, Julius and his brother were students at Budapest University, where 
he attended the philosophy lectures given by George Lukács. As com-
munist rule became increasingly oppressive, and barbed wire began to 
encircle the country, they decided to escape while it was still possible, 
only to be caught at the Austrian border. Julius, even then ideologically 
quick on his feet, told the guards that he and his brother were not reject-
ing communism, they were only foolish young bourgeois students who 
wanted to see Paris before the fi nal collapse of capitalism. Whether or 
not this was a convincing defence, they were released after a beating, but 
only on condition that they report on fellow-students who might also be 
planning to escape. Within days they again headed for the border, and 
this time succeeded in crossing it.
Eventually they made their way to Innsbruck and studied there before 
deciding, with their parents who had now joined them, to take the op-
portunity of migrating to Australia in 1950. Six years after arriving in 
Western Australia Kovesi had mastered English, completed a fi rst class 
honours degree in philosophy, and taken up Australian citizenship. As 
part of the citizenship process he was required to insert a notice in the 
newspaper. Th is appeared not under ‘Naturalization’ but under ‘Lost and 
Found,’ next to a notice about a lost dog. He always thought that this 
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comically symbolised what he had lost in leaving Europe and found in 
coming to Australia. He was awarded a scholarship for postgraduate study 
at Balliol College, Oxford. No sooner had he arrived in Oxford however, 
in late 1956, than the Hungarian revolution broke out, and he was given 
leave to go to Austria to work as an interpreter for refugees, thereby help-
ing others in the same predicament that he had himself been in a few years 
before. From them he learned at fi rst hand what it was like to try to resist 
a communist government that was now backed up with Russian tanks and 
artillery as well as with guards and barbed wire at the border.
Back at Oxford, besides studying for the degree of B. Phil. and writing 
his thesis (on ‘How good is “Th e Good”?’) Kovesi collaborated with An-
thony Kenny in producing a journal of philosophical parody called Why? 
which is still widely remembered.2 Th e fi rst editorial (there were three 
issues) set the tone by declaring: ‘Th e value of philosophy is to protect 
us from other philosophers. But who will protect us from ourselves if we 
take ourselves too seriously?’ Kovesi was never in danger of that, but he 
meant the fi rst sentence to be taken seriously, and often had occasion to 
quote it later on. He knew only too well the power of apparently impres-
sive arguments to bemuse and oppress, and for the rest of his life devoted 
his energies to helping others to see through them and resist them.
Th e philosopher who had the greatest infl uence on Kovesi’s thought 
during his time at Oxford and for some years afterwards was his supervi-
sor, J.L. Austin, whose penetrating, precise and witty analysis of ordinary 
language was the embodiment of the Oxford linguistic philosophy which 
fl ourished in the 1950s. His style of philosophising was aff ectionately par-
odied in Why? in a spoof book review of Th e Philosophy of Cookery, which 
described
Professor A*st*n’s completely original approach to the problem. Instead 
of simply considering ‘to cook,’ he investigates ‘cook with,’ ‘cook for,’ 
‘cook at’ and ‘cook up.’ One must mention his well-known lecture on 
the distinction between ‘boiling’ and ‘broiling.’ We do say we embroil 
but we do not say we emboil. . . .  He prefers the language of a plain cook 
who says ‘take two eggs.’ ‘But how do you separate two eggs? Do you 
separate two eggs as you separate two eggs when they are stuck together 
or as you separate two separate eggs? Do you do the same when you sepa-
rate two potatoes as when you separate two eggs? You can separate an 
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egg. Now separate a potato. Why cannot you separate a potato? Usually 
we say that we cut a potato.’3
Kovesi’s gifts, both intellectual and social, blossomed at Oxford. He was 
particularly delighted by the many Oxford societies, from the seriously 
intellectual Socratic Club, to the rather less serious or even exuberantly 
frivolous societies based on Balliol. During his fi nal year at Oxford Ko-
vesi himself founded a society, modelled on the Socratic Club, for the dis-
cussion of philosophical and religious topics from a specifi cally Catholic 
viewpoint, and attracted a remarkably distinguished group of Catholic 
philosophers to its meetings. Later in his academic life he was to gather 
around himself other more informal groups, modelled on the Leonardo 
Society at Balliol, for the reading and discussion of papers on a wide vari-
ety of philosophical, historical and literary topics. It was an aspect of his 
life that gave him enormous pleasure, and he cherished the friendships 
that grew out of such gatherings.
After leaving Oxford, Kovesi spent a year at Edinburgh University, fol-
lowed by three years at the University of New England in New South 
Wales, before returning to the University of Western Australia in 1962. He 
remained on the staff  there for the rest of his life, and there he taught until 
a week before his death in 1989. Th ough Oxford trained and acutely inter-
ested in concepts, he was no narrowly analytical thinker. He preferred to 
study big intractable concepts such as ‘alienation’ and ‘ideology’ rather than 
the fi ne minor distinctions (‘the dainty and the dumpy’) recommended by 
Austin. Students who took his classes would fi nd themselves reading and 
discussing Plato, Joachim of Fiore, Hume, Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Moses 
Hess (a particular favourite), Nietzsche, Durkheim, Lukács, Collingwood, 
Bultmann, Levi-Strauss, Kolakowski, Winch—and Moral Notions. Triadic 
theories of history, in all their diverse forms, fascinated him; he saw them 
frequently in operation in public debate. He had a talent for identifying 
new fallacies, most notably the Potato Chip Fallacy, based on a Peanuts 
cartoon.4 He hated world-views and ideologies that supply answers with-
out questions. Most of his philosophy was an attempt to think about 
the conceptual tangles that bedevil our shared life. Th is made him very 
much a public person, though one who held few public positions. Ever 
generous with his time, he seemed to be perpetually in conversation, and 
like Socrates he practised his philosophy on his feet. He liked to quote 
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Parmenides’ advice to the young Socrates: ‘Believe me, there is something 
noble and inspired in your passion for argument; but you must make an 
eff ort and submit yourself, while you are still young, to a severer training 
in what the world calls idle talk and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the 
truth will escape you.’
Th ere were diffi  culties and disappointments. Th e high fame of Moral 
Notions was short-lived. Major heart surgery in 1981 was a setback. (‘I have 
experienced contingency,’ he said afterwards.) His research on Moses Hess 
remained unpublished. A successor to Moral Notions and his analysis of 
Plato’s Th eory of Forms remained on the drawing board. Th e attractive 
remoteness of Western Australia, which he loved, had its intellectual costs. 
He never attained professorial status. His experience of the 1970s and early 
1980s was one in which a fl ood of ‘answers’ in ethics, religion and political 
life crowded out any genuine interest in the questions. He went through 
a period of ‘angry estrangement’—to use Selwyn Grave’s phrase—from 
the Catholic Church, because it seemed ‘willing to allow theological dis-
sent to transform doctrines beyond recognition.’5 During this period he 
ceased to practice his religion, though he returned to it eighteen months 
before his death. Th ough he died before the full collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe, he did live to see the fi rst beginnings of that collapse 
with the opening of the Hungarian border, and the symbolic presentation 
to President George Bush, Senior of a piece of barbed wire.
Notes
1. Th is biography is largely extracted from the introduction to Julius Kovesi, 
Values and Evaluations. Essays on Ethics and Ideology, ed. Alan Tapper (New 
York: Peter Lang, 1998), which was written by Janet Kovesi Watt and Alan 
Tapper. 
2. It was the subject of an editorial in Philosophy (April, 1976). See also Jill 
Paton Walsh’s novel, Lapsing (London: Black Swan Press, 1995), p. 217.
3. Why? has been republished by Janet Kovesi Watt, and can be obtained from 
Chris Ulyatt at foxpress@fergco.com.
4. See Values and Evaluations, pp. 110 and 182.
5. Selwyn Grave in Values and Evaluations, p. 74.
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3Preface
SINCE I have been talking about the ideas expressed in this study for 
several years on formal and informal occasions, there are a great number 
of people who helped me in shaping them. Some may not even be aware 
that they did so. Th ey range in place and time from some of the un-
dergraduates at Balliol during the years 1956–58, to some of my present 
colleagues in Australia. Th at I cannot mention them all here does not 
mean that I have forgotten how much I owe them. But I must express my 
special gratitude to Professor S.A. Grave, to Mr. Roy Holland and to my 
wife. Professor Grave read through an earlier version of my script, then 
with equal patience scrutinized the present one, and he was always ready 
to help me make my views clearer. For the views and the remaining ob-
scurities he is not of course responsible. My editor helped not only with 
many valuable suggestions but with his patience and kind encourage-
ment. My wife’s help can be illustrated by this typical dialogue:
Me: ‘I know it sounds much better the way you put it but that’s not 
what I want to say.’
She: ‘Whatever you want to say, you cannot say it like that.’
If sometimes I was forced to say it like that after all, I apologize to the 
reader.

5Chapter I
Between Good and Yellow
1. Material and formal elements
‘GOOD’ is not like ‘yellow.’ Evaluative terms are not like descriptive 
terms. We should not assume, however, that the diff erence between ‘good’ 
and ‘yellow’ is the same sort of diff erence as the one between evaluative 
terms and descriptive terms.
Th ere have been many arguments in this century over the diff erence 
between ‘good’ and ‘yellow.’ Th ey are obviously diff erent, and these argu-
ments were not designed merely to demonstrate the obvious: some times 
the simple diff erence between these two words was used to illustrate or 
to introduce us to the far more complex and sophisticated diff erence be-
tween evaluative and descriptive terms, but more often it was simply as-
sumed that to demonstrate the diff erence between these two words is at 
the same time to explain the other complex diff erence.
‘Yellow’ is not a typical descriptive word. It is a typical colour-word 
and colour-words have special features of their own. Neither is ‘good’ a 
typical evaluative word: it is the most general word of com mendation. 
Not only the word ‘good,’ but practically every word in our language, 
including descriptive terms, is unlike simple colour-words. And not only 
the word ‘yellow,’ but practically every word in our lan guage, including 
evaluative terms, is unlike the most general word of commendation.
I intend to show why and how simple colour-words have special fea-
tures of their own by contrasting colour-words with the rest of our vocab-
ulary. Th e diff erence that we shall fi nd between ‘yellow,’ and, say, ‘table’ 
is the same sort of diff erence that some moral philosophers fi nd between 
‘yellow’ and ‘good.’ I am not trying to eliminate thereby the distinction 
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between evaluation and description. Rather in order to indicate where 
that distinction lies I have to begin by showing that it does not lie in the 
simple diff erence between ‘good’ and ‘yellow.’ For if we want to fi nd at 
the same time and by the same arguments the diff erence between ‘yellow’ 
and ‘good’ and the diff erence between descriptive and evaluative terms, 
we are bound to be mistaken in our attempts to draw both these distinc-
tions.
Tables are a great stumbling-block to philosophers. Some say that we 
just perceive that the object in front of us is a table. Others, with justi-
fi cation, object to this by saying that all that we perceive are qualities 
given to our senses, the hardness, smoothness and the colour of the ob-
ject: there is no quality of being-a-table as such that we could perceive; 
we construct—they say—our notion of a table out of empirically-given 
qualities. It is true there is no perceivable quality called ‘tableness’ as there 
is a perceivable quality called ‘yellow.’ But there is no reason whatsoever 
to say that therefore we construct our notion of table out of perceivable 
qualities. Th is is not the case either historically or logically. Historically, 
without a need for tables we would not have these pieces of furniture; 
logically, we cannot understand the notion of a table without under-
standing that need.
Owing to the construction of our body, and due to some social con-
ventions, we fi nd it convenient to sit by bending our knees at something 
like a right angle. So sitting, our bodies are at a certain height. If we want 
to write or place cups and other objects within our reach, we need to have 
fl at surfaces at a conveni ent height relative to our position when sitting. 
So we manufacture pieces of furniture that meet these needs. Th ese pieces 
of furniture which we call tables may have diff erent shapes and may be 
constructed in various ways, but as long as they meet these needs in an 
accepted way we are entitled to call them ‘tables.’
Certain qualities must be present in a piece of furniture in order that 
we should be able to call it a ‘table,’ but there is no strict rule as to what 
these qualities must be. Th ere are various ways of making tables, and 
we can use various materials. On the other hand not just anything will 
qualify as a table. Our reasons for having tables constitute, as it were, the 
guiding principle for deciding what are tables and what are not, or what 
new constructions will be accepted as tables.
I would like to introduce here two technical terms borrowed from 
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Aristotle, form and matter.1 By introducing these terms I am not going to 
introduce any metaphysical entities. Th ey are no more mysterious than, 
say, the terms ‘evaluative meaning’ and ‘descriptive meaning’ employed 
by contemporary moral philosophers, and I hope they will be more use-
ful. By matter I do not mean simply the tangible material of the object, 
nor by form its shape or appearance. In the case of tables, I call the matter 
not only the various materials out of which we may construct tables but 
any characteristics in which the object may vary without ceasing to be a 
table. So the shape of the table, far from being its form will be part of its 
matter, since it may change—a table may be oblong, round or square—
while the object remains a table. Similarly, whether the object has four 
legs or three, whether it is made of wood or iron, are questions about the 
material elements of tables.
Th e very fact that the material elements are unspecifi ed and may vary, 
calls for the introduction of the term form. An answer to the question 
why we call a large variety of objects ‘tables’ and refuse the word to other 
objects gives what I want to call the form of a table.
I intend to use these terms not only when we analyse our notions of ob-
jects but also in our analysis of human actions. We can commit murder in 
a great variety of ways. It is the material element of an act of murder that 
someone drives a knife into his victim’s heart, or administers poison, or 
strangles him, or pushes him over a cliff . Human ingenuity may increase 
this list, and we may never be able to give a complete enumera tion of the 
ways one can murder someone. What makes all these pieces of human 
behaviour into acts of murder is what I call the form of murder, i.e. that 
we intentionally take the life of someone who is innocent, with the aim 
of personal gain or satisfaction.
I do not want to say that, in contrast to the un specifi ed material ele-
ment, the formal element is always something fi nal and defi nable. It is 
diffi  cult to give precisely once and for all the formal element not only 
in the case of notions like murder but also in cases like the table. With 
changes in our needs and social conventions our reasons for having ta-
bles might also change and consequently what will count as a table and 
1.  Form and matter come from Aristotle, but Kovesi claimed that what he was 
doing was less Aristotelian than Platonic, setting out a version of Plato’s 
theory of forms. See the papers on Plato later in this volume. (All footnotes 
to Moral Notions are by the editors.)
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what will not, will also change. Th e diff erence between our notion of a 
table and that of the Romans for instance, is a diff erence in the formal 
element of the respective notions. We could characterize this diff erence 
by the phrase ‘inverted commas use,’ a phrase with which we are familiar 
in contemporary moral philosophy. Disregarding anachronism, the word 
‘table,’ with our formal element, could not have played a role in the life of 
the Romans, except as a descriptive phrase in an inverted commas sense: 
‘Th is is what some people in some parts of the world call “table”.’
We may be able to see better the need for introducing these technical 
terms into our analysis of the world we live in and talk about if we con-
trast the majority of our words with simple words like colour words.
An object may be yellow because we so painted it. We may scrape off  
this paint and put on another coat, say, a coat of red. In these cases there 
is no connection between the colour of an object and its other properties. 
One box may be painted red and another yellow, while all their other 
properties and features remain the same, and we might call both of them 
‘letter boxes.’
Th ere are cases where there is a connection between the colour of a thing 
and its other properties. Th ere is a connection between certain chemical 
properties of a leaf and its colour, or between the physical properties of 
a prism and its colours. But these are contingent empirical connections. 
Th ere is a connection that we do not fi nd between the colour of an object 
and its other properties: we never call an object ‘red’ or ‘blue’ because of 
the presence of some other properties in that object. Th ere is a recogniz-
able quality called ‘yellow’ and the presence of that very quality entitles us 
to say that the object in question is yellow. Th ough a follower of Wittgen-
stein might rightly say that even the naming of a colour and the subse-
quent use of that colour-word involves the existence of a way of life where 
there is a need for talking about colours and a language in which there is a 
place for colour-words, this does not aff ect my present argument.
Th e important point is that in order for us to judge something to be 
yellow, that very quality has to be present that we have agreed to call by 
the word ‘yellow.’ But for us to judge something to be a table an unspeci-
fi ed group of properties and qualities have to be present, none of which 
is that property or quality that we have agreed to call ‘table.’ I am not 
making the obvious point that a table is not a property or a quality. I am 
making a logical rather than an ontological point. When this diff erence 
Between Good and Yellow
9
between colour-words and ‘table’ which I am now pointing to was no-
ticed as between colour-words and ‘good,’ the term ‘supervenient quality 
(or property)’ or ‘consequential quality (or property)’ was suggested to 
characterize goodness. But this means that goodness is not a quality or 
property at all—for the same sort of reason as table is not a quality or 
property. We remember the familiar argument which says that while it is 
possible for two objects to diff er only in their colour, it is impossible to 
say that two objects are exactly the same in every respect except in this, 
that one is good and the other is not. If one is good and the other is not, 
then they must diff er in some recognizable respect. What they must dif-
fer in, however, is not what we call goodness.
But by showing this diff erence between ‘good’ and ‘yellow’ we have 
not at the same time contrived to throw light upon a characteristic fea-
ture of evaluative terms. It is equally impossible to say that two pieces of 
furniture are exactly the same in every respect except in this, that one is 
a table and the other is not. Th is is so because, over and above or beside 
the unspecifi ed material elements that need to be present in order that 
an object may qualify as a table, there is no extra quality, being-a-table, 
which may be present in one object but not in the other. On the other 
hand two objects may be exactly the same in every respect except that one 
is yellow and the other is not. Th is is so because, as we have seen, we do 
not say that an object is yellow by virtue of some other qualities in that 
object, but because of the presence of that very quality we call ‘yellow.’
2. Lack of entailment between material and formal elements
Let us turn now to another aspect of the contrast between colour-words 
and the word ‘good.’ I emphasi zed earlier that the material elements are 
unspecifi ed. We cannot give a complete enumeration of the condi tions 
that must be fulfi lled for the proper use of a term. Not because of the 
indefi nite number of these conditions, but because these conditions have 
an open texture. Nor can it be stated how many of these conditions must 
be present and how many may be absent. For this reason there can be 
no entailment relation between the material elements and what we say 
the thing or action is. It cannot be deduced from, nor can it be defi ned in 
terms of the material elements, and this is perhaps one of the secrets that 
anti-naturalists are after.
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Th ere is of course a more respectable sense of defi nition, when, without 
reference to material elements, we give what I call the formal element of a 
notion, when we say what makes the thing what it is. A defi nition in this 
sense will determine what material elements we can or cannot accept as 
constituting the thing. In this sense a defi nition also functions somewhat 
like a standard or norm. But both naturalists and anti-naturalists tend to 
concentrate on a sense of ‘defi nition’ in which ‘defi nition’ is defi ning in 
terms of what I call the material elements.
Th e reasons why we cannot defi ne what a thing or act is in terms of 
their material elements, or why we cannot make valid deductive argu-
ments where the premisses contain only material elements and the con-
clusion tells what the thing or act is, is not a special characteristic of 
evaluative arguments. It has to do with the fact that the sort of things that 
can constitute a thing or act, their material elements, cannot be enumer-
ated in a fi nal list. It is their formal element which will determine what 
they are, not a list of their material elements.
In the same way as when we contrast the word ‘yellow’ with the word 
‘good’ we are not contrasting descriptive with evaluative words but col-
our-words with the word ‘good,’ when we contrast the word ‘rectangular’ 
with the word ‘good’ we are not contrasting descriptive with evaluative 
words but geometrical terms with the word ‘good.’ Colour-words and 
geometrical terms have features of their own, which, far from being rep-
resentative of descriptive terms, contrast with them in the same way as 
they contrast with evaluative terms.
Th us, for instance, Mr. Hare2 after noting that the proper use of the 
word ‘good’ depends on the presence of other qualities—as indeed does 
the proper use of most of our words—goes on to say: ‘We have to in-
quire, then, whether there is any characteristic or group of characteristics 
which is related to the characteristic of being good in the same way as 
the angle-measurements of fi gures are related to their rectangularity.’ (Th e 
Language of Morals, p. 82.) Th is contrast, however, cannot illustrate the 
2. R.M. Hare, Th e Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). Hare 
was a leading fi gure in a 1960s debate in moral philosophy, the debate 
being centred mainly in Oxford. Other major participants were Philippa 
Foot (see, e.g., the papers republished in her Virtues and Vices [Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1978]) and Elizabeth Anscombe (see, e.g., ‘Modern Moral 
Philosophy,’ Philosophy 33 (1958)).
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diff erence between evaluative and descriptive terms but only the diff er-
ence between most of our vocabulary and geometrical terms. We have 
seen that, similarly, there is no group of characteristics which are related 
to our notion of a table in the same way as the angle-measurements of 
fi gures are related to their rectangu larity. Th is is so because in geometry 
there are no open textures.
In one, but an important sense, colour-words function more like the 
words used in geometry than like ordinary object words such as ‘table.’ 
I am not making the absurd suggestion that there is an entail ment rela-
tion between something being yellow and the judgment that it is yellow, 
as there is between certain angle measurements and rectangularity.3 I am 
compar ing them in this respect, that there is no ‘gap’ between something 
being yellow and the judgment ‘this is yellow’ as there is none between 
certain angle measurements and rectangularity. Th e entailment relation 
in the case of geometrical notions is just a sub-class of the reason why 
there are no ‘gaps’ in these cases; we are quite sure in these cases what has 
to be present for us to judge something, such and such. By a ‘gap’ I mean 
that we do not move with such ease from observing that something has 
four or fi ve legs and a fl at, square or round surface on it, to the judgment 
that ‘this is a table’: or from observing that someone has been adminis-
tered arsenic or been pierced by a knife, to the judgment ‘this is murder,’ 
as we move from observing that something is yellow to the judgment ‘this 
is yellow’: or from observing that something has certain angle measure-
ments to ‘this is rectangular.’ Colours can shade into other colours, but 
this is not the same as having an open texture in the sense in which I want 
to say that the concept of a table has an open texture. Th e concept of a 
table has an open texture not because tables can shade into other pieces 
of furniture, but because even the unmistakable tables can be made in a 
variety of ways and manners.
It is interesting to observe what diff erent treatment this ‘gap’ receives in 
the case of material objects and in the case of actions. In the case of mate-
rial objects the problem is usually treated as part of the theory of knowl-
edge. Here the talk is seldom of inferences but rather of ‘constructions’: 
3. On this, cf. sense-datum theorists such as A.J. Ayer (in, e.g., Th e Foundations 
of Empirical Knowledge [London: Macmillan, 1940]) and responses such as 
that from J.L. Austin (in, e.g., Sense and Sensibilia,  reconstructed from the 
manuscript notes by G.J. Warnock (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
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how do we construct material objects out of what is given to the senses? 
In the case of actions not only are philosophers more prone to talk about 
inferences, but various other considerations confuse the issue. Th e most 
important of these is that the problem of description and evaluation has 
been telescoped into the problem of what is given to the senses and what 
we judge the action to be. Sometimes we are led to believe that the diff er-
ence between des cription and evaluation is to be found in the diff erence 
between what is given to the senses and what we judge an action to be, 
and we are asked then to justify an inference in moving from the one 
to the other. Th ere are problems in justifying an evaluative judgment 
after having made several descriptive statements, and there might even be 
problems connected with inference-procedures here. What I am trying 
to point out now is that these should not be confused, as they often are, 
with the problem of the connections between what is given to the senses 
and what we judge a thing or act to be. Th is problem presents itself in the 
same way in the case of both descriptive and evaluative terms.
We have seen the lack of entailment relationship between what I call 
the material and formal elements of our concepts; we shall see later how 
pointless it is to try to bridge this gap by creating a major premiss in order 
to have an entailment relation. Yet this is what some moral philosophers 
are trying to do. As if we could solve the problem of epistemology by the 
following way: ‘Th ere are two sorts of statements that we can make about 
a piece of furniture: examples of the fi rst sort are, “Th is piece of furniture 
has four legs and a fl at surface,” “Th is has such-and-such a height”: exam-
ples of the second sort are, “Th is is a table,” “Th is is a desk”; the fi rst sort of 
remark is usually given as a reason for making the second sort of remark, 
but the fi rst sort does not by itself entail the second sort, nor vice versa. 
Yet there seems to be some close logical connection between them. Our 
problem is: what is this connection? What we need is a major premiss: 
whatever has four legs and a fl at surface and has such-and-such a height is 
a table. Th en we can proceed: this has . . . , therefore this is a table.’
To talk about deducing or even inferring that some thing is a table 
sounds strange, and yet in a diff erent fi eld many moral philosophers give 
this strange treat ment to the same type of problem. I have been trying 
to suggest why they do this. It has not been observed that the ‘gap’ be-
tween what is given to our senses and what we claim an act or thing to 
be exists in the case of both descriptive and evaluative terms. Instead, this 
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‘gap’ has been construed as the ‘gap’ between description and evaluation, 
and then by choosing simple words like colour-words as examples of des-
criptive words, and more complex words as examples of evaluative words, 
philosophers have given us the impression that the diff erence between 
description and evaluation is to be found in the diff erence between what 
is given to the senses and what we say a thing or action is. Further, if we 
superimpose on this the idea that the problem of evaluation is somehow 
a problem of deductive arguments, then we have arrived at the strange 
situation that I have just observed: in the case of material objects, where 
the fi eld is free from the moral philosophers’ preoccupation with deduc-
tive arguments, our ‘gap’ remains a problem of the theory of knowledge; 
but in the fi eld of evaluative terms the same ‘gap’ is required to be bridged 
by an inference.
3. Th e diff erence in moral and other notions is a diff erence
in the formal elements
I want to say that ‘driving,’ ‘shopping,’ ‘having a bath,’ ‘gardening,’ ‘writ-
ing’ are not moral notions, while ‘lying,’ ‘revenge,’ ‘inadvertence,’ ‘cheat-
ing’ are. Both groups of notions can be analysed into their formal and 
material elements as I use these technical terms. My object in showing 
this is not to eliminate the diff erence between what is usually called ‘eval-
uation’ and ‘description,’ or the diff erence between moral and other no-
tions. Th ere is such a diff erence, but it is not the same as the diff erence 
which holds between the material and formal elements of a notion. We 
fi nd this diff erence between diff erent formal elements, between diff erent 
notions. In the case of moral as well as other notions we bring together 
an unspecifi ed group of features, aspects or qualities of things, situations 
or objects. But the point of collocating these features, aspects or qualities, 
the reason for grouping them together, is diff erent. Th ere are not only 
moral and non-moral points or reasons for forming our notions but a 
great number of others, and it is among these that the oversimplifi ed 
distinction between moral and non-moral notions is to be found.
In describing the way we came to have tables I began by referring to 
the physiological and sociological reasons for the way we sit, and then 
referred to the need for having fl at surfaces relative to our height when 
sitting. Th is is a partial description of our reason for having tables which 
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is essential to the understanding of our notion of a table. A complete 
account of the behaviour and life of this notion would also include, 
among other things, that we want to manufacture these objects, buy 
them and sell them, remove them and identify them. I would like to 
draw here a useful parallel with the word ‘lever’ suggested to me by the 
late Professor J.L. Austin. 4Before people thought of manufacturing levers 
one didn’t go to a special shop to get them but one asked for a lever from 
anyone likely to have the sort of object that would do the job. What was 
or was not a lever then depended solely on what did or did not fulfi l the 
function of lifting objects in a particular manner. But once levers came 
on the market the situation was diff erent. If one asks in a hardware shop 
for a lever now, the assistant cannot go out into his backyard and look 
for any piece of metal that would do the job. Manufacturing, buying 
and selling, introduced new criteria for what will or will not be accepted 
as levers. (Perhaps the word ‘wrapper’ is going through a similar sort of 
change at present.) Similarly the fact that established fi rms manufacture 
tables, that we buy and sell according to rules partly determines what will 
and will not be a table. Another important activity in our way of life is 
the writing of inventories, and that articles of furniture very often have 
to feature on such inventories is a further element infl uencing the life of 
such notions as ‘table.’ It should not be surprising then that if we want 
to give an inventory of a house or describe precisely what is in a house 
or a room, the word ‘table’ admirably fi ts our purpose in our activity of 
describing. We do not only use tables, we also use the word ‘table.’ And 
because we do not only want to write or eat on tables but want to sell 
them or identify them and list them on inventories the life and use of the 
word ‘table’ is shaped by all these various activities; that is, the life and use 
of the word ‘table’ is shaped not only by the way we use the object table, 
but also by all those other activities in the performance of which we have 
to use the word ‘table.’
If, on the other hand, the point of having a term in our language is not 
that we want to identify, buy and sell something but because we want 
to avoid or promote something, excuse or blame people for certain hap-
penings or acts, then we have a diff erent type of formal element shaping 
4. Austin is best known for the papers collected in his Philosophical Papers, ed. 
J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970) 
and the lectures presented in Sense and Sensibilia.
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the life and use of our term. It is in this fi eld that the diff erence between 
diff erent types of notions is to be found.
4. Th e formal and not the material element makes a thing or act to 
be what it is
Let us now consider the notion of an inadvertent act. Cavemen not only 
did not have tables, but at some stage they did not have the notion of an 
inadvertent act. So when one of them knocked the water over the camp-
fi re while putting on the wood he no doubt received rough treatment 
from his fellows. It was with the realization that we are not responsible 
for all happenings that are caused by the movement of our bodies that we 
must have started forming the notion of an inadvertent act. Just as if we 
had not needed fl at surfaces relative to our height when sitting we would 
not have begun to form the notion of a table, and thus have started 
manufacturing them, so if we had not had the need to blame or excuse 
ourselves and others, we would not have begun to form the notion of an 
inadvertent act, and thus have started excusing ourselves and others.
When I reach for the salt I have to move my arm. If while moving my 
arm my elbow happens to pass through the space occupied by a teapot 
and the impact knocks it over either I was clumsy or I did it inadvert-
ently. If the teapot was within the range of objects that I might reason-
ably be expected to notice, then I was clumsy. In both cases I want to 
claim that knocking over the teapot was not the object of my exercise. We 
have come to realize that in performing an act we have to make certain 
movements or changes in our environment (not always as simple as the 
movement of an arm; we can not only break cups but also romances in-
advertently) and in doing so the movements may produce by-products.
One day I inadvertently break a teapot while reaching for the salt. An-
other day I am walking on the beach and I jump back from a sudden 
wave. In so doing I destroy a sandcastle, inadvertently. Th ere is no observ-
able similarity between the two inadvertent acts, and if we were to think 
of a third example we would not conduct our search for it with observable 
similarities in mind; we would look for cases which however empirically 
dissimilar, would nevertheless come to the same thing. Now the various 
ways in which we can perform inadvertent acts constitute what I call the 
material elements of inadvertency. Inadvertency is not an extra element 
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over and above our doing what we do, it is what these various doings 
all amount to. Th e formal element is that same thing they all come to. 
Without this formal element we would be unable to fi nd new examples of 
inadvertent acts, and unable to follow a rule in using the term. We must 
recognize what it is for an act to be inadvertent, no matter what else it may 
be, before we can call it ‘inadvertent,’ and it is this recognition, and not 
the recognition of any empirical similarities between diff erent instances of 
inadvertent acts which enables us to follow a rule in using this term.
Tables are, of course, similar to each other; but we did not arrive at 
our notion of a table by having discovered similarities between some of 
our pieces of furniture. Rather, we make them similar because, only by 
being made more or less similar, can they meet the need that tables were 
invented to meet. But the number of ways in which we can do something 
inadvertently is not so limited. Our police force would have a much eas-
ier job if, for instance, the number of ways in which we could commit 
murder were limited to a few standard techniques. On the other hand 
one could not get away with murder by claiming that our new method of 
putting an end to someone’s life had no similarity at all with all the previ-
ous hitherto recorded cases of murder. We could not conduct our defence 
by showing diff erences in the material elements, but only by showing 
diff erences in the formal elements: that is, by showing that it was not 
intentional, or that I had a legal right to kill, etc. (We have to observe, 
however, that as manufacturing or stocktaking have standardized tables, 
so the law has standardized some of our moral notions.)
When Hume asked us to ‘take any action allowed to be vicious; wilful 
murder, for instance,’ he asked us in eff ect to examine what I call its ma-
terial elements. (Treatise, Book III, Part I, Section I.) Of course, he was 
right in saying that we cannot fi nd that ‘matter of fact or real existence’ 
which we call vice. But before we get to virtue and vice let us observe that 
Hume on his own ground should not be able to fi nd that matter of fact 
or real existence that we call murder either. He should not have asked us 
to take wilful murder as an illustration of a state of aff airs that we can 
perceive and describe in his sense of ‘description.’ To see the real nature 
of Hume’s claim we might take as our example a man who is pushing a 
length of sharp steel attached to a piece of wood into the space occupied 
by another man in circumstances that we constantly associate with the 
collapse of the other man shortly afterwards. We could take as another 
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example a man on a very high cliff  pushing over another man in circum-
stances that we constantly associate with the other man’s falling down, 
and in turn when this is constantly associated with the man remaining 
permanently motionless. We cannot but agree that not only is vice not 
a matter of fact or real existence that we can observe, but that murder 
likewise is not a perceivable object in the world, nor does it consist of per-
ceivable relationships between objects. Th e conclusion from this, how-
ever, is not that therefore virtue and vice, murder or kindness are not the 
objects of our reason. Rather, what follows from this is simply that they 
are not the objects of our senses. Th ey are the object of our reason. Th e 
distinction is all-important and we must beware of Hume’s systematic 
confusion of perceiving and knowing. He ends this Section by saying: 
‘let us see that the distinction of virtue and vice is not founded merely on 
the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason’; but one should not 
talk like this. We do not perceive with our reason any more than we know 
with our fi ngers; though we might use this phrase very fi guratively as we 
might also say that we have the truth at our fi ngertips.
I am not saying that there are two sorts of objects, objects of sense and 
objects of reason, and that murder and vice belong to the latter category. 
I am not arguing over the inventory of the universe. It was G. E. Moore’s 
solution in a similar predicament to increase the number of objects in 
the universe by one, and then call it ‘good.’5 Hume’s solution was to 
turn somewhere else (into his own breast) where he could perceive or 
introspect something, because he thought that this was the sort of thing 
knowledge was or ought to be. I am simply saying that knowing is dif-
ferent from perceiving, and we do not perceive something called murder; 
we know that certain acts are acts of murder in the same way as we know 
that certain objects are tables. We do not perceive something called ‘table’ 
over and above the material elements that have to be present in order 
that something should be a table. In an important sense, in the world 
there is no value and there are no murders, tables, houses, accidents or 
inadvertent acts. But our language is not about a world in which there is 
no value or no tables, houses, accidents or inadvertent acts. Th at world, 
5. Cf. G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University Press, 
1903). Cf. also Kovesi, ‘Principia Ethica Re-examined: Th e Ethics of a 
Proto-Logical Atomism’ (Philosophy 59 [1984], reprinted in Kovesi, Values 
and Evaluations, ed. Alan Tapper).
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the world of raw data, cannot be described for the sense of that world 
also lies outside it and the very description of it, likewise, lies outside it. 
Th ereof one really cannot speak. In our language the nearest analogy to 
the words that would mirror the world of data are colour words, so I am 
not criticizing Hume alone here, but also those moral philosophers who 
do not use the word ‘descriptive’ itself descriptively, but as a standard to 
which some terms or statements are expected to conform, and who re-
gard colour words as the nearest examples of this ideal standard.
5. Th e formal and not the material element enables us to follow a rule
Whatever might be the advantages of constructing a language that would 
mirror the world of data, our lan guage functions diff erently from such 
a language. In our language, to be able to understand the signifi cance 
or the meaning of a term, we have to be able to follow a rule in using 
that term, not to be able to perceive an entity of which our term is a 
name. We have just seen that ‘murder’ is not the name of an observable 
happening nor of any of its constituents. Let us rather see what it was 
that enabled us to take two happen ings, pushing a knife into someone 
and pushing some one over a cliff , as examples of the same thing. What 
enabled us to follow a rule here? As in the case of inadvertent acts, if we 
were to think of a third example of murder we would not seek empirical 
similarities.
Th e fact that in each case of murder someone’s life is terminated is 
not a suffi  cient similarity, though this element must be there to turn an 
attempted murder into murder. But it is also present in the case of natu-
ral death, or accidental killing, or when we kill someone inadvertently. 
Moreover, examples of murder are acts on the part of the person who was 
not killed: the word ‘attempted’ does not qualify the death of a person 
but the success of the act intended by someone else. In order for an act to 
be an act of murder, and in order for it to be distinguishable from other 
acts that result in the death of a person, other features or aspects of an act 
must be present and/or absent. As we selected certain features that have 
to be present for an act to be inadvertent, because we recognized that the 
presence of these should excuse someone—and we need excusing; so we 
selected certain features that need to be present for an act to be an act of 
murder, because we recognized that the presence of these would render 
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someone liable to blame—and we need to blame and to discourage cer-
tain sorts of act. Th ere are of course other notions of acts which have 
excusing or blaming as their formal element, like mistake and accident 
on the one hand and cruelty and robbery on the other. Th is leads us to a 
hierarchy of material and formal elements. As various movements are the 
material elements of various acts of murder, so murder itself, along with 
cruelty, robbery and so on, are material elements of vice. Th e number 
of ways in which we can be vicious is not limited. Some of the material 
elements of the notion of vice are already formed by us into notions 
consisting of formal and material elements, like murder. We should not 
suppose that the proper use of our words depends on the presence or 
absence or confi gurations of simple qualities in the world; or that our 
whole vocabulary is, as it were, only one level above such simple words 
as colour words. It is not necessarily qualities or properties or movements 
that need to be present for the proper use of a word; we may have to state 
what needs to be present by a word which already functions in such a 
way that for its proper use other things must be present. Further, it is not 
only qualities and properties and movements that we have to mention in 
this context, but also features and aspects of situations and things, inten-
tions and expectations, or perhaps some aspect of a legal, scientifi c or 
other conceptual framework. Empirically observable qualities, properties 
or movements do not take precedence in this list. So if Hume could not 
fi nd ‘that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice’ it should 
not surprise us.
When I claim that we do not need to look for empirical similarities be-
tween various instances of the same thing or same act in order to explain 
why they are instances of the same, I am suggesting something more 
radical than what I understand Wittgenstein to be suggesting when he 
said that we fi nd a ‘family resemblance’ among the various instances or 
examples of the same thing.6 He is still looking for empirical similarities 
between A and Z though it is not one thread that runs from A to Z. A, 
B and C are connected by one similarity, B, C and D by another and 
so A is linked to Z though they do not look alike at all. Th e similarities 
are connected like threads in a rope. Th e family resemblances between 
6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1968), pp. 31–2, section 66.
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various games illustrate this picture well. But I do not see any foundation 
for a claim that we call both football and chess games because football is 
played with a ball, and so is tennis, while tennis is played by two people, 
and so is chess. Not only is this insuffi  cient to explain that connection 
between football and chess which makes both of them games but this 
way we could connect everything to everything else. We could turn off  
at a tangent at any similarity and what we would get in the end would 
not be a rope but a mesh. Balls—cannonballs—were used to bombard 
cities, and duelling is a matter for two people. What we need in order to 
understand the notion of a game or the notion of murder is what I call 
the formal element. Th is is what enables us to follow a rule. I said that 
murder is the object of our reason—the phrase is Hume’s, and not of my 
own choosing—not only because we do not fi nd empirical similarities 
between various instances of murder, but because the very activity of 
following a rule is a rational activity. Since the phrase ‘object of reason’ 
makes one reach for Ockham’s razor one should also beware of saying 
that we do not know particulars but universals. What should be said is 
that we know what this object is only in so far as we know that this is 
the same as that, and that and that. If I could not follow a rule I would 
not know what ‘it’ was, though in suitable conditions I might be able to 
perceive ‘it,’ or I might be acquainted with ‘it.’ Now, unless I understood 
that the two instances I cited as examples of murder are examples of the 
same thing, I would not know that they were murders however long I 
stared at each of them. Nor could I understand that they were examples 
of the same thing unless I could understand why they were, and only 
when I could understand why they were could I follow a rule in looking 
for new examples.
6. Th e unity of formal and material elements
We must see therefore that the material and formal elements of a notion 
are inseparable. Th is is part of the reason why I introduced these terms 
instead of talking about two levels or strata of language, or two diff erent 
language games, because, in these latter phrases, there is no suggestion 
of inseparable connections between two strata or games. Matter and 
form are one pair of concepts. Without the formal element there is just 
no sense in selecting, out of many others, those features of a thing or 
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an act that constitute it that thing or act. Not only is there no sense in 
selecting those features, but some of those features simply would not 
exist at all, e.g. in the case of inadvertent acts there just would not be a 
by-product of an act. Out of the stream of movements that I continually 
perform we would not pair the reaching for the salt and knocking over 
the teapot, let alone call the empirically more impressive performance 
the by-product of the other (especially when it embarrasses me so much 
that I do not even complete my movement in reaching for the salt). And 
of course there are innumerable happenings that I also cause to happen 
when I reach for the salt, some of them even important such as winding 
my self-winding watch. But we do not wind our self-winding watches 
inadvertently.
Th at without the formal element we cannot see the sense of select-
ing the material elements is especially important in connection with our 
moral notions. For the contemporary distinction between ‘evaluation’ and 
‘description’ sometimes assumes that facts just are outside in the world 
waiting for us to recognize them; and that evaluation consists of selecting 
some facts on ‘purely factual grounds’ and then expressing our attitude 
towards them, or making a decision about them. Indeed, decisions and 
attitudes, insights, wants, needs, aspirations and standards do enter into 
our moral notions. But they do not enter from the top, they are part and 
parcel of our notions, and they are organized by the rational activity of 
concept-formation. Evaluation is not an icing on a cake of hard facts. 
It is not the case that we have ready-made facts, and that if we want to 
describe them we state them and say ‘yes’ about them, and if we want to 
evaluate them we state them and say ‘please’ about them.7 A moral no-
tion does not make a roll-call of facts. Th ere is a point in bringing certain 
features and aspects of actions and situations together as being relevant, 
and by removing this point, by removing the ‘evaluative element,’ we are 
not left with the same facts minus evaluation.
Standards, needs and wants also enter into the formation of terms that 
we usually call descriptive terms. What makes a term descriptive is not 
the lack of these but the point of view from which we organize these and 
other elements into concepts. While in using descriptive terms we have 
7. Cf. Hare’s distinction between neustics and phrastics in Th e Language of 
Morals, pp. 17–21.
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to follow interpersonal rules in a public language to talk about aspects 
or relation ships of the inanimate world—or if we talk about men and 
animals we do that in so far as they are part of the rest of the world—in 
using a moral term we have to follow interpersonal rules in a public 
language to talk about some aspects or relationships of those very be-
ings whose lives are regulated by interpersonal rules. Th us if our subject 
matter is the relationship of an acorn to an oak tree, as one destroys 
the other according to the laws of plant physiology and chemis try, not 
even the strongest attitude of disapproval on our part could turn this 
into a situation about which we could form a moral notion.8 Equally if 
our subject matter were the relationship of a child to his father in the 
situation where the one kills the other by being blown from the roof 
and falling on him according to the laws of gravity, by no expression of 
sentiment towards this unfortunate misadventure could we get the no-
tion of murder out of what happened. Not even if we put a special sort 
of exclamation mark after the description of what has happened would 
we get a moral judgment.
On the other hand, except in special circumstances, there is no need 
to re-emphasize that murder is vicious or wrong, or to say ‘this is steal-
ing’ in a ‘peculiar tone of horror’ or write it ‘with the addition of some 
special exclamation marks’ (A.J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd 
ed., p. 107). If someone understands the notion of murder or stealing, to 
say that they are wrong does not give him any more information. Never-
theless to translate ‘wrong’ into an exclamation mark is very misleading, 
for exclamation marks are used for other purposes, and we have a special 
word that we use to remind ourselves of the point of forming notions like 
murder, prejudice, cruelty, stealing: we use the word ‘wrong.’
But ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are not reminders always. Th ey 
would always be reminders, but as we shall see not only reminders, if all 
aspects of the world and of situations that can be the subject of moral 
and other evaluations from the point of view of right and wrong were 
organized into fully developed notions from these points of view. It is 
signifi cant that the notions chosen by both Hume and Ayer to illustrate 
8. Apart from Hume, cf. A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: 
Gollancz, 1946) and Charles L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1944) and Facts and Values (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1963).
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the superfl uity of the terms ‘vicious’ and ‘wrong’ are such fully developed 
moral notions, i.e. ‘murder’ and ‘lying.’ In the fourth chapter we shall 
see an important use of such words as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
when we shall see their use as discriminators. If we did not have the term 
‘murder’ in our language then we would have to describe as killing what 
we now describe as murder. But instances of killing are a mixed bag from 
the moral point of view. If we wanted to, as we do want to, discriminate 
instances of killing from one another from a certain point of view, we 
would have to say that this killing as against that was wrong. In fact we 
would want to say that this type of killing was wrong, but then we would 
be well on the way towards the formation of the notion of murder. When 
we say that this particular killing is wrong or that this type of killing is 
wrong, ‘wrong’ does not function as a reminder but as a discriminator. 
When we discriminate between diff erent types of killing, we are not mak-
ing diff erent evaluations of the same ‘descriptive’ elements in both. It 
would be absurd to claim that the only diff erence between two otherwise 
identical objects or acts is that we like one but not the other, or that we 
make diff erent decisions about them. Th e fact that we like or dislike, or 
make diff erent decisions about, or express diff erent sentiments towards 
otherwise identical objects or acts cannot constitute a diff erence between 
the objects or the acts. We cannot answer the question: ‘Why do we 
disapprove of one act but not of another though we fi nd no factual dif-
ference between the two?’ by saying ‘Because we express a sentiment of 
disapproval towards the one but not towards the other.’
We have seen that we cannot say that two objects are exactly the same 
in every respect except that one is good while the other is not: that they 
diff er only in their goodness. (Let us call this ‘Argument A.’) Similarly, 
according to Argument A, two acts cannot be the same in every respect 
except in this, that one of them is right and the other is wrong; nor can 
we say that two situations are exactly the same except that in one I am 
under an obligation to do something, but not in the other. Th ere must 
be some further diff erence between the two if one is right but the other is 
wrong, or if in one I am under an obligation but in the other I am not.
We must be very careful to understand the proper signifi cance of Argu-
ment A and especially to avoid two misuses of this argument.
(1) Th is argument far from divorcing our evaluative judgments from 
factual considerations—as it is some times assumed to do—rather ties 
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them to such considerations. Th e assumption that it divorces evaluative 
judgments from factual considerations could come about this way. Argu-
ment A does not apply to colour words. Two objects can be exactly the 
same in every other respect except that one of them is yellow and the 
other is not; the colour alone can constitute a diff erence between two 
otherwise identical objects. When one object is yellow and the other is 
not then there is a factual diff erence between the two objects, namely 
that one of them is yellow and the other is not. But when one object is 
good and the other is not, some philosophers are tempted to say that this 
is not a factual diff erence between the two objects because, according to 
Argument A, we cannot point to goodness as we can point to yellow as 
being present in one object but not in the other. Now to say this is just as 
strange as to say that while there is a factual diff erence between a yellow 
table and a brown table, there is no factual diff erence between a table and 
a chair, for while we can point to the presence and absence of the yellow 
colour in the respective tables we cannot point to the presence and ab-
sence of tableness and chairness in the respective objects.
Argument A obviously ties evaluative judgments to factual considera-
tions. If we judge something, x, to be good then unless we can point 
to a relevant (and according to this argument observable) diff erence in 
another object, y, we must judge y to be good also. But not any diff erence 
would absolve us from judging y also good, it must be a relevant diff er-
ence that entitles us to say that y is not good. Someone might object that 
this last sentence does not follow because Argument A is only a rule of 
consistency and has nothing to do with relevant diff erences that entitle us 
to judge one thing good and not the other. Once we judge something to 
be good then we have to stick to it and be consistent. We need the factual 
diff erence only in order to be able to remember which objects we chose 
to judge good and also so that, by being able to point to these factual 
diff erences, we could teach others how to follow our choices. So if we 
want to be rational we have to be consistent, otherwise we cannot follow 
our principles, nor others our advice.
Argument A is certainly based on our rationality. But rationality does 
not begin with our subsequent judgments after we have judged some-
thing good, it is even doubtful if we are rational in being consistent if 
our fi rst judgment was not rational. I said above that if we judged x to be 
good then we must point to a relevant diff erence in y if we want to claim 
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that y is not good. Let us reverse the argument and say that if we do not 
claim that x is good then we must be able to point to a relevant diff erence 
in y if we want to claim that y on the other hand is good. So Argument 
A applies to our judging something to be good for the fi rst time and not 
only to our subsequent judgments when we judge everything else which 
does not diff er from y in a relevant respect to be also good. And we may 
inspect several objects that are diff erent from each other in various diff er-
ent ways and say that none of them are good before we come to the one 
that we claim to be good. So the diff erence we must be able to point to 
cannot be just any diff erence—there have been diff erences between the 
various objects that were not good—but it must be a relevant diff erence. 
Th is leads us to my second point.
(2) Although there must be a factual diff erence between x and y if x is 
good and y is not good, it is also the case that there are factual diff erences 
among things all of which are good and also among things all of which are 
bad. Indeed, as we have seen, there may be no empirically similar charac-
teristics between one right act and another or between one wrong act and 
another. We cannot see what diff erent material elements amount to the 
same act unless we understand why they do so, and unless we understand 
why they do so we cannot follow a rule in fi nding further examples.
I objected to the view that the factual diff erence between good things 
and bad things serves only the purpose of enabling us to recognize what 
things we have chosen to judge good or bad and enabling us to teach oth-
ers how to follow our advice. Now we can object to this view for a more 
important reason. Since in these cases one cannot follow a rule in using 
a term by observing empirical similarities, one cannot say: ‘things that 
have such and such empirical similarities I resolve to judge vicious, do 
so as well.’9 (Although for safety’s sake we might employ this method in 
cases where we or others are not intelligent enough. We might formulate 
a rule to our children by saying: ‘never touch small white objects like this’ 
while pointing to an aspirin, and then add, in order to avoid the charge 
of inconsistency: ‘except when Daddy gives you one.’) So besides real-
izing that not just any factual diff erence will do for the requirements of 
Argument A we must also understand that we do not select these factual 
diff erences from the factual point of view. Th is is how the material and 
9. Cf. Hare, Th e Language of Morals.
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formal elements are inseparable. Th ere must be some diff erences in the 
fi eld of material elements between x and y if we want to judge them dif-
ferently, but we would not know what diff erences would entitle us to do 
so without the formal element. All this may sound very cryptic at present 
and we shall have to elaborate on these points in the following chapters. 
We shall also see then that it is pointless to ask how we move from the 
material elements to what we say the thing or action is once we realize 
that we select the material elements because they constitute that thing or 
act. Th ere isn’t such a thing as murder over and above the various acts that 
constitute murder. If this gives the impression that the formal element 
seems superfl uous we should re-emphasize the other side of the case and 
say that the various material elements of a thing or act are its material ele-
ments only because they constitute the thing or act, because they come 
to or amount to the same thing or act. Th is is why we had to introduce 
the formal element, the point or reason for bringing certain qualities, 
features or aspects of things, actions or situations together.
Equally, on a higher level of the hierarchy of formal and material ele-
ments, ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are not superfl uous, and even 
when they are reminders they are not only or merely reminders. Or 
rather, when we say ‘murder is wrong’ it does not merely remind us that 
murder is murder, but of the reason why such otherwise dissimilar activi-
ties as murdering, stealing, lying get into the same class insofar as they 
are all wrong or vicious. If one is asked what is this point of view, what 
is the reason for saying that they are all the same, one should refuse to 
say anything else than that they are wrong, for there is nothing else com-
mon to all of them, and to many other possible acts, than that they are 
wrong. To understand what we mean by saying that they are wrong is 
to understand what it is which alone is common to all these acts, and 
the test of whether we understand its meaning is whether we are able to 
recognize that an empirically diff erent new act also amounts to the same, 
i.e. that it is also wrong.
7. Elucidation of meaning by analogy
I think Aristotle was right in saying that the way to explain the meaning of 
the word ‘good’ is by analogy. Only I do not think he was right in thinking 
that his theory was a refutation rather than an elucidation of, or possibly 
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an improvement on, Plato’s views. (Nicomachean Ethics, 1096b) Th e pas-
sage in question—¯q gÅr ®n s√mati œciq, ®n cyxÎ no†q kaÁ “llo dÓ ®n 
“llÛ—should not be translated however, as J.A.K. Th omson translates 
it: ‘As sight is good in the body, so is rationality in the mind.’ We do not 
know yet what we mean by saying that sight is good in the body. What we 
want to fi nd out is exactly this: what do we mean by saying that something 
is good? Th e way to do this is not by taking one case where we can assume 
that we know what we mean by it, and then judge everything else good 
by analogy to this paradigm case: rather, we do it by considering what is 
common to sight being in the body and intelligence being in the mind. If 
we cannot see it we should continue: what is rain to the pasture, aspirin 
for your headache, rest when you are tired? We should have constructions 
not only with ‘in’ but also with ‘for,’ ‘when,’ etc., in order to get examples 
from all the Aristotelian categories. Now, if we stopped and explained why 
aspirin is on the list we might give the impression that we are explaining 
the meaning of the word ‘medicine’ and then one would continue to look 
for new examples having artifi cial remedies in mind. Or, if we tried to 
explain why rest is on the list the person might continue to look for new 
examples having natural remedies in mind. Th is is the sort of thing that 
anti-naturalists rightly object to, namely, substituting for the formal ele-
ment a statement of some or even a large number of the material elements, 
even if these elements are not ‘natural’ as given by nature but already for-
mal elements of lower level notions. We would make the same mistake if 
we were to say that medicine is a white little pill or a red liquid, or even if 
we said that it is whatever eliminates headaches.
In making a list of analogies to bring out the meaning of the word 
‘good,’ the more divergent our examples the better chance we have of 
succeeding. Good is the most general and universal formal element in 
its fi eld. We have seen earlier that the material elements of some of our 
notions are such that they in turn can be further analysed into formal 
and material elements. It seems obvious that the higher a term is in this 
structure the more diffi  cult it is to specify the empirically observable 
qualities, aspects and relations or movements of things or bodies that 
have to be present for the proper use of that term.
Th is does not make these terms vaguer however. We can guess more 
readily what movements someone must have performed if we know that 
he misspelled something as against the case when all we know is that he 
Moral Notions
28
made a mistake. Th is is so because we can make a mistake in a greater 
variety of ways: but when we make a mistake what we make is precisely a 
mistake. We can more readily visualize a road accident than an accident, 
but we can precisely distinguish between accidents and mistakes. Preci-
sion of a term does not depend on the number of ways in which it can 
be exemplifi ed for the convenience of our perception. We should look 
for precision in the formal element for the convenience of our rational 
discourse.
It is not necessarily the case that the higher the term is the more dif-
fi cult it is to give the material elements on the level just below that term. 
To take a simple example: it is easier to specify the material elements 
of a table than of furniture in terms of empirically observable qualities, 
though it is easy to give examples of the material elements of the notion 
of furniture, namely tables, chairs and bookcases. Equally it is easier to 
specify the material elements of murder than of vice in terms of observ-
able movements, though it is easy to give examples of the material ele-
ments of vice, namely murder, cruelty, etc.
In cases where we can exemplify something in a greater variety of ways, 
the more prominent the formal element is; the less variety of examples 
we can give of a thing, the less prominent the formal element is. Good is 
a limiting case in its own fi eld. In the case of good, the formal element is 
so prominent that one is inclined to say that it is just a formal element; 
something can be ‘good’ in so many ‘empirical’ ways. On the other end 
of the scale something can be yellow only by being yellow. We do not 
even need to introduce a formal element here, and we can follow a rule 
in using the word ‘yellow’ by observing an empirical similarity.
It is true that we point to diff erent objects, to a yellow pillar box, to a 
yellow canary in teaching how to use the word ‘yellow.’ As in the case of 
the explanation of the word ‘good,’ the greater the variety of objects we 
are pointing to is (though only within one category) the more success-
ful we are in our explanation of how to use the word. But the common 
feature we fi nd is an empirical quality, and what makes them all yellow is 
the presence of this very quality. In this case we need the variety of objects 
to show that the presence of all other qualities is irrelevant for the proper 
use of our word and we must recognize only one empirical similarity com-
mon to them all. Th is is quite the reverse process to the explanation of 
the proper use of the word ‘good.’
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Between these two limiting cases we fi nd a whole structure of terms 
and notions organized according to material and formal elements. Here 
we fi nd, among others, our moral notions. Th e simple comparison and 
contrast between ‘x is yellow’ and ‘x is good’ obscures this. We should not 
concentrate our attention so much on ‘yellow’ and ‘good’ as on the nature 
and variety of that ‘x.’
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Chapter II
Following Rules And Giving Reasons
1. Meaning and the formal element
AT the beginning of the fi rst chapter we had to introduce what I call the 
‘formal element’ because without it we cannot decide what are and what 
are not instances of a thing or action. Th is is so for several connected rea-
sons: we cannot give a list of material elements that would entail what the 
thing or action is; various instances of things and actions do not resemble 
each other empirically except in cases where such similarity is required 
for fulfi lling the same function; our terms must be open for hitherto 
unknown instances of the same thing; and there are always new ways of 
producing a thing or performing an act. Towards the end of the chapter 
the same claim was made by saying that, without the formal element, we 
cannot follow a rule in using a term.
In this chapter we shall investigate some of the implications of this 
claim. But fi rst I would like to mention further considerations showing 
that without the formal element we cannot follow a rule in using a term. 
Th at this does not seem quite obvious but needs to be substantiated by 
further arguments, may partly be due to the sort of examples we usually 
employ to show what ‘following a rule’ consists of.
At the end of the last chapter we saw that there are certain things 
that can be exemplifi ed only in one empirically recognizable way: some-
thing can be yellow only by being yellow. Plato in the Republic (523ff ) 
takes fi nger as an example to illustrate the same sort of point: ‘Each of 
them appears equally a fi nger, and in this respect it makes no diff erence 
whether it is observed as intermediate or at either extreme, whether it 
is white or black, thick or thin, or of any other quality of this kind. For 
in none of these cases is the soul of most men impelled to question the 
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reason and to ask what in the world is a fi nger, since the faculty of sight 
never signifi es to it at the same time that the fi nger is the opposite of 
a fi nger.’ When Parmenides asks whether hair, mud or dirt have forms 
(Parmenides 130c). Socrates replies: ‘In these cases, the things are just the 
things we see; it would surely be too absurd to suppose that they have a 
Form.’ Perhaps it would help to bring out the point I am driving at if I 
say why I think Plato is mistaken in thinking that the notion of dirt does 
not involve a formal element. Not only does the notion of dirt imply 
standards, but unless we understand why we list as examples of dirt cus-
tard on a waistcoat and sand on a lens but not custard on a plate or sand 
on the beach we would not know how to continue the list. Unless we 
understand why the fi rst two are examples of dirt we do not understand 
what they are examples of, however much custard or sand we have the 
opportunity of observing.
If we do not use words like ‘dirt’ but colour words or words like ‘fi n-
ger’ to illustrate what is implied in following a rule, we can easily get the 
impression that we can follow a rule without the formal element. Or 
we might get the same impression by an often used method of teaching 
how words acquire meaning. Suppose that a philosopher in a classroom 
does this: First he coins a silly word—‘tak’ for instance. Th en he draws 
various fi gures on the blackboard. Th e fi gures are of various shapes but 
some of them have a little pointed projection. He points to the fi gures 
with the projection and says: ‘Th ese are “taks.”’ Th en pointing to the 
others he says: ‘Th ese are not “taks.”’ He would have to draw a variety 
of fi gures to indicate that it did not matter what other characteristics a 
fi gure had apart from its projection. Soon the students would be able to 
say themselves whether a newly drawn fi gure is to be called a tak or not. 
Th e impression we get from this example is that we can follow a rule by 
observing empirical similarities only.
Th ere is, however, something strange in assuming that the pupils can 
leave the classroom and say: ‘Now we know the meaning of “tak.”’ Th is 
is so not only because they may never see any taks outside the classroom; 
after all they might, on occasion, see fi gures that exhibit the character-
istics of taks. If however they see one, what are they to do then? Should 
they stop and say ‘tak’ each time, or point it out to someone saying: 
‘Look here is another tak,’ or should they perhaps make a record of the 
number of taks they see each week? What is the point of the word ‘tak’? 
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Th e instructor gave no suggestion about this, and consequently did not 
teach the pupils the meaning of the word. I am not saying that he should 
have told his pupils something besides the rules for the proper use of the 
word; I am saying that he did not give the rules. What he did may have 
been the fi rst step towards giving the rules but so far all that he has done 
is to show how to recognize the fi gures that are to be called ‘taks’ and to 
provide this word for them. Without the need for ‘tak’ in a way of life we 
will not start forming the notion or using the word, and the word will 
not acquire meaning. Th e need for ‘tak’ might arise in a factory where 
tak-shaped fi gures for some reason have to be sorted out, or in a new 
game where tak-shaped counters are used. Possibly the word might play a 
part in a larger system, of crystallography say, or meteorology, where the 
recognition of tak-shaped crystals or cloud-formations may help us in 
manipulating, controlling or predicting events.
In philosophical language it is customary to call the features of a thing 
that enable us to recognize it the ‘criteria’ for the proper use of the word 
that we use to refer to the thing in question. What I am saying is that 
these features are not the criteria for the proper use of the word: they are 
the features that enable us to recognize or identify the thing in question. 
When we see these features we don’t have to use the word—except when, 
as we shall see, the activity of using the word is the activity of answering 
the question: ‘Is this such and such?’ On the other hand, we have to use 
our words at times and for purposes other than to identify a thing when 
we are confronted by it. Comets and revolutions do not appear or occur 
as often as we have occasion to talk about them. Th e occurrence of these 
phenomena is only one special opportunity to speak of them, if what 
we want to do is to announce their arrival or occurrence, but we do not 
even necessarily need to take these opportunities. Th e features enable us 
to recognize the phenomena but they enable us only to do this; they are 
passive, they do not tell us: ‘whenever my features appear use the word x,’ 
let alone tell us what else we can or should do with a word. Th e features 
do not provide us with the rules for the use of a word and so it is mislead-
ing to think that they are the criteria for the proper use of a word. For the 
rules we have to look elsewhere. So in order to avoid confusion, I shall 
call these features not ‘criteria’ as they are so often called but ‘recognitors.’ 
Roughly speaking, ‘recognitors’ are the defi ning characteristics of the ma-
terial elements of a thing or act or situation or any phenomenon.
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Someone who would give the example of our class room where we 
coined the word ‘tak’ as an example to show how words acquire meaning 
and what is necess ary for a word to have meaning does have an activity 
in mind. But this activity is simply the teaching and learning of a new 
word. It is because we have this activity in mind that the example sounds 
convincing, but because this is a special activity the example is mislead-
ing. Th e pupils can perform an activity, just as the factory workers could 
perform the activity of sorting out tak-shaped objects, but their activity 
consists simply in answering the question: ‘Is this a tak?’ Here the rules 
for the proper use of the word ‘tak’ coincide with the recognitors of taks. 
Being able to answer questions like ‘is this such and such?’ is an impor-
tant activity, but we would defeat our aim in studying the proper use of 
words if we unduly projected this activity to the rest of mankind as if this 
were their main activity in using words. People use language as part of 
all sorts of activities. Looking for the rules for the proper use of a word 
or phrase is looking for the rules of those activities in which the word 
or phrase is employed. Even in the classroom we were given the rules 
for the use of the word ‘tak’ for the classroom by being given the rules for 
an activity: ‘Say “this is a tak” whenever I draw a fi gure with a pointed 
projection.’
Language games are not word-games; they are activities of which lan-
guage is a part.
2. Simple examples of notions
a. Notions formed about the inanimate world
Of course we do not start forming a new notion by fi rst inventing a new 
word and specifying the recognitors that will enable us to answer the 
question ‘Is this an x?’ and then trying to think how we could use the 
word or what rules we could give for the proper use of that word. We start 
forming a new notion by a process which is the reverse of this.
For instance, a meteorologist may have been puzzled by a certain phe-
nomenon and after careful observations at last connects the phenomenon 
with certain cloud-formations. He discovers that the pheno menon occurs 
fi ve minutes after a cloud-formation which has a pointed projection. He 
selects these features of clouds because they enable him to perform the 
activity of predicting the phenomenon in question. Th en he may coin the 
Moral Notions
34
word ‘tak’ to refer to these cloud-formations if this is the word he wants 
to use to present his fi ndings. Later, when he teaches what taks are he will 
be teaching at the same time the rules for predicting the phenomenon 
in question. People would not know what taks were if they could only 
recognize the cloud-formations but did not know that fi ve minutes later 
a certain phenomenon will occur. We do not, then, fi rst have words with 
‘neutral descriptive criteria’—or recognitors, as I would like to say—and 
then load them with a theory, but we select the recognitors because they 
are relevant to the activity in which the word will play a role. ‘Tak’ means 
more than ‘being a shape with a pointed projection.’ Th e meteorologist 
would rightly object to the suggestion that what ‘tak’ really meant was a 
certain sort of observable shape, or that the observable shape is the fact 
and the rest is added theory.
Let us suppose that during his investigations our meteorologist ob-
served that the phenomenon occurred either fi ve minutes after a cloud-
formation with a pointed projection or fi ve minutes after a cloud-forma-
tion when there is a hole through the cloud. In this case taks would be 
clouds either with a pointed projection or with a hole through them. 
Being a good scientist he would present his fi ndings by saying that so far 
he has discovered these two diff erent types of taks. In future he might 
discover other cloud-formations that look empirically diff erent from the 
hitherto known taks; nevertheless they amount to the same, they are also 
taks. Th is is in line with the conclusion we came to in the fi rst chapter 
when we saw that it is the formal element of a notion that enables us to 
decide what will or will not amount to the same thing.
Let us consider another example which clearly illustrates that without 
the formal element we cannot decide what will or will not amount to a 
certain thing, and so cannot follow a rule in using a word. Th e example is 
quoted by Ogden and Richards on page 46 of their Meaning of Meaning.1 
Th ey quote it from what they say is a little-known book by A. Ingraham: 
Swain School Lectures on the Nine Uses of Language.
We do not often have occasion to speak, as of an indi visible whole, of the 
group of phenomena involved or connected in the transit of a negro over a 
1. C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, Th e Meaning of Meaning: A Study of 
the Infl uence of Language Upon Th ought and of the Science of Symbolism 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 46.
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rail-fence with a melon under his arm while the moon is just passing behind 
a cloud. But if this collocation of phenomena were of frequent occurrence, 
and if we did have occasion to speak of it often, and if its happening were 
likely to aff ect the money market, we should have some such name as a 
‘wousin’ to denote it by. People would in time be disputing whether the 
existence of a wousin involved necessarily a rail-fence, and whether the term 
could be applied when a white man was similarly related to a stone wall.
Th e reason why in time people would be disputing what is involved 
in something being a wousin is that we do not know what is the point 
of wousins. Th at this collocation of phenomena should be of frequent 
occurrence is not very important, as we have seen; it could occur as sel-
dom as revolutions. More impor tant is, as Ingraham also says, that we 
should have frequent occasions to speak of it. We should have occasions 
to speak of wousins if it were part of a ritual or if the occurrence of a 
wousin would be the beginning of a new year, or, as Ingraham suggests, 
if a wousin would be likely to aff ect the money market. But apart from 
indicating that the term might be used in our fi nancial life he does not 
tell us how and for what purpose ‘wousin’ could actually be used.
On the view I am arguing for, we fi rst experience an event x, say on the 
money market. Th is event must be important enough for us to want to do 
something about it. We would want to promote it or avoid it or at least to 
understand it. Careful observers would connect the event x with the tran-
sit of a Negro over a rail-fence with a melon under his arm. Some observ-
ers would connect the relative positions of clouds and the moon to event 
x, others might think that the position and phase of the moon might vary 
as long as it was dark at the time. Th is disagreement would centre around 
the question whether the positions of the moon and the clouds are or are 
not connected with event x. So far there is no notion of ‘wousin’ in their 
minds; all that they are arguing about are the reasons for event x. When 
they have a working solution to go on, they may publish their fi ndings, or 
if they are not theoreticians they may start talking about it at the stock ex-
change. Th us they may coin the term ‘wousin’ to refer to the collocation of 
phenomena that constitute the reason for the occurrence of event x. Th e 
process of establishing the reasons for this event is at the same time the 
process of forming the rules for the proper use of ‘wousin.’ Furthermore, 
the acceptance of the rules for the proper use of ‘wousin’ is at the same 
time the acceptance of the reasons for the occurrence of event x.
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A very important point to observe is that all this must be a public proc-
ess. Th e reasons for the occurr ence of the event must be publicly testable 
and accept able by anyone. Otherwise, people could not use the word 
in the same way, the word could not become part of our language. Th e 
way, then, in which the word becomes part of our language is at the same 
time the way in which we publicly check that we have correctly selected 
certain phenomena as the reasons for the occurrence of event x.
‘Wousin’ then is not merely shorthand for the recognitors enumerated 
in Ingraham’s example. It is not even shorthand for all the various diff er-
ent possible recognitors, that is, shorthand for a long disjunctive state-
ment: ‘either x crossing a, or y crossing b, or . . .’ We have to introduce 
now a new word not because we want to save time but because we want 
to say more than what is stated in our disjunctive statement, we want to 
say that it does not matter which of these things happens so long as one 
of them does. Th is is so because they all come to, amount to the same. 
Th ere was a point or reason in selecting these recognitors and from that 
point all the diff erent instances of wousin are the same. Th is is not ex-
pressed even by stating all the possible recognitors.
b. A notion formed about ourselves
I would like to turn now to a third example which will bring us nearer to 
the formation of moral notions.
I expect the reader is familiar with those little machines which are used 
by bus conductors in some places for printing the tickets. Now suppose 
that a passenger asked for a fourpenny ticket and for some reason the con-
ductor dialled fi ve, thus producing the wrong ticket. He made another 
ticket but kept the fi vepenny one, as he had to account for all the tickets 
printed. Some time later someone else asked for a fi vepenny ticket and 
was given the one printed earlier. So far so good, but trouble arose when 
the inspector boarded the bus, for since the ticket had been printed some 
time before the passenger got on the bus it had by now expired, and the 
conductor had to be called on to explain. All this was rather a nuisance 
as it took up the conductor’s time while other passengers were getting on 
and off ; besides, he felt that the inspector must have thought him careless 
and ineffi  cient. When he came off  duty he stayed to have a cup of tea at 
the canteen, where he told the story to a group of other conductors who 
replied with similar stories. Some had had to do their explaining during 
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the rush hour or to an inspector who was slow to understand. When I 
want to suggest that the conductors might eventually coin an expres-
sion to refer to these stories I do not of course want to say that they all 
suddenly decide one day: ‘Well, let’s call it making a misticket.’ It might 
take several years of exchanging stories before some conductor coins this 
word, and perhaps even longer before it becomes general currency. Now 
if it is only the conductors who talk together over their cups of tea the 
word will become part only of their vocabulary, but if they share their 
discussions with the inspectors it will become part of their vocabulary as 
well. In the fi rst case the word could only function as a ‘nuisance -word,’ 
in the second, it could function as an ‘excuse -word.’ What I mean is that 
in the fi rst case a conductor could not use the new word to the inspector 
when he wants a shorthand explanation to excuse a passenger and him-
self; he could only use it among the other conductors when he wants to 
say that this trouble has come up again. In the second case, however, he 
can tell the inspector: ‘Th ere is a misticket in the back,’ thus achieving 
what before the existence of this word needed a long explanation.
Th e diff erence between the two cases is not merely that the use of the 
word is extended to a wider group of people. Th e word itself will have a 
diff erent function, with very important consequences. When the conduc-
tor can use this word to tell the inspector that there is a misticket in the 
bus he is not merely saving time by using one word instead of several: the 
new word is shorthand not only for a story but for a story with a point. 
Before the existence of this word the conductors had a point in telling 
the inspectors what has happened; they wanted to excuse themselves and 
the passenger. But the success of this excuse depended on how articulate 
the conductor was, how able he was to master the relevant details and 
leave out irrelevant ones that might only annoy the inspector; it also 
depended on what views the inspector had about this sort of ineffi  ciency, 
on his strictness or leniency, or even perhaps on his like or dislike of the 
conductor. Th e existence of the new word changes all this. A conductor 
now does not need to rely on his own personal capacity to formulate and 
put his case well nor can the attitude of the inspector so freely infl uence 
the success of the excuse. Th e effi  cacy of the excuse is achieved by the 
conductors and admitted by the inspectors when the word is accepted in 
their common language. Th e rules for the proper use of the word are also 
rules in the way of life in which it plays a part.
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At the beginning of the formation of this notion diff erent conduc-
tors stressed various diff erent aspects of the occasions on which they had 
printed wrong tickets, and some of these aspects eventually turned out to 
be irrelevant. Only that which was common to all their experiences was 
eventually incorporated into the notion of making a misticket. Th is must 
be so if the word is to be part of a public language. Before the existence 
of the new notion, when a particular conductor related how he printed a 
wrong ticket, he impressed on his audience that he had had a bothersome 
experience, and his story was possibly coloured by his subjective interpre-
tation of the events. Th e new word ‘misticket’ however does not refer to 
the experience of an individual conductor but to that of any conductor, 
and incorporates those features of the experiences that any of them may 
have. Th e participation of the inspectors in the conversations introduces 
not only a new group of people but an opposite point of view and a new 
set of arguments for and against the excusability of printing wrong tickets 
and saving them for later passengers. As before, irrelevances and subjec-
tive preferences have necessarily been dropped out in the course of this 
process. Before the existence of this excuse-word a conductor had to use 
arguments which, if they were successful, excused only himself. Th e new 
word, however, will excuse any conductor, however unskilled in argu-
ment or disliked by the inspector.
Of course, the existence of the word ‘misticket’ does not settle the prob-
lem for good. Someone may subsequently question whether mistickets 
should after all be excused. He would not raise this question because the 
arguments embodied in the notion fail to come up to some standard or 
because they do not entail that mistickets should be excused. He might 
raise the question because he saw a new point that could be relevant to 
the excusability of mistickets. Or there may be a change because of a 
change in the standard of effi  ciency or because the frequency of mistick-
ets increases to proportions not envisaged earlier. (Th e cause of this might 
be the very existence of the new word.) Th ese are changes connected with 
the formal element. Th e material elements could also change if the em-
ployees come to see that there are other ways in which mistickets might 
come about, or if the company were to introduce new machines which 
operate diff erently.
Due to the nature of the case, the number of ways in which one could 
make mistickets is limited, as the number of ways in which one can 
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make tables is limited. We could readily visualize and describe the sort of 
thing a conductor did if we were told that he made a misticket. Th is does 
not make the term ‘descriptive,’ or even bring it nearer to ‘descriptive’ 
terms in contrast to terms like ‘mistake.’ What makes a term or notion 
‘descriptive’ or not ‘descriptive’ (I am making here an inverted commas 
use, i.e. ‘what other people call “descriptive”’) is the formal element, the 
point of selecting and grouping together some features of the world or 
of our behaviour. We already have in our language words for making 
mistakes in more restricted situations, like ‘misspelling,’ ‘miscalculating,’ 
etc., and we could have words for a mistake in changing gears, introduc-
ing people, addressing letters and so on. If we had a language in which 
there were only these more specialized words and no word correspond-
ing to our ‘mistake,’ it would not satisfy the requirements of our life. 
Since we are the sort of people that we are, the number of ways in which 
we can make mistakes is not limited. What the conductor did with the 
ticket, what the letter writer did with the address could occur in the case 
of a chemist making prescriptions. We do therefore need a word which is 
not restricted to a limited number of situations, i.e. the word ‘mistake.’ 
Remembering that higher and lower order formal elements can consti-
tute a hierarchy, we can say that terms like ‘misspell,’ ‘miscalculate,’ etc., 
have already organized some of the material elements of ‘mistake’ into 
their own units of material and formal elements. But not all material 
elements can be so further organized because there are always new ways 
of making mistakes. ‘Mistake’ is not more evaluative nor vaguer than 
terms like ‘misspell,’ just as ‘furniture’ is not more evaluative nor vaguer 
than ‘table.’
Not all mistakes are excused as mistickets are. In some situations 
with certain specifi cations they are, while in other cases they are not. 
In Chapter Four, we shall consider the diff erences between what I shall 
call ‘open terms’ (where further specifi cations are needed to enable us 
to make a judgment on the act) and ‘complete terms’ (where these fur-
ther specifi cations have been included in the term already). ‘Misticket’ 
is complete compared with ‘mistake,’ not simply because it tells us in 
what situation, in what manner and with what consequences someone 
made a mistake, but because these specifi cations came to be recognized 
precisely because the making of a mistake with these specifi cations was 
judged to be excusable.
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We are assuming that it was eventually agreed that conductors are ex-
cused in these cases. If, however, the outcome is diff erent, then to say that 
someone made a misticket is to accuse him of ineffi  ciency and similarly, 
to use it in the fi rst person is to admit ineffi  ciency. In this case by using 
the term even the most articulate conductor would admit ineffi  ciency 
and the most lenient inspector would ascribe ineffi  ciency. We further as-
sumed that they did come to an agreement which they did not necessarily 
have to. If they did not come to an agreement then obviously there can-
not be such a notion as misticket and the conductors cannot make mi-
stickets, although they will continue to make mistakes in printing their 
tickets. On the other hand, the very existence of the word ‘misticket’ (and 
it can exist only if it is used according to rules) is a sign of the fact that 
they did reach an agreement and created the notion. Future generations 
of the employees do not need to go through the arguments again: they 
will grow into a form of life by learning the language of their colleagues.
But how good was the conductors’ argument? How good were the 
reasonings that were incorporated and crystallized in the notion of 
‘misticket’? When the meteorologists accepted the use of the word ‘tak’ 
they also accepted the rules for predicting a certain phenomenon. Th e 
reasons for the prediction were established and agreed on when the no-
tion of ‘tak’ was formed and accepted in a public language. Th e notion of 
‘wousin’ had to go through a similar process. One may ask, where is the 
similar process in the formation of the notion of ‘misticket’?
Th is question leads us to the consideration of one of the crucial diff er-
ences between moral and other notions. Th e diff erence will turn out to 
be not so much a diff erence in the logic of their formation and structure 
as in their ingredients.
3. Comparison of the two types of notions
To begin with, I would like to claim that the excuse had to satisfy, not 
some abstract logical standard of proof, but the inspectors. Now this seems 
to be diff erent from the formation of a notion like our ‘tak.’ It is true, the 
arguments of the meteorologist had to satisfy the other scientists but one 
cannot say that they had to satisfy the other scientists tout court. Th e other 
scientists are satisfi ed if they cannot fi nd counterexamples to the meteor-
ologist’s claim, so their satisfaction depends on the presence or absence of 
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counterexamples. Th is seems to be missing in the case of our misticket, 
until we realize that in the process of the formation of this notion it is the 
interests of the inspectors that correspond to the counter-examples.
A scientist needs his fellow scientists because the nature of his activity 
is such that it must be governed by publicly accessible criteria, but he 
does not need his fellows to provide the very features and aspects that he 
selects for his notions. In the case of our moral and social life on the other 
hand, it is our wants and needs, aspirations and ideals, interests, likes and 
dislikes that provide the very material for the formation of our notions.
With scientifi c notions, our interests—such as the desire to understand, 
predict, manipulate things or happenings—initiate and guide the selec-
tion of the recognitors, but the recognitors are of the inanimate world, or 
of human beings only in so far as we are also part of the inanimate world. 
Our interests, wants and needs enter our social and moral notions twice. 
As in the case of scientifi c notions, they initiate and guide the selection of 
the recognitors—though these interests are not that of wanting to predict 
or manipulate but of wanting to promote or avoid certain things—and 
secondly, the recognitors themselves are selected from our wants, needs, 
likes and dislikes. In forming the notion of misticket we need the em-
ployees of the bus company not only to form this notion, but to provide 
those relationships of wants and interests, points of view and attitudes, 
without which there would be nothing to form a notion of. Our senti-
ments do indeed enter our moral notions, but not as something extra 
added onto a ‘pure description.’ Our moral judgments do not express 
attitudes towards inanimate objects; if the employees were inanimate ob-
jects, not even the strongest sentiment of approbation or disapprobation 
towards them would help us form a moral or social notion.
Unexpectedly, the fact that our interests enter into our social and mor-
al notions twice does not make these notions more subjective. Of course, 
being objective as opposed to being subjective does not mean that we talk 
about objects rather than about subjects. One can be subjective in talking 
about objects and objective in talking about subjects, i.e. about human 
beings and their actions. Whether we are objective depends on whether 
we form and use our terms according to interpersonal rules.
We have seen that the process of establishing the recognitors and their 
signifi cance must be public. Th is must be so not only because other peo-
ple have to be able to use our terms but because not even one single 
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person, not even the inventor of the notion, could use the new word in 
a consistent way without sharing its use with others. Furthermore the 
possibility of anyone being able to use a term in the same way is the guar-
antee for the fact that the recognitors and their signifi cance have been 
properly selected and established.
Th e recognitors then, have to be publicly recognizable features of the 
world, and the formation of the notion must itself be a public process. 
But since in the case of our social and moral notions the recognitors 
themselves are to be found in our life, it follows that only those features 
of our lives can be incorporated into these notions that are shared by 
any of us and are recognizable by any of us, and in turn the formation 
of the notion must itself be done from the point of view of anyone. Th is 
if anything should make our moral notions more objective. After all, in-
animate objects cannot put up any resistance if as a result of our changed 
interest or changed conceptual framework we select diff erent features of 
the world for special attention. We on the other hand, as users of our 
terms, would resist such a change when the terms are about ourselves.
We saw (on page 38) how individual variations and subjective inter-
pretations as to what does or does not constitute a misticket have to be 
eliminated, and consequently that the new word does not refer to the 
experience of an individual conductor but to that of any conductor, and 
incorporates only those features of the experience that any of them might 
have. When the inspectors as well as the conductors together formed the 
notion, it acquired a new meaning and functioned in a diff erent way. 
Th e parallel to this in the case of a scientifi c notion would not be the 
introduction of a new set of scientists but the consideration of a new set 
of objects capable of serving as examples or counter-examples to a theory. 
Or, to draw another parallel which is absurd but instructive: suppose that 
material objects could think and feel and wanted to live together with all 
their needs and aspirations; in this case the consideration of a new set of 
objects would almost correspond to the participation of the inspectors in 
the discussions with the conductors, but the exact parallel would be if the 
objects themselves did the considering.
Another diff erence between our moral notions and those about the 
physical world which follows from this is that the latter do not aff ect the 
world which they are about. Th e rules for their proper use are at the same 
time rules for our thoughts about, or activities in, that world but they are 
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not rules for the behaviour of the objects. Th e rules for the proper use 
of our moral notions, however, are at the same time rules for what those 
notions are about: they are rules for our behaviour. If Hume’s oak trees 
had formed the notions of parricide and murder their lives would be 
governed by rules as well as by the ‘laws of nature.’
It is not proper to say that everybody’s wants, likes and dislikes, aspira-
tions and ideals enter into the formation of our social and moral notions, 
not only because not everybody in space and time took part in their 
formation but because it is not a numerical universality that we need. 
What we should say is that only those wants, etc., that are anybody’s wants 
are incorporated in our social and moral notions, and the function and 
purpose of these notions in our lives must be such that anybody should 
be able to and should want to use them in the same way and for the same 
purpose. Since we form our notions from the very start from the point 
of view of anybody, these terms do not refl ect my wants but anybody’s 
wants. Th e tension between my preferences and what is good, or between 
what I would like to do and what I ought to do enters into our life already 
with our language.
I must emphasize that it is from the very start that we form our notions 
from the point of view of anybody. Terms used in our language are not 
formed by a single person who then trims them to suit others, nor are 
they a selection from private vocabularies made to suit, or be accepted 
by, others. Nor is it the case that we try to persuade others to accept our 
privately formed notions or that we address them to the whole world for 
general acceptance. I emphasize this because a large number and surpris-
ing variety of moral philo sophers seem to talk about our moral life and 
language as if each of us spoke a private language and yet paradoxically 
lived in society, as if our moral notions were private notions that we try 
to make universal. Obvious examples of this are, for instance, the view 
which claims that when I say ‘x is good’ I express the attitude ‘I like x’ or 
‘I approve of x’ and at the same time expect and try to infl uence others 
to do the same;2 and the view according to which a moral judgment 
must express a genuine want in the agent (or whatever else a fi rst-person 
command addressed to oneself means) and at the same time it must be 
2. Cf. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Gollancz, 1946) and 
Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944).
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addressed to the whole world. A less obvious example is the critical as 
against the constructive part of Hume’s moral philosophy. Th e fact that 
he regards the relationship of a son to a father as the same as that between 
an acorn and an oak tree shows that for him a moral agent does not live 
in society. Th e only sentiment which he considers is his own disapproval 
in his own breast towards what is (apparently) an inanimate world. Or 
again another example is the view which says that e.g. ‘pain’ means what 
I personally want to avoid, and then by means of sympathy I extend this 
notion of pain to others and so come to think that perhaps others would 
also want to avoid pain. But ‘pain’ does not mean ‘a feeling that I person-
ally want to avoid.’ Of course, I do feel something that I want to avoid, 
and it is my sensation, but I can know it to be pain or recognize it as such 
because I learned the notion of pain. I did not form this notion myself; 
when I learned it and the rules for its use, I learned that anybody wants 
to avoid it. Furthermore, only what anyone can recognize as pain can be 
among the recognitors of this term.
4. Following rules and giving reasons
One can break the rules for the proper use of our terms with regard to 
both their material and formal elements. An economist may break the 
rules for the proper use of the term ‘wousin’ either by calling a group of 
pheno mena wousin which is not recognized as such, or by not recogniz-
ing that the occurrence of wousin would cause event x on the money 
market. In the fi rst case he would break the rules with regard to the 
material elements, in the second case with regard to the formal element. 
Similarly the employees of the bus company may break the rules for the 
use of the term ‘misticket’ in these two ways. A conductor may collect 
tickets from the box for used tickets and sell them to the passengers and 
then claim that they are mistickets, or an inspector may rebuke a conduc-
tor for making what is recognized to be a misticket. Again, someone may 
break the rules for the proper use of the term ‘inadvertent’ with regard to 
its material elements by claiming that he poisoned someone inadvertent-
ly, when in fact he carefully chose the poison that he mixed into the bowl 
of punch. One would break the rule for the use of this term with regard 
to its formal element if one claimed that someone was responsible for 
what he caused to happen while intending to do something else. Th ese 
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two ways of breaking the rules for the proper use of our terms are intrinsi-
cally connected. To see this connection is to see the unity of material and 
formal elements.
If our economist called anything he liked a wousin he would defeat 
the economists’ eff orts to try to predict the occurrence of event x on the 
money market. We would object to his calling just anything a wousin by 
drawing his attention to the purpose of trying to fi nd out exactly what 
constitutes a wousin. And, if sometimes he said that the occurrence of 
wousin caused event x and sometimes that it did not, we would again 
object that he did not know why we selected for special recognition the 
group of phenomena called ‘wousin.’
Th us in both cases, when the rules are broken with regard to the materi-
al elements and when they are broken with regard to the formal elements, 
we appeal to the formal element. Th is is to be expected. Following a rule 
in using a word ‘x’ is nothing else than being able to see what are instances 
of x, and we cannot see what are instances of x unless we understand why 
they are such. We have seen that we cannot follow a rule in using a word 
‘x’ on the basis of the empirical similarities in the material elements of the 
various instances of x, and this is why it is not the material but the formal 
element that we appeal to even when we break the rules with regard to 
the material elements. We have to refer to the signifi cance of the material 
elements in order to claim that certain phenomena or happenings are or 
are not instances of x and to appeal to their signifi cance is to appeal to the 
formal element. Th is is why it is pointless to ask how we move from the 
material elements to what we say a thing or act is. Th e fact that we can 
follow a rule shows that we have already made that move.
To know how to follow a rule is to know what the material element of 
an act amounts to. Suppose someone is trying to buy fl owers, but cannot 
fi nd any. If he then buys a packet of paper streamers we can say that he 
was trying to buy decorations, but if he comes home with a box of choco-
lates, we can say that he was looking for a present. If we want to fi nd out 
what someone is doing who is, say, leaning against a door frame, we need 
to fi nd out what he would do instead which would amount to the same 
thing. If he sits down, then we can say that he was resting; if he stands a 
beam against the frame then we can say that he was supporting it.
In the fi rst chapter I objected to Hume’s taking murder as an example 
of vice. Th ere I objected on the grounds that ‘murder’ cannot feature in 
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his vocabulary for it is already one of those words that do not ‘stand for’ 
a matter of fact in Hume’s sense of ‘fact.’ Now I may add a more signifi -
cant point. Had he stated his example in terms capable of featuring in his 
vocabulary, that is, had he stated the material elements of a vicious act, he 
could not have given us another example of the same vicious act. One can 
only follow a rule in using the word ‘murder,’ that is, one can give other 
examples of murder, if one understands that the occurrence of certain 
material elements are reasons for claiming that they constitute murder.
Let us revive now the argument we called Argument A in the fi rst 
chapter. Let us consider someone explaining to us why a certain object 
is a kettle. He will point to certain features of an object that are reasons 
for calling it a kettle. After having done this he cannot point to another 
object and say that it has the same features but it is not a kettle. Th is 
would be saying at the same time that certain features are and are not 
reasons for calling something a kettle. Th us, this argument does not only 
call for consistency, and does not only tie our judgments that something 
is such and such to the material elements: it also shows us why we have 
to be consistent by showing how the material elements are tied to our 
judgments. We have to be consistent because of the way in which we give 
reasons for claiming that something is such and such.
But how similar do the two objects have to be in order that we should 
be able to call both of them kettles? In other words, what are the features 
relevant to judging something to be a such and such? Obviously kettles 
can be made of several materials and they do not have to be round. But 
when it was explained to us why a certain object is a kettle, its round 
shape was not given as one of the reasons for calling it a kettle, and so 
we are not going to contradict ourselves if next time we point to a square 
object and call that a kettle too. Again, that it should be made of tin or 
steel is given only under the formal aspect of ‘non-infl ammable material’ 
which allows for a certain variation of material elements.3 In turn, it is the 
formal element of our notion of a kettle which determines that a kettle 
should be made of non-infl ammable material. We decide what are the 
3. Until the 1960s, something that would not burn was non-fl ammable and 
something that would burn was infl ammable. Because of concerns that 
some people took infl ammable to be a negative, a deliberate move was 
made to remove ‘infl ammable’ from the language and replace it with 
‘fl ammable.’
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relevant features of a kettle by referring to the point of having kettles. Th e 
features which we have to look for are those that constitute x’s being the 
sort of thing which serves the purpose that kettles were invented to serve. 
So unless we can point to relevant diff erences between two objects, if one 
of them is to be called a kettle, so is the other.
By having shown how we move from the material elements to what 
we claim a thing or act to be, we have not bridged the ‘gap’ between de-
scription and evaluation. I have argued in the fi rst chapter that these two 
moves should not be confused. What we have established applies both 
to moral and non-moral notions, to murders, lies and inadvertent acts 
as well as to tables and kettles. In the case of all our terms we can follow 
a rule in using a word ‘x’ only if we know what features of the world or 
what facts (not in Hume’s sense of ‘fact’) are reasons for saying that some-
thing is an x. Whether we make a judgment by using a descriptive term 
or a moral term, i.e. whether we make a judgment like ‘this is a table’ or 
‘this is murder,’ the justifi cation for our judgment lies in the presence or 
absence of certain relevant facts.
I am handicapped by the established terminology in expressing my 
views here because the terms ‘descriptive’ and ‘evaluative’ as used in con-
temporary philosophical literature are already committed to a theory I 
am trying to argue against. If there were no such commitment of the 
terminology I could say that we describe the features of the world and of 
our own lives for diff erent purposes. Th e contrast is not, then, between 
descriptive and moral notions, but between description from the moral 
point of view as opposed to other points of view.
Th e way in which we move from the material element to what we 
claim a thing or act or situation to be is what has often been confused 
with the ‘move from description to evaluation.’ If this were a problem at 
all it would be present in the case of any description, whether from the 
moral or from any other points of view, for whenever we describe we 
make use of terms consisting of material and formal elements.
It is a diff erent question to ask how we move from a description which 
is not a description from the moral point of view to one which is a de-
scription from the moral point of view, and this is not a problem because 
we would never want to make this move. Th e fi rst move, the move from 
the material elements to what we claim something to be, is not a problem 
in the moral context because we always and in every context make this 
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move; the second, the move from one type of des cription to another, is 
not a problem because we never want to make this move. Th e fi rst ques-
tion is like asking how we make scrambled eggs, fried eggs or omelettes 
out of eggs, and the second is like asking how to make scrambled eggs 
out of fried eggs. But just because we never make scrambled eggs out of 
fried eggs it does not follow that we do not make both out of eggs. Just 
because we never move from a description in terms of, say, civil engineer-
ing to a description in moral terms, it does not follow that they are not 
both based on the respective relevant facts.
If a term is formed from the legal, prudential, functional point of view, 
or from the point of view of one of the sciences, or from any other than 
the moral point of view, then in so far as these terms fulfi l their respec-
tive roles they cannot be used as moral terms. Ex hypothesi our purposes 
in forming these notions are diff erent. We cannot base a moral decision 
on the sorts of considerations that scientists base their decisions on. If we 
could, scientists would form moral rather than scientifi c notions. It is to 
be expected that only those features of the world would be incorporated 
into a notion that are relevant for forming that notion. So if we have a le-
gal, scientifi c or functional term, then it incorporates only those features 
of the world that are relevant to these various points of view. Th e material 
elements grouped together under these formal elements do not provide 
us with reasons to come to a moral conclusion. Th ere is nothing to pre-
vent us, however, from using all or some of the material elements of these 
terms as some of the material elements of a moral term if they are relevant 
to the formation of a moral term. As constituents of a diff erent notion 
they would be added to other material elements, for diff erent sets of facts 
and diff erent combinations of them are relevant to diff erent notions. If 
we want to get from a notion which was not formed from the moral 
point of view to a moral notion it is only because what is incorporated 
in one sort of notion, or part of it, becomes relevant to the formation of 
another sort of notion. But then, as we have seen, there is no problem as 
to how we make the move, that is, there is no problem as to how to move 
from the material elements to what we claim a thing or act to be.
Our diff erent sorts of notions do not cross the fl oor of the house: in 
order to get to the other side they have to go back to their constituencies 
and be elected for the other side. If certain material elements have been 
elected to serve a purpose then they serve that purpose. In order for them 
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to serve another purpose they have to go through the same process again 
that enables them to serve a particular purpose: they have to be elected 
again.
50
Chapter III
Commands, Rules and Regulations
WE shall take up the main theme of this study in the next chapter again. 
In this present chapter I would like to consider three views which provide 
alternatives to my general position so far. I have selected these three views 
not only because they are well known and infl uential, but because by 
means of them I can elucidate my position further. My aim, then, is not 
so much polemical as elucidatory.
First I would like to comment briefl y on Aristotle’s theory of the Mean 
in Book II, Chapter VI of his Nicomachean Ethics, then look at the actual 
text of the passage in Hume’s Treatise that we have referred to earlier 
(Book III, Part I, Section I). Th irdly, I shall analyse an important example 
in Mr. R. M. Hare’s Th e Language of Morals (Part III, Chapter II, Section 
5). Th e problem raised by this example will occupy most of this Chapter, 
giving it its title.
(1) I would like to criticize a possible interpretation of Aristotle’s text 
without necessarily committing Aristotle to that interpretation.
Aristotle begins by saying that ‘in anything con tinuous and divisible 
it is possible to take the half, or more than the half or less than the half. 
Now these parts may be larger, smaller and equal either in relation to the 
thing divided or in relation to us. Th e equal part may be described as a 
mean between too much and too little.’ In the fi eld of human actions the 
relevant sense of the mean is the one in relation to us. Th en he turns to 
moral goodness within the fi eld of human actions and claims that to fi nd 
moral goodness is to fi nd a mean in our feelings and actions.
It is possible, for example, to experience fear, boldness, desire, anger, pity, 
and pleasures and pains generally, too much or too little or to the right 
amount. If we feel them too much or too little, we are wrong . . . Th e same 
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may be said of the mean and extremes in actions. Now it is in the fi eld of 
actions and feelings that goodness operates; in them we fi nd excess, defi -
ciency and, between them, the mean, the fi rst two being wrong, the mean 
right and praised as such. (J.A.K. Th omson’s translation)
Th is is sound in so far as it is a rejection of the idea that some feelings 
are good and others bad, and that virtue consists in having the good ones 
and not having the bad. Aristotle seems to be saying that our feelings and 
movements are raw materials out of which we can bring about virtuous 
or vicious dispositions and acts. Th is is also my position: the material ele-
ments have to constitute a signifi cant human disposition or act in order 
to be judged good or bad; and since the same material elements can form 
parts of diff erent acts, or the same act can be performed by the use of dif-
ferent material elements, the material elements by themselves are neither 
good nor bad.
Our Argument A substantiates another aspect of Aristotle’s view here. 
Since what a thing or act is is not something extra over and above what 
its material elements amount to, if we want to change anything, or any 
act, then we have to change the material elements. If we want to turn a 
particular ugly object into a beautiful object we have to do something to 
it, and the nature of the universe is such that doing something to a thing 
always has a quantitative aspect in some sense.
But the idea that we can produce and/or explain these changes without 
reference to the respective formal elements, or the general idea that quali-
tative change is the result of quantitative change, is what I would reject. 
We do not produce beauty or virtue by quantitative change: but if by 
reference to these formal elements we want to produce beautiful things 
or perform virtuous acts then we have to make quanti tative changes in 
the world. Furthermore, we need the formal element in order to deter-
mine in what respect and to what extent we should make these changes, 
we need the formal element to determine the mean. We would not even 
begin to look for a mean unless we aimed at certain things and we could 
not aim at certain things unless we had the notions of those things. Given 
all this we can start working out what changes we have to make in the 
world in order to bring about the aimed at result, and then we may call 
the suffi  cient amount of change ‘the mean.’
If I complete the above quotation we can see that Aristotle’s text bears 
Moral Notions
52
this out. ‘But to have these feelings at the right times on the right occa-
sions towards the right people for the right motive and in the right way 
is to have them in the right measures, that is somewhere between the 
extremes; and this is what characterizes goodness.’ Th is statement clearly 
reintroduces the need for the formal elements in order to determine what 
is the mean.
(2) Th e passage in Hume’s Treatise I want to investigate comes after the 
well-known example of the acorn destroying its parent tree. When the 
acorn destroys its parent tree we have a relationship between two inani-
mate objects. Hume claims that the same relationship exists between a 
child and father when the child murders his father, and yet we disapprove 
of the latter but not of the former.
‘Nor does this reasoning only prove,’ says Hume, 
that morality consists not in any relations that are the objects of science; 
but if examined, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in 
any matter of fact, which can be discovered by the understanding . . . Take 
any action allowed to be vicious; wilful murder, for instance. Examine it 
in all lights, and see if you can fi nd that matter of fact, or real existence, 
which you call vice. In whichever way you take it, you fi nd only certain 
passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. Th ere is no other matter of 
fact in the case. Th e vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider 
the object. You never can fi nd it, till you turn your refl ection into your 
own breast, and fi nd a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, 
towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, 
not of reason.
Let us observe what an unexpected turn this argument takes in the last 
sentence. If you turn your refl ection to relations that are the objects of 
science you cannot fi nd notions of morality. So far so good. Th en you 
turn your refl ection into your own breast and there you fi nd a feeling. 
Observe that it is your refl ection that you turned towards this feeling: 
the feeling which Hume claims to be a matter of fact is the new object of 
your refl ection. From this he concludes: ‘but ’tis the object of feeling, not 
of reason.’ Th is conclusion is so unexpected that one could say it is a non 
sequitur. What does the ‘it’ refer to in the last clause? Does it refer to that 
matter of fact that he claims is here? But that matter of fact was the feeling 
which was the new object of his refl ection.
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I am not being fussy over a small point for this small point is largely 
instrumental in creating a picture that still tends to hold a large section 
of philosophical ethics captive. Th e picture is that in the world there are 
hard facts recognizable by reason but our reason cannot fi nd anything 
which would justify us in making moral judgment or in forming a moral 
notion. We just have a feeling towards some facts and not towards others, 
the facts being the same.
Even if I were to admit that I am unfair to Hume because he was just 
obscure in the last sentence of my quotation, his text still cannot support 
his conclusion. Perhaps he wants to say that the feeling is an object of 
our refl ection, but what we feel about the relationship in the world, is 
the object of feeling. But what he says is that ‘in whichever way you take 
it, you fi nd only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts.’ I as-
sume you fi nd these by your refl ection in that relationship that you are 
considering. Why then is the only matter of fact diff erence that you fi nd 
between the relationship of trees and that of humans your own sentiment 
towards the latter? When we have these material elements of ‘passions, 
motives, volitions and thoughts,’ our reason forms moral notions out of 
them as the scientists might form scientifi c notions of the material ele-
ments presented by the destruction of trees.
In order to form the notion of a vicious act what we have to fi nd is 
not a bit of something called vice. To expect this would be just as strange 
as to expect to fi nd something in the relationship of the acorn and oak 
tree that we call fact. We cannot conclude that the destruction of the tree 
is not a fact or that it is not the object of our reason because whichever 
way we look at it all that we can fi nd are certain movements, changes of 
colour and so on, but we do not fi nd that matter of fact or real existence 
which we call fact.
Even if we keep to Hume’s terminology and restrict the use of the verb 
‘is’ to express those four relationships that he allows us to express by this 
verb and say that ‘ought’ expresses a new relationship, he is still wrong. 
We did discover those new relationships when we discovered those ‘cer-
tain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts’ between the child and fa-
ther. Th e important thing to note is that these do not just colour certain 
hard facts but are new material elements out of which our reason forms 
moral notions as other aspects of the world are material elements out of 
which our reason forms other notions.
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So I diff er from Hume on at least these three points:
(a) Not only non-moral but also the moral notions are formed 
by reason; what I mean by this is that the rule-following activity which 
is essential for the formation of any notion is the same type of rational 
activity in both cases.
(b) Although something called ‘feeling’ is an additional element 
in moral notions, it is not my feeling expressed towards a happening; the 
place of this feeling is among the raw materials which are the object of 
our reason—and not of feeling. If I did not also disapprove of the child’s 
murdering his father I would not understand the notion of parricide. Be-
side the rational activity of disapproval—rational because it is part of the 
formation, understanding and use of the notion of parricide—most or 
all of us may have diff erent emotional feelings about these tragedies but 
these are irrelevant to our investigations. Th ey are irrelevant by reason of 
my third disagreement with Hume:
(c) Th e moral agent is not a lonely observer con templating an 
inanimate world, not even a lonely observer contemplating other human 
beings. Th e relevant sense of feelings, etc., is the one in which these are 
anyone’s feelings, including those of the murderer, the murdered and the 
observer. And of course Hume is right in fi nding not only feelings but 
also motives, volitions and thoughts in the relationships of human beings 
and this list can and should be extended.
(3) When I turn to Mr. Hare’s example I want to re-emphasize what I 
said about Aristotle’s example. I am going to criticize a possible interpreta-
tion of what the example could be said to exemplify without committing 
Mr. Hare to that interpretation. I want to say this especially in view of the 
qualifi cations made by Mr. Hare in Freedom and Reason1 on views he alleg-
edly expressed in Th e Language of Morals from where I take the example.
Mr. Hare would agree with Hume that no facts in the world are rea-
sons for doing one thing rather than another. But what makes a judg-
ment to be a moral judgment for him has nothing to do with feelings 
and sentiments, for reasons that contemporary philosophical psychology 
would support. An active principle should be provided as a major premiss 
to bridge the gap between the facts that are stated in the minor premiss 
and a moral judgment. ‘A statement, however loosely it is bound to the 
1. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963).
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facts, cannot answer a question of the form “What shall I do?”; only a 
command can do this.’ (Th e Language of Morals, p. 46) ‘Commands’ and 
‘imperatives’ are used interchange ably, the major premiss is an imperative 
in the sense that to assent to it is to assent to a command addressed to 
oneself as well as to others. According to pp. 168–9 this is so by defi ni-
tion. If one does not act on the imperative then one does not assent to it 
and does not use it as value judgment.
However many problems this part of the theory raises, e.g. whether the 
solution of the problem is made analytic or indeed what this is a solu-
tion of, they do not concern us here. Th e example we are concerned with 
tries to show the diff erence between imperatives and moral judgments; 
it tries to show that while imperatives at least implicitly always refer to 
indi viduals or particulars moral judgments are universal. To show this 
diff erence, Mr. Hare contrasts the sign ‘No Smoking’2 with the judgment 
‘You ought not to smoke in this compartment.’
Suppose that I say to someone ‘You ought not to smoke in this compart-
ment,’ and there are children in the compartment. Th e person addressed 
is likely, if he wonders why I have said that he ought not to smoke, to 
look around, notice the children, and so understand the reason. But sup-
pose that, having ascertained everything that is to be ascertained about the 
compartment, he then says ‘All right; I’ll go next door; there’s another com-
partment there just as good; in fact it is exactly like this one, and there are 
children in it too.’ I should think if he said this that he did not understand 
the function of the word ‘ought’; for ‘ought’ always refers to some general 
principle; and if the next compartment is really exactly like this one, every 
principle that is applicable to this one must be applicable to the other. . . . 
On the other hand, when the Railway Executive is making the momentous 
decision, on which compartments to put notices saying ‘No Smoking,’ 
nobody says ‘Look here! You’ve put a notice on this compartment, so you 
must put one on the next to it, because it’s exactly like it.’ Th is is because 
‘No Smoking’ does not refer to a universal principle of which this com-
partment is an instance. (pp. 176–7)
Mr. Hare goes on to say that if an imperative or a command is made 
universal, then by virtue of this fact it will become equivalent to a value 
2. In the 1960s, smoking was still a common habit and not especially frowned 
on. It was a common arrangement on public transport for smoking to be 
allowed in any area not marked off  by a no smoking sign.
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judgment. Th us if we make the imperative ‘Do not ever smoke in this 
compartment’ universal by saying: ‘No one is ever to smoke in any rail-
way compartment anywhere,’ he claims that ‘it is not clear what could 
be meant by the sentence just quoted, unless it were a moral injunction 
or other value-judgment’ (p. 177). Similarly, if ‘Honour thy father and 
mother’ is not addressed to the members of a chosen people but to every 
man, then it becomes equivalent in meaning to the value judgment ‘One 
ought to honour one’s father and mother.’
We may remark fi rst of all that ‘Never smoke in this compartment’ is 
claimed to be a particular, not a universal, imperative, because it refers to 
a single place in the British railways, while ‘Honour thy father and thy 
mother’ is a particular imperative because it is supposedly addressed to a 
single group of people. Th is observation may help us later on to distin-
guish to some extent between rules and regulations made by competent 
authorities over the area of their juris diction, and commands and orders 
given by competent authorities to people under their jurisdiction. In the 
fi rst case one can extend the area over which the rule is applicable; in the 
second one can extend the number or class of people to whom the com-
mand is addressed. But in the fi rst case even if the area is restricted the 
rule is applicable to everyone, and in the second even if the command is 
restricted to a group of people no restriction of place is implied. Th us, 
nobody can say that a ‘No Smoking’ sign on a particular compartment 
is not addressed to him, and especially one cannot say that it is not ad-
dressed to everyone because the sign is not put on every compartment.
As a matter of fact Mr. Hare is not contrasting the logical force of the 
sign ‘No Smoking’ with the injunc tion ‘Do not smoke in the presence of 
a child,’ but with the putting up of the physical object, the ‘No Smoking’ 
sign itself. What the supposed objector objects to is that the sign itself is 
not put on every compartment. We shall see presently that this is not a 
defi ciency in universality but is the very nature of regulations: we do not 
protest to the manager of a department store if he puts an ‘In’ sign over 
one door and an ‘Out’ sign over the other, although the two doors look 
exactly alike.
Both the sign and the child can be reasons for not smoking, though as 
we shall see, quite diff erent sorts of reasons. Once we have accepted the 
presence of a child (or of a sign) as a reason for not smoking—as ex hy-
pothesi it happened in Mr. Hare’s example—then one cannot at the same 
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time say that the presence of a child is not a reason for not smoking, as 
one would do if one behaved like the person in the example. It is for this 
reason, and not because of some reference to a universal principle, that 
one should not smoke in the next compartment either if there is a child 
in it too. Th e same applies to the ‘No Smoking’ sign if one regards it as 
a reason for not smoking. One cannot say: ‘All right I shall go next door, 
there is a “No Smoking” sign there too, and I shall smoke there.’
In saying this I am not intending to eliminate the diff erences between 
moral injunctions, judgments and advice on the one hand, and rules, 
regulations, com mands and orders on the other. But before we can draw 
these distinctions we have to eliminate a confusion due to a misleading 
comparison, that is, the compari son of the logical force of a statement 
like ‘You ought not to smoke where there is a child in a compartment,’ 
to the putting up of a physical object, the ‘No Smoking’ sign, on vari-
ous compartments. (To see what is compared to what in the example 
one should reverse the comparison and we then get the absurd objection 
addressed to the mother: ‘Look here! You brought a child to this com-
partment so you should bring a child to the one next door because it is 
exactly like this one.’)
Now if we observe what diff erent sorts of reasons the child and the 
sign are for not smoking then the contrast intended in the example will 
be reversed. Th e sign, unlike the child, is a reason for not smoking only if 
we refer to a general principle like ‘No one is to smoke in a compartment 
where there is a sign like this put up by a competent authority.’ But the 
sign by itself is not, as the presence of a child is, a reason for not smoking. 
Continental railways may illustrate my point better. On some continental 
railways a simple triangular sign without words is put on non-smoking 
compartments. A triangular sign by itself, without reference to a rule or 
regulation, is not a reason for doing anything. Th is type of example could 
be used as an illustration by someone who would like to claim that practi-
cal reasoning conforms to a deductive argument where the minor premiss 
simply states a fact from which no obligation can follow. If we stated in a 
minor premiss that there is a triangular sign on a window we would not 
be given any reasons for doing anything. For this sort of minor premisses 
commands, rules and regulations are obvious major premisses if as a con-
clusion we would like an injunc tion for doing or not doing something. 
Th is however does not help us in the analysis of moral judgments. Th e 
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presence of a child is not like the presence of a triangle which by itself 
does not provide us with a reason for doing or not doing something. If we 
read the example carefully, we see that the person addressed looked round, 
noticed the child and so under stood the reason. We remarked already that 
the reason why he then could not say that he will smoke in the next com-
partment where there is also a child is not because there is a further general 
principle beyond what he already understood, but because if he accepted 
the reason he could not at the same time reject it.
Next, let us see why the sign is not put on every compartment that 
looks the same. Th e sign is part of the rules and regulations of the rail-
ways. Th e reason for having regulations is that some people want to do 
one thing and others another and so their behaviour has to be regulated. 
A conscientious Railway Authority may conduct a survey on the smoking 
habits of people before they put up their signs. If they discover that only 
thirty per cent of their passengers are non-smokers then they will put 
‘No smoking’ signs only on thirty per cent of their compartments. If they 
discover that smokers like to sit in carriages near the engine then they 
will put the signs on the rear carriages. But the reason for putting up the 
signs does not depend on certain features of the compartment and this is 
why we cannot protest to the Railway Executive: ‘Look here! You’ve put 
a notice on this compartment, so you must put one on the next to it, 
because it is exactly like it.’ As we noted, we do not put an ‘In’ sign over 
all doors that look exactly alike. (Th ere can be a ‘No Smoking’ sign on a 
compartment because of certain features of the compartment, e.g. when 
it is made of infl ammable material, but then the sign is not a regulation 
but a warning. In this case it would be inconsistent not to put a sign on 
all compartments that are alike in this respect. Warnings need to be given 
if we could not by ourselves detect the reason for doing something; if we 
could detect it, this case would be similar to the presence of the child: 
by looking around we would notice the infl ammable material and so 
understand the reason for not smoking, and we would not smoke in the 
next compartment either if it was also made of the same material.)
It is perfectly conceivable that no one would be allowed to smoke in 
any railway compartment any where. Th is would not turn the regulation 
into a proper universal and thereby into a moral judgment; it would turn 
the regulation into a rule. It would then be suffi  cient to put a sign to this 
eff ect at a suitable place on the station.
Commands, Rules and Regulations
59
I quoted Mr. Hare as saying that only a command can be an answer to 
a question of a form ‘What shall I do?’ so we should glance equally briefl y 
at some aspects of commands. When the Railway Authorities put up a 
‘No Smoking’ sign they are not issuing a command. Th ey may give orders 
to their employees but they have no authority over the passengers to give 
them orders, let alone commands. Th ey have authority over certain places 
where they can make rules and regulations. As rules and regulations are 
restricted to or are applicable to certain places, commands are restricted 
to groups of people over whom the authority extends. While reference to 
a commanding authority is essential for the analysis of commands, here 
I would like to touch on another aspect of the logic of commands, an 
aspect similar to what we noticed about regulations.
We noticed that although there are reasons for making regulations, 
these reasons are not necessarily given in the situation where the regula-
tion is made. Th us, for instance, we do not fi nd the reason for the pres-
ence of the ‘No Smoking’ sign in the compartment where it is placed. 
Similarly, although there are reasons for issuing commands, they are 
not necessarily in the situation about which the command is made. 
An offi  cer in the army could command one morning ‘Use the start-
ing handle’3  and next morning command ‘Run around the block.’ Th e 
reason for the command was to make the recruits fi t or to make them 
obedient, so none of them could protest next morning that although 
the cars were in the same condition and the temperature was the same 
yet they were not commanded to use the starting handle again. Th is is 
unlike the case when I give advice on how to start a car which is in a 
certain condition in a certain temperature. If the temperature and the 
condition of the engine are the reasons for my advice then if again the 
same reasons are present I have to give the same advice. Th is diff erence 
between the command ‘Use the starting handle!’ and the advice ‘Use the 
starting handle’ is not due to the alleged fact that the one is not while 
the other is a universal imperative. Th e discrepancy in the consistency in 
following a rule is due to the diff erent reasons for saying that one should 
use the starting handle.
3. In times gone by, before the advent of modern starting motors, the engine 
was turned over to start a car by inserting a starting handle into the engine 
and turning it. Th is operation was often hard work.
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It would be instructive to consider a case where a command resembles 
a piece of advice in that it is given on the basis of the relevant facts of the 
situation. On the battlefi eld the offi  cer might command ‘Move forward’ 
because of certain facts in the situation. If he thinks his reasons are cor-
rect, then next time when the same facts are present he will give the same 
command. Th e soldier who moves forward might not know the reasons, 
either because he is inexperienced or because he does not know all the 
facts about the situation. (We may compare this to the case when the ‘No 
Smoking’ sign was a warning.) Since he is ignorant of the facts and their 
signifi cance, only a command can answer his question ‘What shall I do?’ 
Th is is especially so in a military context where sometimes one should 
not do something unless commanded to do it. Th e commanding offi  cer 
however has reasons for commanding ‘Move forward.’ If his reasons for 
giving the command were in the situation, then if another situation is the 
same in the relevant respects he will give the same command again. In 
fact this is what is happening even in the training-camp when his reasons 
for giving the command is to make the recruits fi t. If the same reason is 
present he will give appropriate commands. But since there are many 
ways of making recruits fi t he can command fi rst one thing and next time 
another thing. If something else can achieve the same purpose that mov-
ing forward on the battlefi eld achieves then on the battlefi eld the offi  cer 
can vary his commands too.
Again, just as we noted in the case of regulations, we can note in the 
case of commands that they provide some of the few examples where 
practical reasoning has a deductive form. However much the recruits in 
the training ground would investigate the facts they would fi nd no rea-
son either for using the starting handle or for running around the block. 
So in cases like this, besides stating a fact like ‘this is a starting handle,’ 
we would need a command as a major premiss if we want to have the 
injunction ‘use this’ as a conclusion. But this is not the pattern of moral 
reasoning. When we told someone to use the starting handle as a piece 
of advice we did so because of certain facts, because of the condition of 
the engine and the temperature. Th at these facts were the reasons for 
doing something is shown by considering that it would be inconsistent 
not to give the same advice again if the same facts are present again. 
Moral judgments are like pieces of advice in that they are made on the 
basis of the relevant facts of the situation. Th e reasons for doing what a 
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piece of advice or a moral judgment tell us to do are the same relevant 
facts of the situation and not some logical features of the speech act, 
that is, not that the advice or the moral judgment is an imperative or 
command. We need to give advice or make a moral judgment if the 
person addressed does not know the relevant facts and/or their signifi -
cance. Otherwise the justifi cation for giving advice and for doing what 
is advised is the same. It is not the case then that we need a reference 
to a command or to an imperative in explaining why we do something. 
Far from commands being the reason for even doing anything, issuing 
commands is just one of the things that we do. Th e recruit in the army 
was doing something for no other reason than that he was commanded 
to do it, but the offi  cer did not give the command for no other reason 
than that he in turn was commanded to do so. If we consider that even 
to make a descriptive statement is to do something, we realize the fun-
damental inadequacy of explaining why we do something in terms of 
commands and imperatives.
We do not get a moral judgment or something equivalent to a moral 
judgment by making commands, rules or regulations universal. We have 
seen that commands are or can be restricted with regard to the people 
addressed while rules and regulations are or can be restricted with regard 
to the places to which they apply. If they are lumped together under 
the umbrella term ‘imperatives,’ following grammar book divisions, then 
a certain ambiguity results as to what we should do in order to make 
imperatives universal. We might think of extending the range of places 
to which rules and regulations apply, as we did when we eliminated the 
reference to British Railways; or we might think of extending the number 
or class of people addressed, as we did when we addressed ‘Honour thy 
mother and thy father’ to all men. Whichever way we take universality 
it is not the distinguishing mark of moral judgments. When a dictator 
aspires to address his commands to all men over the whole world, he is 
not aspiring to turn his commands into moral judgments.
With moral judgments the question of universality does not arise. 
Th ey are not commands that can be addressed to some or all people, they 
are claims about situations in which something should or should not be 
done. Th e validity of these claims can be impugned only by reference 
to the relevant facts of the situation. So unless a person by being in the 
situation makes a relevant diff erence to the situation, the claim applies 
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to him. Th ey are not addressed to everybody, they apply to anybody. If 
the same situation is present again we have to make the same judgment. 
Th is is not universality but rationality.4 In the next chapter we shall see 
that the importance of moral notions is that they group together for us 
some of the important and most often recurring confi gurations of mor-
ally relevant facts.
But fi rst I want to make three further brief observations on the diff er-
ences and connections between commands, rules, regulations and moral 
judgments, observations which open up further problems rather than 
solve them.
(1) It seems that rules and regulations are formulated in such a manner 
as to enable people to follow them on the basis of empirical similarities, 
e.g. ‘do or do not do something wherever there is such and such a sign.’ 
Th is must be so partly for a logical reason: if people do not know why 
they should or should not do something then only empirical similarities 
could enable them to follow a rule. It must also be so for practical consid-
erations. Rules and regulations have to be enforced, punishments or pen-
alties may be attached to breaking or breaching them, insurance claims 
may be connected with them. It is easier to enforce and observe rules and 
regulations if they are formulated in terms of empirical similarities. Th is 
may create a certain discrepancy between some of our rules and regula-
tions and our moral judgments. Someone may refrain from smoking in 
an empty ‘No Smoking’ compartment and smoke where the regulation 
allowed him though there are several children present.
(2) While in our daily life we have to be aware of the possible discrep-
ancies between the content of some rules and regulations and some moral 
judgments, my second point is that rules and regulations, however neu-
tral they may be from the moral point of view, can take on a moral signif-
icance. Rules and regulations can create expectations that we want to rely 
on and sometimes are entitled to rely on. Th is may give to the observance 
of rules and regulations a moral signi fi cance even though they are about 
morally neutral or even trivial matters. In order that expectations would 
not be frustrated, everybody’s co-operation is needed. I think that some 
4. Cf. D.H. Monro, ‘Impartiality and Consistency,’ Philosophy 36 (1961), and 
Empiricism and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
Part III.
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of the utilitarian theories draw our attention to the moral signifi cance of 
this type of universality, but this type of universality is diff erent from the 
ones we have been considering. Th e area of our life where this problem is 
signifi cant is restricted to cases where everybody’s co-operation is neces-
sary for the success of an operation, e.g. to cases like the observance of 
water restrictions, observance of the rule of the road or clean air regula-
tions.5 Although one cannot see anything wrong in watering one’s garden, 
the appeal ‘what would happen if everybody did the same?’ is legitimate 
and signifi cant because the operation in question, water restriction, is a 
communal, corporate activity. But if we were to extend this type of argu-
ment to cover the whole fi eld of moral life absurdities would follow. It is 
true that if everyone left his wife disaster would follow, but this is not the 
reason why I should not leave my wife. Leaving one’s wife is not like wa-
tering the garden in that one cannot see anything wrong with it without 
the appeal ‘what would happen if everybody did the same?.’
G.E. Moore argued that murder is wrong because if murder were a 
general practice it would create insecurity, and ‘the feeling of insecurity, 
thus caused, would absorb much time, which might be spent to better 
purpose, is perhaps conclusive against it,’ i.e. against committing murder. 
(Principia Ethica, pp. 156–7.) Again this may be true, but this is not the 
reason for not murdering someone.
(3) My third point not only concerns the logic of commands but is 
crucial for the correct handling of the connections between what is usu-
ally called ‘description’ and ‘evaluative judgments.’
When I issue a command my speech act must include or else refer 
to a description of what I command you to do. Th ere may of course be 
conventions simplifying our linguistic conventions, as for instance when 
soldiers have to stop at the sound of a whistle, but these special cases can 
be dealt with without invalidating the obvious point I am making. Simi-
larly, when I make a prediction of a future event I must describe in my 
prediction what future event I am predicting, and when I give you advice 
5. Discussions relevant to this might be found in J.J.C. Smart and Bernard 
Williams, Utilitarianism for and against (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973); Marcus George Singer, Generalization in Ethics (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1963); and Colin Strang, ‘What if Everyone Did Th at?,’ 
Durham University Journal, 1960, reprinted in Ethics, ed. Judith J. Th omson 
and Gerald Dworkin (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).
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or tell you what you ought to do, naturally I must state what you ought 
to do. If we wish, we can separate out this part of the speech act and write 
it down in a sentence which, according to grammarians’ classifi cation, 
would be in the indicative mood. Some philosophers then might go on 
to say that this is the ‘descriptive content’ or ‘descriptive element’ of im-
peratives, commands and moral judgments. Th ere must be then another 
element in these speech acts that makes them commands, predictions 
or something else. Th is is not only harmless but has its intrinsic value 
when our object is to work out a system of formal logic for sentences 
that are not in the indicative mood. We can make a fundamental mistake 
however, if we assume that in looking for a connection between state-
ments of fact on the one hand, and commands, predictions and moral 
judgments on the other, we should be looking for a connection between 
this ‘descriptive content’ and what diff erentiates these various speech acts 
into commands, predictions, etc. For the ‘descriptive content’ of these 
various speech acts is not the relevant description we are interested in in 
this context.
For instance, if I command you to shut the door, or advise you to do 
so, or for some reason say that you ought to shut the door, or predict that 
this is what you are going to do, we fi nd a common descriptive element 
in all these speech acts: ‘your shutting the door soon.’ We may call this 
the ‘what’ of these speech acts, since it tells us what it is that we should 
or shall do. Th e ‘what’ in our examples so far does not tell us why we 
should do what we are told to do. When we are interested in the con-
nection between ‘description’ and ‘evaluation,’ we are interested precisely 
in this ques tion, namely whether we can give reasons for saying that you 
must or ought to do something by reference to some facts that can be 
stated in ‘descriptive statements.’ Since as we have seen in our examples, 
the ‘what’—the supposed ‘descriptive element’—does not tell us why we 
should do what we should do we may come to the wrong conclusion that 
no description can be given as the reason for doing something. But the 
‘descriptive element’ does not give us the reason why we should do what 
we are told to do—not because it is a ‘descriptive element,’ but because it 
is not the relevant description we are interested in. Th e ‘what’ tells us only 
what we should do, and the set of facts we should be interested in is the 
set that gives us the reasons for doing what we are told to do. Examples 
of this other set of facts could be in this case that there is a draught and I 
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have a cold or that there is noise and we want to discuss something, or in 
the case of a moral judgment, the fact that there is a tetanus patient in a 
hospital room who should be protected from noise. But in none of these 
cases does the ‘what’ tell us why we should do or say something, not even 
in the case of predictions, unless we are clairvoyant.
Th is confusion of the relevant facts with the ‘descriptive content’ of 
certain statements can be illustrated by a more popular example. We are 
often told that we cannot move from the statement ‘the cat is on the mat’ 
to ‘the cat ought to be on the mat.’ Of course we cannot. But why we 
cannot move from the one to the other is not because one is a ‘descriptive 
statement’ and the other is an ‘ought judgment,’ but because the fact that 
the cat is on the mat is not a reason for saying that the cat ought to be on 
the mat. If there are reasons for saying that the cat ought to be on the mat 
they are a diff erent set of facts.
What I have been saying applies primarily to commands and only to 
some extent to moral judgments. To see this we have to recall that the 
reason for what is commanded is not necessarily in the situation in which 
or about which the command is made, while on the other hand, moral 
judgments state what in certain situations should or should not be done. 
If a speech act states merely what some people should do, then we do 
not fi nd the reason for doing it in the speech act. But if a speech act 
states what in certain situations should be done then the speech act may 
include the reason for doing what we are told to do. At the same time the 
more we know of the reasons the greater choice we have in the ways of 
implementing what should be done, that is, we have a greater choice as 
to what we should do. If we assume that the ‘what’ is the only descriptive 
content to think about we might get the impression that the descriptive 
content of such speech acts is left vague.
For instance, the soldiers were simply commanded what to do—theirs 
not to reason why. Th e descriptive content of the command—moving 
forward or using the starting handle—is not the reason for doing what 
they were told to do. Not even in the case of advice or of moral judg-
ments is it necessarily the case that by being told what to do we are also 
told why we should do it, though this could happen, and when we use a 
moral notion in our moral judgment it does happen that we are given the 
reason. When we use moral notions, we express why something should 
be done as well as what should be done, because, as we shall see in the 
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next chapter, moral notions group together in one term the morally rel-
evant facts of certain situations.
When I say ‘Do not smoke,’ I tell you what not to do without saying 
why not to. Th e reason may be because the compartment is small and 
there is a child in it. So when I say ‘Do not smoke in a small compart-
ment in the presence of a child’ I also say why you should not do what I 
tell you not to do. If we had in our language one term ‘x’ for smoking in 
a small compartment in the presence of a child then ‘x’ would be a moral 
term and I could say ‘x is wrong.’
When we had a moral reason for saying ‘Shut the door,’ the reason for 
shutting the door was that a tetanus patient had to be protected from 
noise. Let us suppose that in hospital and medical circles the term ‘tetpro-
tect’ is used to state that since noise is a mortal danger to tetanus patients 
appropriate measures should be taken when such a patient is in hospital. 
If the doctor uses this term to state what the nurse should do, then if the 
nurse understood the term she understood not only the ‘what’ but also 
why the request was made. We can also see a familiar feature of our moral 
notions in this example. ‘Tetprotect’ can be exemplifi ed by putting saw-
dust on the road outside, by wearing soft shoes or by shutting the door. 
Not only should the nurse understand why she should do something if 
the doctor tells her to enforce or bring about tetprotection, unless she 
knew the reason she would not quite know what to do and she would 
not know that all these diff erent activities are examples of the same thing. 
Without such a term the doctor would have to tell the nurse simply what 
to do.
For a proper analysis of this one would also have to go into the vast 
problem of the diff erences between the reasons for what we say, the rea-
sons for saying it at all and the reasons for the manner in which we say 
it. Th e reason why the door ought to be shut is diff erent from the reason 
why I have to say at all that it ought to be shut. Th ere are further special 
reasons why sometimes it has to be commanded, e.g. when the nurse just 
would not do it otherwise. But in the case of moral judgments at least, 
the reason for what I say, namely that the door ought to be shut, and the 
reason for shutting it are the same: the relevant facts of the situation. It 
is important to realize this, especially in contrast to theories that would 
separate both (1) the justifi cation of an ‘ought judgment’ and (2) the rea-
son for doing something, from the facts of the situations, and instead 
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of preserving the relation of each of these to the facts, connect them to 
each other. In the case of these theories the reason why I do something 
is explained by reference to some feature of a speech act, i.e. that it is a 
command addressed to me.
We had to go through these arguments not only to show that the logic 
of commands is not the model for the analysis of moral judgments, but 
because by doing so we are able to indicate the role that moral notions 
play in our language. After clearing away a few more diffi  culties we shall 
address ourselves in the next chapter more directly to the function of 
moral notions in our language.
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Chapter IV
Moral Notions and Moral Judgments
1. Men of principles and moral principles
IN this chapter we shall investigate the role moral notions play in our 
moral judgments. By moral judgments I mean judgments like ‘lying is 
wrong,’ ‘promises ought to be kept’ and also judgments like ‘it is you who 
should stay with your mother and your brother should join the resistance 
movement.’ While moral notions play a role in the fi rst two judgments, 
the third does not incorporate a moral notion.
Before we can embark on this investigation we have to clear away an-
other problem. We have to investigate fi rst the use of the term ‘moral 
principle’ because it could be argued that the fi rst two of my examples 
were examples of moral principles and only the third is an example of a 
moral judgment. It could further be argued that the third example is a 
particular moral judgment applying general moral principles to a par-
ticular situation, or, as someone with an existentialist persuasion might 
say, it is a moral judgment simply.
In the next section of this chapter we shall fi nd that there is some justi-
fi cation for making this distinction. In one particular sense of ‘principle’ 
we can say that judgments like ‘lying is wrong’ provide us with a principle. 
But this particular sense of the term will not be suffi  cient to separate my 
three examples from the point of view of their logic. Rather, I shall be justi-
fi ed in assimilating them in view of the great diff erence in the logic of this 
particular sense of ‘principle’ and other uses of this term. I am not here 
concerned with terminology in the sense of wanting to correct or change 
everyday usage, but I want to distinguish between diff erent uses of a term 
for the sake of what I think to be greater clarity in philosophical analysis.
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Th e term ‘principle’ has a long and rich history from the translation 
of Aristotle’s term ‘arche’ to the present day. Th e history of science and 
mathematics as well as the history of our moral life have aff ected its life 
and meaning. Because of its rich history we have to be careful when we 
use this term in moral philosophy. Th e use of a single umbrella term to 
cover a wide variety of judgments and other performances can be con-
venient if it is a neutral technical term which, however, the term ‘moral 
principle’ is not. Its use could commit us to a particular view of our moral 
life and language.
‘Being a principle’ is not a feature of statements or judgments. It is 
people—and only some people—who make and have principles or live 
according to prin ciples. Moreover, the term ‘principle’ is used outside our 
moral life, in science, for instance, in such a way that to understand what 
being a principle is we have to understand the place of certain proposi-
tions in a system. Th e association of this term with scientifi c systems and 
reasonings should make us careful in our philosophical analysis when we 
use the term ‘moral principle.’
We can decide to make a principle about almost anything. We can 
decide to get up every morning at the crack of dawn, or not to eat to-
matoes, or never to leave kerosene heaters alight in an empty house, on 
principle.
Let us consider how we would question the wisdom of an act when it 
is and when it is not done on principle. If someone gets up with the sun 
every morning because he thinks it makes him healthy, or if someone 
refuses to eat tomatoes because he thinks they increase the blood pres-
sure, then these acts are not done on principle. To question their wisdom 
we can produce medical evidence on the subject and dispute the justi-
fi cations off ered for them. If, however, someone says that he does these 
things on principle the whole procedure of challenging the wisdom of his 
acts will change. Not that we cannot question or challenge them, only 
we have to adopt a diff erent approach. People do have reasons for adopt-
ing certain principles, but these are not based on the actual situations in 
which the acts are performed. Whenever reference is made to a principle 
the argument is shifted away from the merits or demerits of the action in 
question to a diff erent fi eld.
A person may think that tomatoes are both delicious and health-giving, 
but since he disapproves of the activities of the Tomato Marketing Board, 
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he refrains from buying and eating tomatoes on principle. It would be 
out of place to tell him about the merits of eating tomatoes because he 
knows that tomatoes are good and even likes them. Th e only point on 
which we can argue with him is his disapproval of the Marketing Board, 
but then we would shift the argument from the merits of eating tomatoes 
to the merits of the Marketing Board.
Th ere are many patterns of adopting and behaving according to prin-
ciples. One case could be that the person does not mind if his acts do not 
aff ect the Marketing Board: his not eating tomatoes is the expression of 
the genuineness and sincerity of his disapproval. Cases like this indicate 
why we some times respect people who act on principles even when we 
disagree with them, and in these cases perhaps the only appropriate praise 
is for their sincerity. I want to outline however two diff erent patterns of 
adopting and behaving according to principles, two patterns that exhibit 
some similarities to patterns of behaviour we have considered in the pre-
vious chapter in connection with commands, rules and regulations.
Th e commanding authority, which is so important in explaining why 
we obey commands, is absent in the case of principles. But we have seen 
that there are other reasons for doing things besides being commanded 
to do them; there are reasons for issuing commands and also reasons 
for making things matters of principle. So let us consider, as against the 
above case, a more likely one, when the person who disapproves of the 
Marketing Board would like to eff ect changes in the Board. If his acts are 
to have any signifi cance they must take on the pattern conforming to the 
pattern of water restrictions and clean air regulations in so far as his act 
must be part of a corporate act. He must make the principle universal: 
‘nobody should eat tomatoes.’
What is happening in this case is that the person’s act, what he is do-
ing, is not simply eating or not eating tomatoes, but is aimed at changing 
the policy of the Board. If we apply the test I mentioned on page 45 and 
ask, if for some reason he cannot avoid eating tomatoes, what alternatives 
are open to him that would amount to the same act, then in his case the 
alternatives would not be the taking of drugs to counteract the supposed 
ill eff ects of tomatoes or the pouring of seasonings on them to counteract 
their taste. Th ese would be the alternatives if his acts were simply the not 
eating of tomatoes and the reasons for them lay in the merits of eating 
or not eating them. In our present case, as alternatives he might organize 
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pickets outside the Board Offi  ce, write letters to the papers or lobby par-
liamentarians. Or, to apply a further test, if the Carrot Marketing Board 
adopted the same policy then it would be carrots that he would stop 
eating. What he is concerned about is not the eating of tomatoes in so 
far as they are tomatoes but in so far as not eating them is the material 
element of a diff erent act, the act of changing reprehensible policies. We 
could put it this way: it is not a matter of eating tomatoes but a diff erent 
matter, a matter of principle. Th e pattern of the act is the same as in the 
case of the slogan ‘Support local goods.’ Th e very nature of the act is such 
that it must be corporate and this is why we need universality. How many 
people should co-operate in the act depends on the nature of the act. 
Two people are suffi  cient for performing the act of quarrelling or singing 
a duet, but more are needed for an orchestral performance. Still more 
people are needed if the act is aimed at supporting local goods.
It is very important to see what function is played by universalizing in 
connection with these acts. It is not the case that we want everybody—or 
most people—to perform the same act, but that we need the cooperation 
of all or at least most people, in order to perform an act at all. When I 
want another person to sing with me what I want is not more than one 
person to sing solos but another person to sing in order to sing a duet. If 
my reasons for not eating tomatoes were their supposed detrimental ef-
fect on health then equally of course I would try to persuade others not to 
eat this harmful vegetable, but this is not a case of refraining from eating 
them on principle.
As the pattern of reasoning behind obeying com mands or following 
rules and regulations lends itself to being represented in a deductive argu-
ment, so the pattern of reasoning behind acting on principle could give 
the same impression. We do not know why we should buy something 
which is a local commodity unless we are given a major premiss ‘Buy 
local goods’; we cannot see anything wrong with eating tomatoes unless 
we are asked not to eat them on principle. Th e various local goods or the 
tomatoes are given in a ‘descriptive’ minor premiss and reasons for doing 
anything about them cannot be derived from these minor premisses. It is 
very often the case that we would not buy some of the local goods unless 
we were doing it on principle. But what we are asked to do when we are 
asked to do these things on principle is not to take note of a major prem-
iss from which certain obligations may follow but to regard our act as 
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amounting to a diff erent act: we are asked to regard the tomatoes not as 
food but as the commodity of a certain Marketing Board, and to regard 
a cake-mixer not as an instrument that mixes the ingredients more or less 
effi  ciently but as a product of someone of your own community. Nor do 
we deduce our principle from a still higher principle: we have reasons 
for disapproving of the Marketing Board or for supporting local manu-
facturers. An appeal to a principle functions like a lever that shifts the 
reason for one’s acts to a diff erent ground. To some extent the pattern of 
be haviour in buying local goods could be compared to the behaviour of a 
farmer who is sorting apples according to offi  cial standards.1 (Th e diff er-
ence is that we are reintroducing a competent authority who sets up the 
standards.) Th e farmer does not look at the properties of the apple and 
ask: ‘Are these good reasons for claiming this apple to be Super Grade?’ 
He looks at the properties of his apples simply to recognize whether they 
satisfy the offi  cial standards or not. He does not make value judgments, 
he does not evaluate apples: he is sorting them. But in sorting his apples 
he does not regard the offi  cial standard as major premisses and the de-
scription of the properties of the apples as minor premisses. He appeals 
to a standard. Th ere are reasons for setting up these standards and when 
he appeals to them he is shifting the reasons for classing certain apples 
as Grade A from the merits of his particular apples to those reasons that 
were adduced for setting up the standards. Such standards are called for 
where disputes may arise which for some reason should be avoided, or 
where uniformity is desirable.
Reference to a principle does not make an act a moral act. Whether 
the act is moral or not cuts across the distinction between doing some-
thing on principle or not on principle: it depends on the sort of reason 
we have for doing something either way. If tomatoes caused cancer then 
not eating them could be a moral matter, though it is not on principle 
that we stop eating them. On the other hand if we disapprove of the 
Marketing Board because we think that marketing should not be organ-
ized by a group of bureaucrats, then although we stop eating tomatoes 
on principle our act will not be a moral matter. Th e two cases coincide, 
if, for instance, the Board, knowing the ill eff ects of tomatoes, goes on 
advertising them.
1. Cf  J.O. Urmson, ‘On Grading,’ Mind 59, 1950, pp. 145–169.
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Let us turn now to another pattern of adopting and behaving accord-
ing to principles. Th ere are reasons for not leaving a kerosene heater alight 
in an empty house. Whenever these reasons are present we should turn 
the heater off . But sometimes these reasons may not be present, as when 
there is no possibility of a draught, there are fi re guards around the heater 
and so on. According to our analysis of the rationality of human acts, 
one could leave the heaters on when the reasons for putting them out are 
not present. But can we be sure? ‘I know there are no reasons for putting 
it out now,’ someone could say, ‘but I put the heater out on principle.’ 
Th is is similar to the case when some one knew all the reasons for eating 
tomatoes and even liked them and yet refused to eat them on principle. 
But now the reference to a principle does not shift the reasons so far away 
from the actual reasons for not leaving heaters on in empty houses. One 
adopts a principle now because one does not want to rely on the actual 
reasons for putting the heater out each time. We might not be able to 
ascertain all the facts, some unknown contingency could arise, we might 
be careless or complacent, so it is better to lay down a fi rm rule and on 
principle never leave heaters on in an empty house.
One could argue that here again we are performing a diff erent act if we 
do what we do on principle. As in the previous case the movements of 
consuming the vegetable came under the formal element of disapproval 
of certain policies and not under the formal element of eating, so now 
the movements of putting out the fl ames come under the formal element 
of cautiousness and not under that of fi re prevention, and this is what 
makes a diff erence to the following of rules. For our present purposes 
we do not need to go into this problem. It is enough for us to observe 
that in this case rule-following has been simplifi ed by following empirical 
similarities. Th is is more like the case of not smoking wherever there is a 
‘No Smoking’ sign. Such simplifi cations are important where we cannot 
rely on our own judgments, where the nature of the case is such that un-
foreseen contingencies could arise or where we are prone to carelessness. 
Mothers are wise always to close safety pins or always to put cold water 
into the bath before the hot, on principle. A doctor may advise someone 
whom he cannot continually visit to take a certain pill as soon as the 
slightest signs of a symptom appear. Th e doctor would know that half of 
the time the pill would not be necessary but he has to simplify the rules 
for someone who does not know the reasons for taking the pill. Here we 
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have again a pattern of behaviour such that the reasoning behind it can 
be exemplifi ed in a deductive argument. When we should do something 
can be stated in a ‘descriptive’ minor premiss, and ex hypothesi the rea-
sons for doing something are not in this description. We do something 
on these occasions by reference to a principle. If one’s life is conducted 
according to principles of this type, the relevant facts of the situation are 
not given as reasons for one’s acts or for one’s decisions. Th e relevant facts 
of the situation serve only to enable us to recognize that here is a case that 
falls under a principle.
If we took this pattern of behaviour as the typical example of fol-
lowing a rule then our Argument A (of Chapter One, pp. 23ff ) could 
be made to look quite diff erent. In this case the reason why one can-
not say that in situation X one should do something but in situation Y 
which is like X in all relevant aspects one should not do it, is because 
if we were to say this we could not teach our principles to others and 
they would not know how to recognize what falls under our principle. I 
tried to show earlier that Argument A illustrates the behaviour of people 
who have reasons for doing something. But this argument can be made 
to look like a guide for those who do not know the reasons for doing 
something.
As I said, there are special situations and cases where acting on princi-
ples of this type is called for. Our literature is full of examples of people 
who extend this to cases and situations where such a pattern of behav-
iour is not called for. Th ere are occasions for being kind, visiting friends 
in hospitals and making polite conversation. One should hope that we 
know when these occasions arise and when they do not, and so we do not 
need to do these things on principle.
Th e sense of universality in this type of principle is diff erent from the 
sense of universality involved in our previous type. Th ere it was a ques-
tion of all or most people doing something, now it is a question of always 
doing something or doing something in all cases of such and such. In 
this respect the fi rst type exhibits similarities to commands, the second 
to rules and regulations. In connection with the second type of principle 
we also fi nd a parallel to the possible discrepancy we found between fol-
lowing some of our rules and regulations on the one hand and our moral 
judgments on the other.
We have considered briefl y two patterns of behaving according to prin-
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ciples. Th ere are many other patterns each exhibiting special character-
istics and logic. Diff erent reasons, diff erent situations and circum stances 
call for the adoption of principles in diff erent restricted areas of our lives. 
Some are connected with virtues, when living according to principles or 
rules is regarded as an exercise in obedience or self discipline, while on 
the other end of this scale we might fi nd cases of moral immaturity or 
fear of responsibility. A nice example of yet another use of ‘principle’ is 
provided by one of the fi rst quotations under the relevant sense of ‘Prin-
ciple’ in the Oxford English Dictionary (No. 7 out of 11 senses). It comes 
from Cromwell: ‘If I were to choose any servant . . . I would choose a 
godly man that hath principles . . . Because I know where to have a man 
that hath principles.’ My primary aim in this excursion was to show that 
being a principle is not a property of certain judgments; it is people who 
regard certain things as matters of principle, who adopt certain principles 
or behave according to principles. Consequently the term ‘moral prin-
ciple’ should be used with caution as a term in philosophical analysis. I 
considered two patterns of behaving according to principles out of the 
many because I thought that perhaps these two may have had some infl u-
ence on some of the contemporary analyses of our moral language and 
reasoning.
At the beginning of this chapter I said that perhaps I could not object 
to anyone giving as an example of moral principles ‘lying is wrong.’ I am 
not concerned about terminology but I am concerned about the diff er-
ence between the judgment ‘lying is wrong’ and somebody’s not lying on 
principle. One could of course make a principle about lying and could 
decide never to tell a lie under any circumstances, not even in order to 
save a man’s life, but this is diff erent from making the judgment that ly-
ing is wrong. If we ever justify our not doing something by reference to 
such a judg ment as ‘lying is wrong’ we are not appealing to a prin ciple. 
(In fact, for a reason that we shall see on page 90, namely that the word 
‘wrong’ functions here only as a reminder, it is enough to say ‘but this 
is a lie.’)
2. Situations and moral notions
Until we can see why I want to call judgments like ‘lying is wrong’ as 
well as judgments like ‘it is you who should stay with your mother and 
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your brother should join the Resistance movement’2 moral judgments, 
we shall temporarily refer to the fi rst type of judgment as ‘moral princi-
ples’ in inverted commas. Th ere seems to be a diff erence between the two 
types of judgments that may invite one to call the fi rst ‘moral principles,’ 
and while we discuss this diff erence we might as well use this inverted 
commas device.
Th ere are few such ‘moral principles,’ at least fewer than one might 
expect. Th eir form is ‘X is right (or wrong)’ or ‘X ought (or ought not) 
to be done’ and their number is restricted by the number of terms we 
can substitute for ‘X.’ Of course we can judge an unlimited number of 
actions right or wrong if we state or indicate the relevant facts of the 
situations in which they are performed. Without that the act may or 
may not be right. What we mean by saying that the act may or may not 
be right is that its rightness or wrongness depends on the relevant facts 
of the situation in which it is performed. We may recall here our brief 
reference to Aristotle’s theory of the mean in the previous chapter. Our 
feelings and acts can be right or wrong; to have them or perform them 
‘at the right times on the right occasions towards the right people for the 
right motive and in the right way . . . is what characterizes goodness.’ 
But if for ‘X’ in the above forms we substitute not only a verb or verbal 
noun specifying an act but also terms specifying some of the relevant 
facts of the situation in which the act is performed then our judgment 
will not look like a ‘moral principle’ but more like my example ‘it is you 
who should stay with your mother. . . .’ (I referred to the Resistance 
movement to indicate at least the type of situation in which the choice 
is made and the references to ‘you’ and ‘brother’ far from making the 
judgment applicable only to two particular individuals at least indicates 
that there must be some extra facts in the situation which are reasons 
for this choice.)
If someone were to ask whether it is right or wrong to utter certain 
sounds our immediate reaction would be to say ‘it depends.’ It depends 
on what human act the uttering of sounds amounts to and for what rea-
son and in what situation that act is performed. ‘Uttering sounds’ in itself 
2. Th e example is based roughly on a case discussed by Jean-Paul Sartre in his 
1946 lecture ‘Existentialism is a Humanism.’ In Sartre’s story there is only 
one son, who is deciding between staying with his mother and joining the 
Resistance.
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is neither right nor wrong. What we mean by ‘in itself ’ is that without 
that additional information we are not able to judge it right or wrong. 
Suppose someone were to begin to give the additional information by 
putting the question this way: ‘Is it right or wrong to utter certain sounds 
when the sounds are uttered according to certain rules and conventions 
that exist in a society . . . ?’ In fact we have one word for uttering sounds 
with these qualifi cations, we do not need to state the movement and then 
add all these qualifi cations; we have the verb ‘saying (something).’ All this 
extra information is still not enough, we should still say ‘it depends’ if we 
are asked whether it is right or wrong to say something. Th e question ‘Is 
it right or wrong to say what is not the case?’ gives us more information 
but even this is not enough. We are told neither the intention in nor the 
consequences of saying what is not the case. So as a next step we might be 
asked ‘Is it right or wrong to say what is not the case with the intention of 
setting a problem in a tutorial class?’ and this additional information may 
enable us to answer the question. Th ere is no single word with which we 
can state that someone says what is not the case with this intention. But 
there is a single word to state that someone says what is not the case with 
the intention to deceive: we use the word ‘lying.’ Th e diff erence then 
between ‘Is it wrong to say what is not the case?’ and ‘Is lying wrong?’ is 
that the second question does give us that additional information with-
out which we could not answer the fi rst question. One could answer the 
fi rst question by saying that it is not always wrong. What we mean by 
this is that we could give examples of saying what is not the case when it 
is right and other examples when it is wrong. Th e diff erence between the 
two sets of examples is that we would give diff erent additional facts, we 
would describe diff erent situations. Instances of saying what is not the 
case with the intention to deceive would be among the second group of 
examples. Th e word ‘lying’ as it were carves out for us these instances for 
special recognition.
Someone could object now that not only is saying what is not the case 
only sometimes wrong but also lying is only sometimes wrong. Without 
committing ourselves to a moral view let us consider the logic of this 
problem. According to this objection we can fi nd examples of saying 
what is not the case with the intention to deceive when it is wrong and 
other examples when it is right. But now we do not need to give new ad-
ditional facts in both cases. Enough has been said already by saying that 
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the intention was to deceive, to judge it to be wrong, but this may not 
be the full story. If we can provide just one example when saying what 
is not the case with the intention to deceive is not wrong, it is enough 
to defeat the claim that lying is always wrong, but this would leave all 
other instances of lying still wrong. Th e objector might bring up the 
usual example of the maniac who is looking for his intended victim. 
His intended victim is hiding in the house but we tell the maniac that 
we just saw him disappear around the corner. Problems like this are 
sometimes represented in terms of ‘confl ict of principles’; we have the 
principle ‘lying is wrong’ and also ‘lives ought to be saved.’ Let us sup-
pose now however that we had a single term by the help of which we 
can state that a life is being saved by means of a deceit. Other instances 
of this act could be to dress the intended victim as an old woman or to 
put a wardrobe in front of the door where he is hiding. We might call 
these instances of ‘savingdeceit,’ and instances of savingdeceit are not 
instances of lying. We could apply our test of asking what one would do 
instead of an act of savingdeceit. One might try to ring the police or bolt 
the doors or frighten the maniac with a gun. If we have not got a gun 
to make the maniac go away we might think of another tool that can 
achieve the same end, we could use language. One way of making the 
maniac go away is by means of savingdeceit. In some cases the material 
elements of the notion of lying and that of savingdeceit may coincide 
but they amount to diff erent acts.
To envisage such a change in our language is not a far-fetched fancy. 
Let me make an analogy: threat is to promise as savingdeceit is to lying 
in the following respect. If we did not have the term ‘threat,’ as we now 
have not got the term ‘savingdeceit,’ then we would have to use the term 
‘promise’ to describe the action of someone who makes a threat, as now 
we have to use the term ‘lying’ to describe some acts of savingdeceit. In 
this case we could not unhesitatingly say that promises ought to be kept. 
Th ey would not have to be kept always, and again by ‘not always’ we 
mean that we can give instances of promises when they do not need to 
be or should not be kept, e.g. when I promise to hit you on the head or 
to deprive you of a legacy. Without the term ‘threat’ in our language we 
would have to make careful distinctions between diff erent kinds of prom-
ises by reference to their intentions and consequences, and after a more 
or less long description of these intentions and consequences we could 
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say ‘ . . . is right’ or ‘ . . . is wrong.’ Th ese judgments would not look like 
our ‘moral principles’; they would be moral judgments. Th e term ‘threat’ 
carves out from the fi eld of promises some that are made with certain 
intentions and have certain consequences so successfully that we do not 
even think that threats are promises. Since the term ‘threat’ covers now all 
those performances—among other performances—that someone could 
have cited as examples of promises when promises ought not to be kept, 
we can now freely say ‘promises ought to be kept.’
If the term ‘savingdeceit’ performed the same function in relation to 
‘lie’ as ‘threat’ does in relation to ‘promise’ then we would be more willing 
to say that lying is always wrong, or simply that lying is wrong. We would 
also now have a new ‘principle’: ‘savingdeceit is right (or good),’ and in 
situations where we would perform an act of savingdeceit we would no 
longer be confronted by a ‘confl ict of principles.’
Let us see now why we are inclined to call some of our moral judg-
ments ‘principles.’ Out of the many uses of the term ‘principle’ there is a 
use when by asking for the principle of something we are asking for the 
point of that thing, for its rationale or for the reason why certain things 
are made to happen the way they do. We can ask for the principles of a 
machine, of a game or of selecting candidates. Editors usually explain in 
the Preface of their Selections the principles on which they included or 
excluded certain articles in or from the volume. In giving these principles 
they give their reasons for the selection, the point of view that guided 
their classifi cation.
We should recall now from page 22 that the words ‘right,’ ‘wrong,’ 
‘good,’ ‘bad’ can be used as discrimina tors or as reminders. When a no-
tion is not formed completely from the moral point of view (e.g. ‘killing’) 
then it includes both morally right and wrong acts and in these cases the 
words ‘right,’ ‘wrong’ are used for selecting from a mixed class the types 
of acts that are diff erent from the moral point of view. When a type of act 
selected completely from the moral point of view receives its own term 
(e.g. ‘murder’) then the words ‘right,’ ‘wrong’ are used only as reminders, 
they remind us what was the point of forming such notions. I would like 
to call such notions complete notions.
Th e diff erence between moral judgments and ‘moral principles’ is that 
in the latter we have complete moral notions. Moral judgments ex hypoth-
esi do not contain complete moral notions. Th is is why we have to make 
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judgments by using the words ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ as discriminators and 
not as reminders. Th e formal element of a notion which is not complete 
does not enable us to follow a rule in such a way that only the right acts 
or only the wrong acts are mentioned in a series of examples of an act. 
Th e need for introducing a complete notion is precisely to eff ect this 
discrimin ation, as we have seen in the case of savingdeceit. Such a notion 
by virtue of its formal element enables us to follow a rule from the moral 
point of view. We can see then the sense in which a complete moral no-
tion, by virtue of its formal element provides us with a ‘principle.’ Refer-
ring to a ‘principle’ in this sense is referring either to the formal element 
of an already existing complete moral notion, or to a formal element 
which could be the formal element of such a notion, though for some 
reason the notion has not been formed.
Perhaps an analogy with the often discussed example of following a 
rule in continuing a series of numbers may help here. When I observe 
someone continuing a series of numbers I may ask on what principle he 
is continuing the series. One may say either: ‘I am giving every second 
number starting from number 2’; or one may give the principle by the 
help of a mathematical notion: ‘I am giving the series of even numbers.’ 
A moral notion can give a principle in the way in which the mathemati-
cal notion ‘even’ gave the principle. But the person is not giving the even 
numbers on principle, in the same way as the person who refers to a ‘moral 
principle’ does not behave on principle.
Th e sense in which a complete moral notion provides us with a prin-
ciple is the sense in which it enables us to say that the following two are 
examples of the same act: saying what is not the case in order to bring 
punishment on someone for an act for which he is not responsible, and 
saying what is not the case in order to gain a benefi t to which I am not 
entitled; but on the other hand saying what is not the case in order to 
save the life of an innocent from a maniac is not an example of the same 
act.
Obviously this sort of ‘principle’ cannot be used as a major premiss in 
a deductive argument. Without this ‘principle’ we would not be able to 
recognize what the act is which should be stated in the ‘minor premiss.’ 
But once we know what is the morally relevant descrip tion of our act we 
do not need a major premiss to come to a conclusion.
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3. Th e importance and validity of moral principles
We have seen in the fi rst two chapters that moral notions do not refl ect 
the needs, wants, aspirations or ideals of any one person or a group of 
individuals, but those of anyone. Th is is so not because we happen to be 
such nice people that we formulate our notions from the point of view of 
anyone, but because our language is public. To presume that our notions 
refl ect anyone’s views because we are such people, or because we are fair, 
is to presume that our language is a private language which is turned by 
our benevolence into a public language. But the very notion of fairness is 
a notion that can exist only in our public language.
Th is claim does not eliminate personal decisions from our moral life, it 
only puts them into their proper place. Indeed, without a personal deci-
sion one’s act is not a moral act. But our moral life cannot be based on 
decisions, nor our moral philosophy on the concept of decision. Without 
our moral notions there would be nothing to make decisions about; there 
would not even be a need to make decisions.
When we have to decide whether we should tell a lie in order to save 
someone’s life, we would not be confronted by a need for a decision 
unless we knew that lying was wrong and that we have to save people’s 
lives. Without these principles (and now that I have made clear that by 
‘moral principle’ I mean a special type of moral judgment we can discard 
the inverted commas) there would be nothing to make a decision about, 
there would not be a need for a decision, we would not even be in a situ-
ation. It is only by the help of moral principles or other moral judgments, 
or at least by the help of complete or incomplete moral notions that an 
existentialist can produce his examples of extraordinary situations where 
no principle can help the moral agent to make his decision. What these 
extraordinary examples show is only that we have not got a single term 
to sum up the whole situation in which one ought to do one thing rather 
than another. We need a whole novel to state all the relevant facts.
Th e plot of such a novel could run roughly like this. Georges is con-
demned to death by due process of law, and Philippe, the executioner, 
alone knows that Georges is innocent. But Philippe also knows that 
Georges works for the Gestapo and is very near to discovering who are 
the leaders of the local Resistance. We do not need to complicate the plot 
further; our existentialist could say that since there is no principle on 
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which Philippe could act, he would have to make his own decision. But 
why would he have to make a decision at all? Would he have to make a 
decision at all unless he were convinced that murder is wrong? Without 
accepting the validity of moral principles or the force of moral notions 
he would not be in a complex situation. One could say that he would not 
be in a situation at all. He would merely be in an excellent position to 
dispose of a Gestapo agent.
One of the relevant facts incorporated in the notion of murder is that 
the murderer has no legal right to take life. Our executioner has such a le-
gal right technically. But is he murdering all the same if he knows that the 
person so condemned is innocent? His problem and decision is meaning-
ful only within our conceptual framework, which framework is not the 
result of his decision. Again, when he knows the man to be innocent of 
one crime but not of another he not only makes his decision by the help 
of our moral notions such as ‘innocence,’ but he has to make a decision 
because of the force of these notions. Without the appropriateness of one 
or another description providing him with reasons for doing one thing 
rather than another he would not have to make a decision.
Let us suppose that earlier in the story Philippe was waiting in am-
bush for Georges who, dressed as an innocent looking farmer, was look-
ing for the hideout of the Resistance. He never came into the range of 
the ambush. But had he done so it would have been quite irrelevant 
for Philippe’s decision to know that Georges was at the same time in-
nocent of something else that he was accused of. So now in his role as 
an executioner he might be considering whether his act would amount 
to the same as his ambush would have amounted to. But we do not have 
to make the decision for him. Our aim was to show that examples of 
extraordinary situations can be produced only by the help of moral no-
tions and both the predicament and the decision are intelligible only in 
terms of these notions. Th e validity of our moral principles and other 
moral judgments cannot be denied in these extraordinary situations be-
cause without their validity the situations would not be extraordinary. 
Th ese examples are only more complex versions of the sort of problem 
we considered when we coined the term ‘savingdeceit.’ What these ex-
amples show is only what we have seen already, that there can be com-
plex situations the relevant facts of which are not grouped together into 
one notion. But there is no logical reason why this could not happen. 
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Perhaps the title of the novel could serve as a term corresponding to 
such a new notion. Even if it were unlikely that another example of the 
same situation with the same material elements would come about in 
the course of history there could be examples of the same situation with 
diff erent material elements. In the present case another such example 
could be something like this. A civil servant’s task happens to be to send 
out notices to people who have been selected for an extended overseas 
service. He observes that someone’s name was selected by mistake. He 
knows however that this person is engaged in an elaborate scheme to 
wreck someone’s marriage and nothing but his removal from the coun-
try could save that marriage.
Th is also illustrates the fact that moral reasoning is not deductive but 
analogical. Only if it were deduct ive should we worry about cases where 
there is no prin ciple by the help of which we could deduce what to do 
in such and such a situation. By analogical reasoning I do not mean that 
we have certain paradigm cases that we know to be good or right, and 
then by analogy we work out what to do in similar cases. Th is is the view 
I criticized at the end of the fi rst chapter when I mentioned the mistake 
in Th omson’s translation of Aristotle’s theory of analogy. I pointed out 
there that far from knowing the meaning of ‘good’ already, we are trying 
to elucidate what it is. When we are looking for a formal element we are 
looking for that which alone is common to a variety of things or actions. 
Th is common element we are looking for is not one of the empirical simi-
larities but that which brings a variety of things together as examples of 
the same thing. Th ings, happenings and situations diff er from and resem-
ble each other in many ways; what we regard as the same depends on the 
formal element of our notions. But sometimes the appropriate formal el-
ement is precisely what we are looking for. We can direct our attention to 
the appropriate formal element by trying to consider what we would or 
would not regard as instances of the same something. By trying to think 
of another instance of a situation that would be the same we are trying 
to think what makes the situation to be what it is. In the extraordinary 
situations our predicament is exactly this: we have no principle to help 
us because our situation has not been brought under a formal element 
which could enable us to form a notion of what it is. Without a notion 
and a term corresponding to it in our language we cannot formulate a 
principle. Looking for a principle is looking for a formal element.
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It could be objected now that I am contradicting my earlier important 
claim that we can think of another example of the same thing only by 
the help of a formal element. Now I seem to be saying that we can fi nd 
a new formal element by trying to think what other instances would be 
examples of the same thing. I am not saying, however, that fi rst we fi nd 
other instances of the same thing which will then enable us to discover 
the formal element; but only that the process of fi nding the formal ele-
ment is the process of fi nding what would or would not be instances of 
the same thing.
Furthermore, we have seen in connection with the hierarchy of formal 
and material elements that some of the material elements of a notion 
(N1) are already organized into further formal and material elements (n2) 
while others are not (nx). So we may come across situations where the 
material elements are not organized into a notion (nx) compared to other 
situations (n2), but at the same time there exists a higher order notion 
(N1) which may help to fi nd a new notion, may help to turn nx into one 
of the n2s. We were able to make our new notion of misticket plausible 
only because of the existence of the notion of mistake. Or, under the no-
tion of vice we may fi nd murder, cruelty, etc., but these are not the only 
ways of being vicious. When we are in a situation that does not come 
under the notion of murder, cruelty or any other of these notions, we 
might think that our situation is without a formal element, when in fact 
it comes under the formal element of viciousness. So in a new situation 
(x) we are helped by a formal element in trying to fi nd other instances of 
x: we are looking for that common element which would be common to 
our new notion (nx) and to murder, cruelty, etc.
It is evident that in extraordinary situations we must possess a higher 
order moral notion. Without that it would not be an extraordinary moral 
situation. From other points of view, other than the moral point of view, 
our situation may be the same as straight forward moral situations, or 
two situations that are the same from the moral point of view may not 
be the same from other points of view. We are in an extra ordinary moral 
situation precisely because we have found a new fact which is relevant to 
the rightness or wrongness of what we are about to do. Th is, along with 
the higher formal element enables us to look for other instances of the 
same situation.
Our present problem then diff ers from Aristotle’s example of analogical 
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reasoning in two related respects. For one thing, when we are looking for 
a new moral notion we have already got a higher formal element that 
helps us in our search, or at least we have already got the highest notion 
in this fi eld, the notion of right (or wrong). Th is must be so ex hypothesi 
because unless we viewed the situation from a moral point of view we 
would not have a problem. Secondly, since it is this higher order notion 
which makes a situation diff erent from others, we must be in possession 
of two sets of relevant facts, the facts that make a situation diff erent, and 
those that would make it standard, from the moral point of view.
If we were to think of a case when someone would have to leave his 
mother to join the Resistance, we would have to discern whether it is a 
case of leaving, forsaking, abandoning or deserting a mother. Which of 
these descriptions is the correct one depends on the relevant facts of the 
situation. If we fi nd that none of these or any other available descriptions 
are appropriate, it is only because we have found some new relevant facts 
that would make all available descriptions inappropriate. But these new 
facts must be the sort or type that would be relevant for deciding between 
possible alternative descriptions. So the facts that would make a situa-
tion allegedly ‘unique’ are the sort of facts that are relevant for deciding 
whether a situation should or should not come under a certain descrip-
tion, that is, they do not make a situation logically unique.
A new moral situation could never be referred to by a proper name. 
If we used the title of a novel as a term to refer to a moral situation that 
title would not function as a proper name but as an expression indicating 
what made the situation in the novel to be what it is, that is, indicating 
its formal element. By being able to think of another Munich we are able 
to recognize what made Munich what it was, but in this case ‘Munich’ 
is not the name of a city or even the name of a situation. What in fact 
happened at Munich was but one example of a ‘Munich.’ In time it may 
turn out to be not even the best example.3
Th e human activities that make it necessary for us to coin proper 
names make certain characteristics of people, places and events relevant 
3. Other dramatic events in Munich, such as the Black September attack of 
1972, might make this reference obscure though it would have been quite 
clear when Moral Notions was fi rst published. A Munich is a misjudged or 
dishonourable appeasement, the term coming from the Munich Agreement 
of 1938 in which the Sudetenland was ceded to Germany.
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for calling them by this or that proper name. But these are not the sort of 
facts that can be relevant for distinguishing a situation as morally diff er-
ent from others. Th e facts that can make a situation morally diff erent are 
the sort that can bring a situation under some or other morally relevant 
description, or, which is the same, they are facts that can make it impos-
sible to describe a situation by the available terms, and necessitate the 
coining of others. In this latter case, ex hypothesi we need a new moral no-
tion, not a new proper name. Th ere is a diff erence between introducing 
another Herr Quisling at a party and thinking of another Quisling.4
Nevertheless, if we ask a moral agent after he has made a decision in 
a complex situation whether he thinks that anyone else ought to do the 
same, we would not be asking the empirical question whether he could 
visualize another situation like his or whether a situation like his would 
ever occur again. We would be asking a question about the logic of his 
decision. We would be asking whether he made the decision because of 
his being what he is or because of the relevant facts of the situation. If he 
said yes, he thought that anyone else ought to do the same in that situ-
ation, he would be affi  rming that he based his decision on the relevant 
facts of the situation. His answer would not be about anybody else, let 
alone about all people, but about the dependence of his decision on the 
relevant facts of the situation. Th is is why anybody else in that situation 
ought to do the same.
Another person, however, by his presence could make a diff erence to 
the situation itself. Situations are not out there in the world, existing 
independently of us, so that human beings could just step in and out of 
them. Situations are not like puddles that we can step in and out of; to be 
in a situation is to be related to other human beings in a certain way.
An analysis of the notion of ‘situation,’ which, along with other simi-
lar notions like ‘predicament,’ is already to some extent a moral notion, 
would be of primary importance for a moral philosophy on a more ambi-
tious scale than this study. Here let us only recall again that the subject 
matter of morals is the human beings who live that moral life, that is, 
who are related to each other in the relevant manner. Moral notions do 
4. A Quisling is a traitor. Th e term derives from the name of Major Vidkun 
Quisling, a Norwegian offi  cer and diplomatist who collaborated with the 
Germans during the occupation of Norway in World War II.
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not evaluate the world of description but describe the world of evalua-
tion. As Hume observed in a way, ‘“ought” expresses a new relationship.’ 
When we turn our refl ection to the relationships that exist between hu-
man beings, we turn our refl ection to the area where we fi nd moral no-
tions. But not all human relations are relevant for our moral notions. 
Terms like ‘situation’ and ‘predicament’ carve out some of the relevant 
relationships. Th ere is some circularity in saying that our obligations de-
pend on the relevant facts of the situation, but this is all the more reason 
for the analysis of the notion of ‘situation’ for it would shed light on the 
notion of ‘obligation’ and on the sort of facts that are relevant for our 
obligations. (One should investigate for instance why one was inclined 
to say that if Philippe, the executioner, did not believe that murder was 
wrong, he would not have been in a situation but in a position, in a posi-
tion to dispose of a Gestapo agent.)
It could happen that certain relationships exist between one son and 
his mother that do not exist between his brother and his mother, rela-
tionships that would be relevant for anyone who has to decide whether to 
leave his mother or not. It could happen that these relationships would 
constitute the facts that would make him to be in a situation at all. So 
the moral judgment I cited at the beginning of this chapter, namely: ‘it is 
you who should stay with your mother, and your brother should join the 
Resistance’ is not a particular judgment applicable to one person only. 
It is a moral judgment because anyone else in the same situation ought 
to do the same, that is, because the obligation depends on the relevant 
facts of the situation, and for this reason we can tell some one ‘it is you 
who ought to stay with your mother and your brother should join the 
Resistance.’ Th e only diff erence between this moral judgment and what 
we may regard as moral principles is that there is no term in our language 
that sums up the situation in which he is.
4. ‘Always good’ and the ‘highest good’
Earlier in this chapter when we reconstructed the notion of a lie we ob-
served that until we were given all the relevant facts we were not able to 
judge the act of saying something, or even the act of saying some thing 
false, to be always right (or wrong) but only sometimes right (or wrong). 
A case when we can judge an act to be sometimes right is the corollary of 
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our Argument A, according to which there must be a relevant diff erence 
between two sets of instances of the same thing if one set is good and the 
other is not. If these relevant facts are unspecifi ed then we are not entitled 
to judge the thing good or bad, or the act right or wrong; we should say 
‘it depends’; that is, the rightness or wrongness of the act depends on 
those further specifi cations.
By taking away from the instances of lying those that we came to call 
instances of savingdeceit, that is, by further specifying the relevant facts, 
we made lying always wrong. If these further relevant facts entitle us to 
say that saying what is not the case with those facts present is wrong, then 
in another case with the same specifi cations, saying what is not the case is 
wrong. Th is is what we express by asserting that lying is always wrong. If 
we still think that lying is not always wrong and wish to make it so, then 
we have to add still further similar specifi cations to the notion of lying 
until it would be absolutely always wrong. But we have not made lying 
any worse than it was before, nor would an act of lying be any better if in 
the absence of these refi nements of language we could only say that lying 
was sometimes wrong.
Let us say that a, b, c, d, are instances of an act X. If a and b are good 
while c and d are bad we can say that X is sometimes good. If by the help 
of two new terms we separated the fi rst two by calling them Z while we 
call the second two Y, then we could say that Z is always good. But just 
because Z is always good, if we did Z we would not be performing a 
better act than if we did X when it was good to do it, for in both cases 
we would be doing a or b. Nor would we be any less culpable of doing 
either c or d if we did them under the description of X just because X is 
sometimes good.
Th e activity of moral evaluation is carried out when one considers and 
decides whether this or that fact is relevant to making a particular act 
right or wrong. When we ask by the help of a term describing an act 
whether the act that falls under that description is right or wrong our 
question is more of a theoretical kind. We are asking a question about the 
way in which the term specifi es the act, whether it specifi es the act from 
the moral point of view and if so to what extent. Th is is why judgments 
like ‘x is always (or sometimes) good’ do not further evaluate the act but 
say something about the logical features of our term.
To some extent these judgments are like saying that not all marbles in 
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a bag are white. One black marble in a bag of white marbles is enough to 
defeat the claim that all marbles in the bag are white. Let us not be dis-
tracted by the fact that in one case we are concerned with morally good 
and bad acts and in this case with black and white marbles. Deciding 
whether an animal is carnivorous or not is a diff erent activity from decid-
ing whether an animal is dangerous or not. But the judgments ‘not all 
animals are carnivorous’ and ‘not all animals are dangerous’ have similar 
logical features. Th at judgments like ‘x is not always wrong’ do not seem 
to belong to this class may partly be due to a grammatical diff erence. Hu-
man acts are not identifi able particulars in the way in which animals and 
marbles are, so instead of ‘all (or some) instances of . . .’ or ‘all (or some) 
members of the class of . . .’ we more naturally employ the phrases ‘always 
. . .’ or ‘sometimes . . . .’
Th ese judgments are not distributive; from ‘not all marbles are white’ 
we cannot infer that each marble is not all white, but spotted. From ‘ly-
ing is not always wrong’ we cannot infer that there is a bit of merit in 
each act of lying, or that there is some uncertainty about the rightness 
or wrongness of each lie. Further, the fact that not all marbles in our bag 
are white does not prevent us from fi nding in it a marble which is much 
whiter than any of the marbles we may fi nd in a bag in which all marbles 
are white. An act of saying something that is not the case with the inten-
tion to deceive, when it is good—if for instance it saves your brother 
from a maniac—may be much better than an act which is always good, 
like consoling a distressed child.
Let us see now the diff erence between our marble example and exam-
ples involving moral notions. We can enable ourselves to say that all mar-
bles in the bag are white by picking out the black marbles from the bag. 
But we cannot remove bad acts from a certain fi eld or area in a similar 
way. We have to make a change in our terms to ‘remove’ bad acts from 
an ‘area’ in order to enable ourselves to make judgments like ‘x is always 
good.’ Beside the term ‘marble’ we also have a bag containing the mar-
bles, but in the case of moral terms the terms themselves function like the 
bags. (I am making the contrast now within this particular example; I am 
not claiming that only moral terms function like this.) Terms function 
like bags in the manner in which terms can so function, that is, not by 
physical but by logical means. When terms function like bags then the 
connection between the ‘bag’ and what it contains is not a contingent 
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and empirical but a logical and conceptual relationship. So when x is a 
moral term, the judgment ‘x is always (or sometimes) good’ tells us about 
the logical and conceptual features of the term x; it tells us whether the 
term specifi es an act from the moral point of view and to what extent it 
does this. When the term is a complete term, complete from the moral 
point of view, then ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ function like reminders, they sig-
nify that our term has been formed from the moral point of view. When 
our term is incomplete, or open to further specifi cations from the moral 
point of view, then we use ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ to discriminate and distin-
guish from the moral point of view between diff erent instances of the act 
referred to by the incomplete term.
Towards the end of this chapter I shall argue that we do not fi nd a 
highest good by fi nding that which is always good. In preparation for 
that I have to make now another obvious contrast.
Th ere must be something wrong with a particular thing if it is only 
sometimes good. In some cases, as in the case of a watch, the thing 
would not be good at all, while in other cases it is not as good as if it 
were always good. When a particular thing is always good it usually pos-
sesses some special qualities for which we prefer it. A car which is always 
good, in other words, a reliable car, is so well constructed and is made of 
such materials that it never lets us down. Th is is the case when we talk 
about particular things. We have seen that in the case of human acts, 
that which is always good is not better than that which is only some-
times good. It is not that I am contrasting particular things with classes 
of acts instead of particular acts. Th e point is that we simply cannot even 
talk about particular, individual acts being sometimes or always right or 
good. Th is category of evaluation is not relevant for moral evaluation. 
Only when we evaluate things from the point of view of their service 
to us, and when these are durable things or ‘goods’ is it relevant to ask 
questions like ‘how well do they serve us?,’ ‘do they let us down?,’ ‘are 
they dependable?’
To make a particular thing which is sometimes good into one which is 
always good we have to use a screw driver or some other means in order 
to eff ect changes in it. To make an act which is sometimes good into one 
which is always good we do not exert some special eff ort in the perform-
ance of the act to make it better; instead, we have to specify the circum-
stances under which the act would be good, or provide the relevant facts 
Moral Notions and Moral Judgments
91
that were missing from the description and without which we could not 
judge it to be always good.
It may be objected that we can never succeed in suffi  ciently specify-
ing the intentions, results, circumstances and other relevant facts and 
incorporate them in one term so that using that term we could say that 
x is always right or wrong. But the task is not as hopeless as it may seem. 
Although there may be innumerable facts that one could mention in 
connec tion with anything, there are not innumerable relevant facts. To 
begin with, as we have already noticed, only those facts are in the running 
for being relevant that can make a diff erence to a situation. After this 
pre selection similar other large scale eliminations reduce the number of 
relevant facts. Diff erent types of situ ations automatically eliminate whole 
groups or types of facts as irrelevant. We are not confronted with an 
indefi nite number of facts but with types or categories of facts and the 
number of these types or categories is limited. We have just observed, for 
instance, that the category of evaluation which evaluates durable things 
from the point of view of their reliability is altogether irrelevant for the 
moral evaluation of human acts. In this way whole areas of facts can be 
ignored altogether. Furthermore, a specifi cation within one area or cat-
egory can look after all the possible facts within that area. For instance, if 
our problem is the question of the rightness or wrongness of some form 
of discrimination, the area from which facts can be cited as relevant is the 
area of the various reasons for which someone would distinguish between 
human beings, and within this area only those distinctions that would 
result in diff erent treatments or attitudes. Within this limited fi eld we 
can specify the cases when someone does not even consider or weigh up 
his reasons for treating human beings diff erently but makes up his mind 
on grounds other than reasons. In fact we have a term, ‘prejudice,’ to re-
fer to discrimination with these specifi cations. Since the only fi eld from 
which facts could be cited as relevant for saying that some cases of dis-
crimination are right is the fi eld of one’s reasons for discrimination, and 
this whole fi eld was eliminated by one move, we can say that prejudice 
is always wrong. It is possible then to create watertight terms that can be 
used in judgments like ‘x is always wrong (or right).’
As against such complete terms, open terms do not say anything about 
the relevant facts in certain fi elds. For instance, the notion of lying, un-
like a complete notion such as bearing false witness, does not include 
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anything about the purpose of deceiving. Consequently, the presence of 
certain facts from this fi eld has nothing to do with the proper use of the 
term ‘lying.’ If we bring up a relevant fact from this fi eld we can still 
say that the act we are performing is an act of lying, but there are more 
relevant facts that have to be considered. On the other hand, since a 
complete term specifi es something about the relevant facts in all the pos-
sible fi elds, a new relevant fact will aff ect the proper use of the term itself. 
Or rather, in the case of the complete terms the only relevant facts are 
those that will aff ect the proper use of the term. In the case of prejudice, 
for instance, the only possible relevant fact that one could bring up in 
order to justify one’s conduct would be good grounds for treating people 
diff erently in a certain case, but then we can no longer call this a case of 
prejudice. Th is is why it is possible to say ‘this is an act of lying but go 
ahead and do it,’ but one cannot say ‘this is prejudice but go ahead and 
maintain it.’ If we had the term ‘savingdeceit’ in the way I envisaged, 
then the notion of a lie would include some reference to the purpose of 
deceiving someone. Deceiving someone for certain reasons would not be 
called lying but engaging in savingdeceit. In this case ‘lie’ would function 
as a complete term like ‘prejudice,’ that is, we could no longer say: ‘this is 
an act of lying but go ahead and do it.’
Since judgments like ‘x is sometimes right’ are not distributive, an ex-
ample of a lie which is justifi ed by reference to further relevant facts does 
not invalidate the claim that lying is wrong when it is wrong. We have 
to distinguish however between open moral notions and non-moral no-
tions of human acts. A human act specifi ed by a non-moral notion can 
be right or wrong depending on further facts just as acts specifi ed by an 
open moral notion. But in the case of non-moral notions we have to 
bring additional facts to make the act either right or wrong. In the case 
of a notion like lying we do not need to bring more facts to make the act 
wrong. An act is wrong in so far as it is an act of lying. But saying what is 
not the case, which is a non-moral specifi cation of an act, is neither right 
nor wrong in so far as it is just saying what is not the case. To make this 
act either right or wrong we have to add further specifi cations. So moral 
notions also act like challenges. If a term which is formed from the point 
of view of the wrongness of an act is relevant for the description of our 
act, then if it is an open term, it challenges us to bring more relevant facts 
to justify our act, and if it is a complete term, it challenges us to bring 
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more relevant facts that would make the term not applicable to our act. 
In the absence of such further relevant facts our act would be wrong ir-
respective of whether it is an open or a complete term which is the correct 
description of the act.
One can even go on to say that an act of saving deceit in so far as it is an 
act of lying is still wrong. But we do not claim more by saying this than if 
we claimed that an act of lying in so far as it is saying what is not the case 
is neutral. We cannot say, however, that an act of lying is no more than 
just saying what is not the case, nor that savingdeceit is no more than 
just a lie. To condemn savingdeceit by saying that it is no more than a lie 
would be just as much conceptual reductionism as to condone lying by 
asserting that it is no more than saying what is not the case.
We cannot reduce an act to one of its material elements, we cannot say 
of an act that it is nothing but one or any of its material elements. But 
neither should we regard the material elements as means to an end. Saying 
what is not the case with the intention to deceive is one of the material 
elements of savingdeceit. Th e relationship between formal and material 
elements looks like the relationship between ends and means but it should 
be distinguished from it, and so kept apart from the vexed problems that 
the question ‘Does the end justify the means?’ raises. In the sense in which 
the relationship between formal and material elements looks like a rela-
tionship of ends and means all human acts exhibit this relationship. Th ere 
cannot be just a formal element existing by itself: when I perform an act I 
have to do something, I have to use one of the material elements to bring 
about the act. If I want to be kind, I have to do something that amounts to 
an act of kindness. So, in my example of savingdeceit I was not advocating 
the view that the end may justify the means.
It may be thought that another, more serious, moral consequence may 
be implied by some of my views. It may be assumed that according to 
my views we can simply redescribe our acts according to our inclinations. 
Furthermore, since the proper analysis of an act implies the notion of 
intentionality and since the agent himself can claim to know his inten-
tion in a way that nobody else can, the agent can be the fi nal arbiter as 
to what he is doing.
A proper treatment of these problems would take us far outside the 
scope of this study and especially into fi elds of philosophical psychol-
ogy where most of the work is still going on. While I am aware of the 
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com plexity of these problems, the above moral implications are serious 
enough to call for a few brief comments to dissociate my views from these 
implications.
At the beginning of section 3 of this chapter, I repeated an important 
theme of this study by saying that moral notions do not refl ect the needs, 
wants, aspirations or ideals of any one person or group of individuals, but 
those of anyone, and then I went on to say that this does not eliminate 
personal decisions from our moral life. But when we make decisions we 
have to make them in terms of, or within the framework of, our moral 
notions.
A similar distinction should be made with regard to intentions. A 
proper analysis of a human act must involve reference to intentionality: 
without it we cannot give a proper description of what we are doing. 
But this intentionality which is built into our moral notions and which 
makes a diff erence to the proper description of an act is not the intention 
of any one person performing an act. When we intend to do something, 
or mean to do something, we can intend to do only what is describable 
by terms that embody references to intentionality, or, if there is no avail-
able term, we can intend to do something only if we know how our act 
would signifi cantly diff er from an act which is describable by our avail-
able terms. Our acts are intelligible to others as well as to ourselves only 
if what we intend to do is publicly describable in terms the proper uses of 
which are governed by interpersonal rules.
Th e appropriateness of diff erent descriptions cannot depend on my 
personal intention if I can intend only within our conceptual framework. 
We must therefore distinguish between the generic intentionality which 
is built into our terms and without which we cannot give a proper analy-
sis of human acts, and what we may call personal intentions which are 
expressed in avowals like ‘I meant to do such and such’ or ‘my inten-
tion was such and such.’ So far this distinction is similar to the one we 
observed between decisions that are built into our terms and personal 
decisions that are intelligible only within the framework of these terms. 
But personal intentions, unlike personal decisions, are not only separated 
from but connected to the proper description of our acts. Th e proper de-
scription of an act depends on the relevant facts of the situation, and the 
agent’s intention can feature among the relevant facts. But in so far as the 
agent’s intention can feature among the relevant facts it must be publicly 
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knowable or accessible, either through the agent’s avowal, or through the 
pattern of his behaviour which makes his act intelligible and meaningful 
for us. For the agent himself, his intention must become the object of 
his refl ection to form part of his assess ment of what he is doing. When 
an appeal to a personal intention does succeed in changing the proper 
descrip tion of an act it succeeds by virtue of interpersonal rules that gov-
ern these procedures, and not by virtue of the fact that the agent knows 
what he intends to do in a way that nobody else can know it. Even if we 
could never be mistaken as to our own intentions, we can be mistaken as 
to the proper description of our act.
All this raises such complex problems that to say a little about them 
may be worse than to say nothing, and I referred to these problems only to 
indicate that my views do not imply that in our moral life we can get away 
with almost anything by redescribing our acts. Th ese problems raise ques-
tions not only in the fi eld of philosophical psychology but also in what is 
more specifi cally the fi eld of moral philosophy. Although our avowals of 
personal intentions do not always succeed in changing the proper descrip-
tion of our act, they may succeed in excusing ourselves and sometimes 
in justifying ourselves. Th is problem would lead us to the analysis of the 
notion of responsibility, of the occasions on which we can say ‘you should 
have known better,’ and this would raise the question why it seems to be 
the case that one of our fundamental obligations is to consider all the rel-
evant facts, or rather, to consider what facts can be relevant.
We must sharply distinguish these questions from the case of the well-
meaning person with good intentions. Sometimes someone may be so 
radically unsuccessful in doing what he ought to have done that the only 
thing left for us to say is that his intentions were sincere or that he had 
good intentions. Th is seems to me to be quite a diff erent sense of ‘inten-
tion’ from those we were considering. Intending to do what is good is 
very diff erent from having good intentions. We cannot intend to do what 
is good without intending to consider all the relevant facts, but we can 
have good intentions and be quite irresponsible.
After this digression, which was for the sake of repudiating some pos-
sible implications of my views, let us now return to some further points 
about our moral notions.
Some theories of ethics claim that we justify our acts by reference to 
intentions, while others claim that we justify them by reference to conse-
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quences. In assessing the confl icting claims of these theories it is impor-
tant to remember that diff erent terms specify relevant facts in diff erent 
fi elds and leave facts in other fi elds unspecifi ed. If a term leaves the fi eld 
of consequences unspecifi ed, then what would make the act referred to 
by that term right or wrong could be the consequences of that act. But 
this is so only because the intention has already been specifi ed by the 
term. If the intention is unspecifi ed by such a term, then an act referred 
to by such term could seem to serve as an example supporting a theory 
according to which we justify our acts by reference to intentions.
Th ere can be other reasons supporting the claims of these confl icting 
theories; all I wanted to do was to point out that certain examples can 
be adduced which while they seem to support one or the other of these 
theories, do not in fact do so. Complete terms, for the same reason, 
may appear to support an intuitionist theory of ethics. An intuition-
ist would claim that neither the intentions, nor the consequences, nor 
any other additional relevant facts are needed to judge an act or state 
of aff airs right or wrong, good or bad: we just consider it in itself and 
intuit its rightness or wrong ness.5 Of course, if a term already specifi es 
all that we need to know to judge the act referred to by that term right 
or wrong, we do not need any additional relevant facts for our judg-
ment. Such an act, which is specifi ed by a complete term, can be said 
to be good in itself.
We should turn our attention now to the group of phrases: ‘good in 
itself,’ ‘good without qualifi cations’ and ‘unconditionally good.’ I have 
argued already that judgments about human acts are unlike judgments 
about particular things in that when we judge an act to be always good 
we do not judge it to be any better than an act which is sometimes good. 
But now we have another set of judgments that give the impression that 
if they are applicable to an act or to a state of aff airs, then that act or 
state of aff airs is better than those to which their opposites are applic-
able. We may get the impression that an act which is good in itself is 
better than one which is not good in itself, and that an act which is good 
without quali fi cations is better than that which is good only with certain 
5. Cf. for example Sir W. D. Ross, Th e Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1930) and H.A. Prichard, Moral Obligation: Essays and Lectures 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949). 
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qualifi cations, and that what is unconditionally good is better than what 
is not unconditionally good. Someone may go even further than saying 
that these acts are better, and claim that an act or state of aff airs which 
can be described by these terms must be the highest good or one of the 
highest goods. Indeed, if someone were to look for a highest good he 
would not settle for anything less than what can be described in these 
terms, and once he found such a thing, surely, he may think, he must 
have found the highest good. It may even be assumed that we could fi nd 
the foundations of morality this way, for that which is un conditionally 
good must surely be the condition of all other goods. Cases when we 
judge human acts good in conjunction with these phrases could be com-
pared and contrasted with cases when these judgments do express extra 
evaluation; and this would be one way of showing how these phrases 
behave when they are applied to human acts. Th is is what we did when 
we investigated the judgment ‘x is always good.’ Our present problem 
is just an elaboration of the conclusion we came to in connection with 
that judgment.
When we cannot say that an act is always good we have to add some 
more facts to the description of the act to render it always good. So when 
an act is specifi ed by a description which is incomplete from the moral 
point of view then we cannot say that it is good in itself. On the other 
hand, as I indicated when I referred to the intuitionists, an act specifi ed 
by a complete term can be said to be good in itself. It is good in itself 
because all that we need to know in order to judge it good is incorpo-
rated in the term that specifi es that act in question. Th e same is true 
about ‘good without qualifi cation’ and ‘unconditionally good.’ We have 
to give further qualifi cations to an incomplete description or specify cer-
tain conditions in order to be able to judge these acts always good. Once 
these qualifi cations and/or conditions are incorporated in a term then 
an act referred to by that term can be said to be good without qualifi ca-
tion or unconditionally good. We have seen, however, that an act which 
is describable by a complete term may not be as good as an act whose 
description requires a host of qualifi cations. So these judgments are not 
about the merits or value of our acts but about the logical features of the 
terms that we use in talking about our acts.
Because this attempt to fi nd the highest good is so simple in structure, 
we should not be misled into thinking that we will not encounter it in 
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more sophisticated theories. But if I am right in saying that the diff er-
ence between that which is always and that which is sometimes good is 
not one of degree in value but a degree of specifi cation, then we cannot 
fi nd the highest good by trying to fi nd that which is always good, and so, 
good in itself, good without qualifi cation or unconditionally good. Still 
less can we go on to make the assumption that that which is uncondition-
ally good is the condition of all other goods, or that everything receives 
its goodness from that which does not receive its goodness from anything 
else. (Th at which is sometimes good, or not good in itself, ‘receives’ its 
goodness from something else, namely, from the further specifi cation. 
But had our term incorporated that specifi cation to begin with, while 
leaving something else unspecifi ed, then the act referred to by that term 
would ‘receive’ its goodness from something else.)
At the same time, the simplicity of my argument should not make us 
think that the various systems of ethics that try to fi nd the highest good 
boil down to nothing else than the erroneous move I pointed out. Plato 
would come to one’s mind as a most obvious example of someone who 
might have argued the way I indicated, since he regarded only what is 
always good as good, just as he regarded only what is always true as true. 
And yet he was the fi rst to point out that the solution of these problems 
lies in the art of proper divisions. Th ese divisions should follow the ‘ob-
jective articulations; we are not to attempt to hack off  parts like a clumsy 
butcher’ (Phaedrus 265e, Hackforth’s translation). Th e Sophists were able 
to give the impression that the same thing is like and unlike, one and 
many, and also that the same act is both right and wrong, good and bad, 
because they did not realize that they were talking about many things 
under the same term, some of which were this sort, others of that sort. 
Th e whole of the Phaedrus, for example, is an exercise to demonstrate 
this. Plato tries to show there that two speeches describing the charac-
teristics of love came to diff erent conclusions, one to the conclusion that 
love is good, the other that love is bad, because we group together under 
one form, under the form of love, or ‘irrationality’ as it is defi ned in the 
dialogue, things that are diff erent from the point of view of good and 
bad. It is not the case that the two speeches were about diff erent things: 
they were both about love. Many diff erent things can be the same in so 
far as they are instances of love, but at the same time they may not be the 
same under diff erent formal elements. Th is is precisely what causes the 
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confusion that the same thing is both this and that, as in this case both 
good and bad. So, according to Plato, after the fi rst stage of his proce-
dure, ‘in which we bring a dispersed plurality under a single form,’ the 
second stage is ‘the reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide 
into forms, following the objective articulation,’ whatever we grouped 
together under one form.
To take example from our two recent speeches. Th e single general form 
which they postulated was irrationality; next, on the analogy of a single 
natural body with its pairs of like-named members, right arm or leg, as we 
say, and left, they conceived of madness as a single objective form existing 
in human beings. Wherefore the fi rst speech divided off  a part on the left, 
and continued to make divisions, never desisting until it discovered one 
particular part bearing the name of ‘sinister’ love, on which it very properly 
poured abuse. Th e other speech conducted us to the forms of madness 
which lay on the right-hand side, and upon discovering a type of love that 
shared its name with the other but was divine, displayed it to our view and 
extolled it as the source of the greatest goods that can befall us. (266a.)
To assume that love is both good and bad is the same sort of assump-
tion as to assume that the human arm or leg is both left and right. Not 
each arm is both left and right, some are left, some are right. But since 
they are all grouped together under a term which was not formed from 
the point of view of left and right, they can be left or right and still be 
arms. Similarly, not each instance of love is both good and bad; some 
are good, some are bad. Some, with certain specifi cations, may be very 
good indeed. In fact one is able to fi nd under the description ‘irrational 
behaviour,’ which cannot be said to be always good, behaviour which can 
be extolled ‘as the source of the greatest goods that can befall us.’
If Plato, who would come to one’s mind most readily as someone who 
might have fallen into the error of fi nding the highest good by fi nding 
that which is always good, did not make this error, then a fortiori one 
cannot assume that my argument undermines systems of ethics that are 
suspect of this error. My aim was only to bring to our attention certain 
moves that we may or may not make in the limited fi eld of moral argu-
ments that are connected with moral notions.
Aristotle, for one, did think that Plato committed this error, if he was 
referring to Plato in 1096b of the Nicomachean Ethics:
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 . . . If we are allowed to argue on these lines, we shall fi nd no diff erence 
either between the really good and the good, in so far as both are good. 
Nor will the really good be any more good by being ‘eternal.’ You might as 
well say that a white thing which lasts a long time is whiter than one which 
lasts only a day.
Although in my marble example I also used colours for comparison, 
there is a diff erence in Aristotle’s criticism. I pointed out that ‘always’ in 
the case of acts does not refer to duration but corresponds more to the 
phrase ‘all instances of’. Because ‘always’ does not refer to duration in the 
case of acts, to judge them always good is not an extra evaluation. Cer-
tainly a white thing which lasts longer is not whiter than one which lasts 
for a day. But a car which lasts longer would be better than one which 
lasts only for a day. But since we do not evaluate human acts from the 
point of view of their duration, this sort of evaluation is irrelevant for 
human acts. So to bring home the argument to the fi eld of acts, in my 
example of the marbles I asked ‘Is a marble less white if it is classifi ed with 
black marbles?’ and not ‘Is a marble less white if it lasts only for a short 
time?’ But Aristotle’s way of arguing may be more appropriate if Plato 
thought of his Forms in terms of duration.
Th ese problems are applicable not only to actions and dispositions but 
also to states of aff airs. In G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica the candidates for 
the position of the highest good, or goods, are states of aff airs and not ac-
tions. Th e problems involved however are the same. In looking for the good 
he is looking for that which is always good, he is looking for states of aff airs 
that are good in themselves in the sense that they are always and uncondi-
tionally good. He is conducting this search in terms of ‘organic wholes’ in 
such a way that the addition of various elements to an ‘organic whole’ will 
render it good in itself. Instead of adding qualifi cations to the description 
of an act he adds qualifi cations to the description of states of aff airs. I am 
referring of course to the last Chapter of Principia Ethica, though the pro-
cedure itself is described already in the second half of the fi rst Chapter.
It is interesting to note that the reason why Moore’s candidates for the 
highest goods are states of aff airs and not actions or a certain type of will 
or disposition is already due to the problem of judging something to be 
always good. Moore takes the position from the very start (Principia, pp. 
viii–ix) that actions can be judged good or bad only by reference to the 
results of the action in question, and since these judgments involve what 
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he calls ‘causal truth,’ we can never be certain of the rightness or wrong-
ness of our acts. ‘Indeed, so many diff erent considerations are relevant to 
its truth or falsehood [i.e. truth or falsehood concerning the results of the 
action], as to make the attainment of probability very diffi  cult, and the 
attainment of certainty impossible’ (p. viii). If actions are right or wrong 
in so far as they may or may not produce certain things or states of aff airs 
then obviously the candidates for what we can judge to be always good 
must come from the fi eld of things and states of aff airs. Were we to con-
struct a theory according to which things or states of aff airs are right or 
wrong in so far as they create certain dispositions in us or help us to have 
a good will or to perform good acts, then we may not be able to judge 
states of aff airs always good or good in themselves. So the reason why 
actions cannot even be candidates for the position of the highest good 
in Moore’s ethics is that the place he allocates to actions in his system 
renders it impossible to judge actions to be always right or good.
It would be foolish to attempt a closer examination of the various sys-
tems of ethics from the point of view of the method by which they arrive 
at the highest good. To do them justice would involve us in complex ar-
guments. We can fi nd however two paragraphs in Professor Paton’s com-
mentary on Kant’s Groundwork which formulate our problem briefl y. 
Th ough I am quoting Paton’s words out of their context, I quote them 
only because this is the most concise passage I know which illustrates 
how the search for the highest good is often conducted in terms of and 
by the help of the expressions I briefl y discussed.
If a good will is the only thing which is an unconditioned or absolute good 
in the sense that it must be good in every possible context, can we go on to 
assert with Kant that it must therefore be the highest good?
Th e phrase ‘highest good’ is ambiguous. It may mean merely the good 
which is itself unconditioned and is the condition of all other goods. In 
this sense ‘highest good’ and ‘absolute good’ mean precisely the same 
thing. But Kant is also making a judgment of value; for such a good is to 
be esteemed as ‘beyond comparison higher’ than any other good. Its useful-
ness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this unique and 
incomparable worth.6
6. H.J. Paton, Th e Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, 
3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1958), p. 41.
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As a natural conclusion to this chapter one cannot help making a few 
general remarks about various systems of ethics, for, as we observe, the 
logic of moral notions is central to all of them.
An intuitionist is able to intuit an obligation in a situation only if the 
situation is described by a moral term which is complete; a deductive 
system can have major premisses only if the crucial term in the major 
premiss is a complete moral term; a utilitarian can have a highest good 
only if that highest good is described by a complete term; a positivist can 
claim that words like ‘wrong’ add nothing signifi cant to our judgment if 
what we judge to be wrong is described by a complete moral term, and 
the existentialist can claim that principles are no help in one’s moral deci-
sions only if the situation is such that it cannot be described by the help 
of a complete moral term.
Th e logic of complete moral notions also explains how these systems 
succeed in their various ways in distilling all value from our ordinary life 
and language, leaving them empty of value, concentrating it into a ‘purely 
evaluative element.’ For an intuitionist like Prichard the consideration of 
facts is not a moral activity but is like any other empirical consideration: 
the moral act is the act of intuition. Th e positivists only substitute an 
expression of attitude towards, in place of an intuition about, something 
which they think can be empirically ascertained. In other systems the 
‘purely descriptive’ statement of our acts takes either the form of a minor 
premiss with which our obligation is deductively connected via a major 
premiss, or the form of a causal statement with which our obligation is 
causally connected via a highest good. Th e existentialists are no excep-
tion and provide another variation of this pattern. Th eir world is without 
values and the purely evaluative element is there in the claim that we 
create values by our decisions. We have seen that what is created in these 
situations is that formal element in the absence of which there could not 
be a complete moral term.
Th e purely evaluative element in a world in which otherwise there is 
no value reminds one of what Marx said about money. Without agree-
ing with his observa tion I quote it in order to be able to make use of it. 
‘Money is the universal, independently constituted value of all things. 
It has, therefore, deprived the whole world, both the world of man and 
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nature, of its own value. Money is the alienated essence of man’s work 
and his being’ (MEGA 1 /1, p. 603).6
It is the ‘purely evaluative element’ of our moral philosophy which is 
the universal, independently constituted value of all things which has 
therefore deprived the whole world, both the world of man and nature, 
of its own value. Th e ‘evaluative element’ is the alienated essence of man’s 
work and his being.
7. ‘On the Jewish Question,’ in Th e Writings of the Young Marx, ed. Loyd D. 
Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), p. 
264.
Chapter V
Evaluation and Moral Notions
IT is an interesting phenomenon that we tend to expect that a contribu-
tion to moral philosophy, more than a contribution to any other branch 
of philosophy, will give us the answers to all the major problems within 
its fi eld. Th is expectation takes a subtle form. It is not that if someone 
deals with problems within a limited area we expect him to deal with 
other problems as well, but we expect those arguments, at the same time, 
to be arguments about other problems as well. If someone deals with, say, 
the inference patterns exhibited in moral arguments, we are tempted to 
regard his conclusions as telling us what is the distinguishing feature of 
moral arguments and also what is the foundation of morality, what is the 
distinction between right and wrong, and what is the highest good. Th e 
answers to the same set of problems are expected from a contribution to 
another limited fi eld, say, from a contribution to the study of the various 
uses of the word ‘good.’ While a work may be at least an illuminating 
contribution in a limited fi eld, it may easily be dismissed for not provid-
ing the right answers to these other large problems.
It is not therefore out of modesty that I want to say that this present 
study does not deal with any of the major problems of moral philosophy. 
Nor is it that I want to point out this obvious fact before any of my read-
ers do so. What I have to emphasize is not that questions like: ‘what is the 
foundation of morality?’ or ‘what is the moral point of view?’ and many 
others have not been answered or treated in the preceding pages, but 
that what I had to say in these pages should not be regarded as answers 
to these questions. It might be argued that I should have discussed or at 
least indicated what the moral point of view is, besides discussing some 
of the logical features of those notions that are formed from this point of 
view. But I am anxious that what I had to say about the logical features of 
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these notions should not be mistaken for an answer to the question ‘what 
is the moral point of view?’
In fact, part of my eff ort was devoted to trying to show that the logical 
features of moral notions cannot provide us with the answer to this ques-
tion, nor can they tell us what distinguishes moral from other notions. 
Th e logic of moral notions exhibits essential similarities to non-moral 
notions. Th is of course does not eliminate the distinction between moral 
and other notions, it only shows that we fi nd this diff erence elsewhere, 
namely in the reasons for forming the diff erent notions.
Not even the fact that moral notions are formed from a particular 
point of view distinguishes them from other notions, because all notions 
are formed for some reason and from some point of view. Even when we 
make our notions follow patterns given by nature, as in botany or geol-
ogy, we do so because there is a point in doing so. Far more is this the 
case in the fi eld of some of the other sciences, where we form notions 
in order to be able to make predictions or to be able to control things. 
Th en in our everyday life the notion of ‘function,’ which is a very high 
order notion consisting almost entirely of a formal element, guides the 
formation of a large variety of lower order notions until we get down 
to such low order functional terms as medicine, furniture, fertilizer, etc. 
It would be impossible to fi nd the descriptive point of view among all 
the points of view that guide the formation of our notions. In fact my 
view is that whenever we use a term composed of formal and material 
elements we describe—but never from the descriptive point of view. It 
does not follow from this that we can never know the facts, only that 
we always want to know the facts for some reason. Th is is what puts 
moral notions alongside all other notions. In all cases we group together 
certain facts about the world or ourselves or our activities, but in dif-
ferent cases we do this for diff erent reasons and with diff erent conse-
quences. We describe the inanimate world for various diff erent reasons, 
and ourselves and our activities for various diff erent reasons. So ‘descrip-
tive term’ cannot be used in contrast to other terms, though if we could 
deter mine what could properly be called the ‘descriptive point of view,’ 
that could be used in contrast to other points of view. In this case we 
would have description from the descriptive as well as from the predic-
tive, functional, moral, prudential, etc., points of view. Th e problem 
therefore is not what the diff erence is between descriptive and moral 
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notions but what is the diff erence between describing from the moral, as 
against other, points of view.
Besides the similarities, we have also observed an important diff erence 
between moral and other notions, but again I must emphasize that this 
diff erence does not provide us with the moral point of view any more 
than the similarities did. I intend to summarize this diff erence and then 
to outline a further problem which this will lead us to, viz. the problem 
of the diff erence between evaluation and moral notions.
Th e diff erence between moral and other notions, I have already argued, 
is that moral notions are not only formed by ourselves but they are also 
about ourselves. Th is statement is imprecise in two respects. Some of the 
other notions are also about ourselves in so far as we are part of the physi-
cal or organic world, while moral notions are about ourselves in so far 
as we are rule-following rational beings. But there are also other notions 
that are about ourselves in so far as we are rule-following rational beings, 
like ‘clever,’ ‘consistent,’ ‘learned,’ etc., which are not necessarily moral 
notions. While it is easy to eliminate the fi rst group, the delineation of 
moral notions from the second group would require an investigation of 
the moral point of view. Since such an investigation is not our concern 
here, I leave it at this, that we fi nd moral notions among those that we 
form about ourselves in so far as we are rule-following rational beings.
Th is diff erence between moral and other notions, we remember, had 
important consequences, which could be summarized by saying that (a) 
moral notions have to be public twice over: they not only have to be 
formed from the point of view of anyone, but they also have to be about 
those features of our lives that can be the feature of anyone’s life; (b) they 
provide not only the rules for our thinking about the world but also the 
rules for our behaviour, while other notions are not at the same time rules 
for the behaviour of their subject matter; (c) partly as a consequence of 
(b), if other notions did not exist those events that are their subject mat-
ter would still go on happening, but without moral notions there would 
be nothing left of their subject matter.
Th ese points have far reaching consequences for the logical behaviour 
of moral notions. Here I just want to draw our attention to the fact that 
moral judgments, far from being expressions of attitudes, emotions, likes 
or dislikes towards empirically observable entities or happenings in the 
world (which are usual candidates for the subject matter of ‘descriptive 
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statements’) do not express even diff erent, more rational judgments 
or evaluations of the inanimate world. Th ey are simply not about that 
world. So the picture which would suggest that ‘descriptive state ments’ 
state how things are and moral judgments express our attitudes, decisions 
or even evaluations of that world is not so much a misleading picture as 
not the picture of anything. Nor is it the case that moral judgments ex-
press our attitudes, decisions or even evaluations of a diff erent world, the 
world of our interpersonal life, for without moral notions there would 
be nothing to express an attitude to, nothing to make a decision about, 
nothing to evaluate. So judgments made by the use of moral notions, 
that is, moral judgments, cannot be expressions of attitudes towards, or 
even evaluations of, something, if by these very notions we state what the 
attitudes, evaluations are supposed to be about.
Th e proper fi eld of the activity of evaluation is not the world of our 
moral life. (For a more proper treatment of these problems one should 
investigate the full implications of the fact that evaluation as well as de-
scription is an activity.) I would like to mention three activities that can 
be candidates for the activity of evaluation and then say that only the 
third one is what is specifi cally evaluation.
(1) It is sometimes thought that if in response to a claim like ‘this is 
murder’ we ask for a description of what has happened, we are contrast-
ing evaluation with description. But this is parallel to any request when 
we want to know whether a thing, happening or act has properly been 
described. If someone claims that a substance is fertilizer, or that we are 
experiencing an anticyclone the same request can be made by asking for a 
‘description.’ We are not asking for a ‘description’ in these cases as against 
an ‘evaluation,’ but we are enquiring whether those material elements 
are present that entitle us to use a certain term. We are not asking for 
something ‘neutral’ as against something ‘evaluative,’ but we are asking 
for the relevant facts. When we are asked to describe the substance which 
we claim to be fertilizer, we are not asked to describe the substance dif-
ferently, e.g. ‘it is a brown powdery stuff ,’ but to establish the correctness 
of our original description. When we are asked to describe what we claim 
to be murder, we are not asked to substitute a diff erent description, e.g. 
‘he moved his arm very fast,’ but to substantiate our original description. 
Since what we are asked to do is to give that description on which we can 
base our claim, we are not asked to give such a description on the basis 
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of which one could not claim that the substance was fertilizer or that the 
act was an act of murder. Only if the claim cannot be substantiated can 
one demand a diff erent description. But equally, if the original description 
had been ‘he moved his arm very fast,’ we might end up by saying ‘he 
murdered someone,’ after having been asked for a proper description. We 
met this problem earlier when we noted that one can break the rules for 
the proper use of terms with regard to material as well as formal elements. 
Th is problem is present whenever we use terms consisting of material and 
formal elements.
(2) Th e second activity which may be thought of as an activity of evalu-
ation is a version of this. It is sometimes thought that when I say ‘this is 
a table’ I am describing, but when I deliberate whether this is a table or 
something else then I am evaluating. Here we are concerned again with 
the question of proper description and these problems arise when we 
fi nd that some of the material elements are not present, or other material 
elements are present which make the object or event in question exhibit 
similarities to other objects or events. When we met this sort of problem 
in connection with the existentialist-type decisions we noted that two 
factors help us resolve these problems: (a) we must be aware of and in 
possession of not only the facts but the relevant facts, because ex hypothesi 
the problem arises because of new facts that we regard as relevant; (b) we 
have the formal elements to help in our decision because if we did not 
know what the facts are relevant to and did not know for what reason we 
wanted the proper description, our problem would not even arise.
Since a statement of the material elements never entails a statement 
of what the thing in question is, there is a decision in claiming what a 
thing is even in the standard, let alone in the borderline cases. In all cases 
it is the formal element which enables us to follow a rule, enables us to 
decide what should or should not be regarded as instances of ‘the same.’ 
So this second candidate for the activity of evaluation is a variation of 
the fi rst, being concerned with the proper description of the world; and 
its problems are present whenever we use terms composed of formal and 
material elements.
Th ere can of course be cases when something could be either a this or a 
that without any relevant facts helping us to make a decision. Th ere may 
not even be a reason why it should matter whether we say that it is a this 
or a that, and the only reason why we should make a decision is because 
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we have to say something. I do not know whether this would be a case 
of making a decision but it is certainly not a case of evaluation. Tossing a 
coin is not evaluation.
(3) Th e proper fi eld of the activity of evaluation is not, as in the pre-
vious two cases, when we have to decide about alternative descriptions 
but when we have to decide about the qualities of particulars falling un-
der one and the same description. We always evaluate under a certain 
description. We judge some thing to be a good such and such. Other 
constructions and phrases using the word ‘good’ fall into the pattern of 
‘a good such and such’ with one notable exception, when ‘good to . . .’ 
is used meaning good towards and not good with an infi nitive. In this 
case we are not saying that someone or something is a good instance of a 
such and such but are talking about human rela tionships that can bring 
us back to the fi eld of morals.
We do not use the phrase ‘good for’ when the object is for what we 
would want to judge it good for. We do not say that telephones are good 
for ringing up people or that shoes are good for protecting our feet. Not 
because they are not good for these but because these are what they are 
for. Only when it was being explained for the fi rst time what they were 
for could perhaps the phrase ‘good for’ be used. We can say however that 
telephones are good for, say, keeping the door open. We use the phrase 
‘good for’ when we use something for what it is not for, when we want 
to evaluate something under a diff erent description, e.g. in this case good 
as a doorstop. Th e phrase ‘good as’ should be followed by a description, 
and the phrase indicates under what description we are evaluating some-
thing. Sometimes no single term exists for a new description and this 
may obscure the fact that all these phrases conform to the pattern of ‘a 
good such and such.’ To evaluate skills we use the phrase ‘good at.’ If the 
skill in question can be described by the use of one phrase we can evalu-
ate someone’s skill by saying that he is a good such and such, e.g. that 
he is a good carpenter. In the absence of a term like, e.g. ‘fi relighter’ we 
say that he is good at lighting fi res. ‘Good to . . .’ when it is followed by 
a verb, falls into the same pattern: what is good to eat is good as food or 
as nourishment.
Th is evaluation, when we evaluate particulars falling under a descrip-
tion should not be confused with valuing things for what they are. We 
value tables and medicines, as against earthquakes and measles. To say 
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that tables are good things is diff erent from saying that this is a good or 
bad table, and to say that earthquakes are bad is diff erent from saying 
that this is a good or bad earthquake. One way of making the distinc-
tion is to say that we can evaluate particu lars as good or bad instances of 
a such and such, but then we also value or detest, seek or avoid or are 
indiff erent to things in so far as they are such and such. In the fi rst case I 
said we evaluate, in the latter that we value (or detest, etc.) things in so far 
as they are such and such. In the latter case we do not need to evaluate. 
In cases when we value or detest something in so far as it is a such and 
such we do so because we formed the notion of a such and such from the 
appropriate point of view. We form notions from other points of view 
than those of valuing or detesting, seeking or avoiding certain things 
but my observation applies generally. In cases when we are indiff erent to 
things in so far as they fall under a certain description we have no rea-
son to value or avoid them under that description, otherwise we would 
have formed diff erent notions of them. Of course we can further evaluate 
things under a diff erent description, and this is when we use phrases like 
‘good as . . . ‘ or ‘good for . . .’. We can evaluate even pebbles by saying 
that they are good as ballast or good for cobblestones. Here we do not 
evaluate them in so far as they are pebbles but as instances of ballast or 
paving material. What happens in these cases is that something which is 
already specifi ed by a term is brought under another term as a particular 
of that other term. Although it retains its original description we are not 
evaluating it under that, but as a particular under another description. 
Without a certain description we cannot evaluate anything. But we do 
not evaluate descriptions, but particulars by reference to or by the help of 
certain descriptions. Th e terms themselves by the help of which we de-
scribe something are formed from certain points of view, and this is why 
evaluation here is either redundant or irrelevant. It is redundant if the 
reason for forming a notion was that we value certain things, and irrel-
evant if the reason for forming a notion is not that we value, seek or want 
to avoid certain things. In the latter case ex hypothesi there is no point in 
evaluating something in so far as it comes under a ‘neutral’ description.
Needless to say there is a close logical connection between a description 
and the evaluation of particulars falling under the description. Th e formal 
element of a notion determines what are the relevant qualities falling un-
der a description, and we judge particulars to be good or bad by reference 
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to their qualities relevant to the description, so it follows that the formal 
element of a notion is logically connected to the evaluation of particulars. 
Nevertheless, we must distinguish between the two roles of the formal 
element: fi rst its role in determining what type of notion we have, and sec-
ondly its role in determining what are the relevant qualities of a particular 
for judging it a good such and such. Th ese two roles might diverge with 
regard to valuing and evaluating. We do not value burglars but we can 
evaluate someone as a good burglar, and in the previous chapter we ob-
served that the original events of Munich which gave rise to the notion of 
a Munich, may turn out in time not to be the best instance of a Munich.
Th e evaluation of particulars is possible not because we value some-
thing in so far as it falls under a description but because the description 
functions like a standard to which particulars approximate. We saw in the 
fi rst chapter that no term can be reduced to a statement of, or an enumer-
ation of, its material elements. Th is also means that we can never equate 
or identify what we say a thing is with any of its instances or examples, 
and that all observable particulars are instances or examples of what they 
are. I am claiming that apart from such exceptional cases as the standard 
metre in Paris, there are no paradigm particulars, but rather that, as a 
supposed paradigm case would serve as a standard for other particulars, 
our notions of things serve as standards for all the respective particulars 
that come under them. Th e various particulars exemplify more or less 
what they are supposed to be under a certain description. It is by virtue 
of this fact that we can evaluate them.
We also observed, when we discussed the alleged uniqueness of exis-
tentialist-type situations that there must be more than one instance of 
anything which can be described by the help of a term consisting of 
formal and material elements. Evaluation is possible only when there are 
or can be more than one instance of a thing. If something were unique in 
the sense that we could refer to it only by a proper name, say, Jack, then 
we could not say that it was or was not a good Jack. Of course we could 
still evaluate Jack under a description by saying that Jack was good for 
putting things on or good as Hamlet (Hamlet is not a proper name here 
but a role that can be played by diff erent actors), but in these cases we are 
not evaluating Jack as Jack. Th e reason why it is a prerequisite of evalua-
tion that there should be more than one instance of a thing is not that we 
need several instances for comparison. Even if as an empirical fact there 
Moral Notions
112
is but one instance of a thing, it must be described by a term of which 
logically there could be more than one instance in order that we should 
be able to evaluate it. We can evaluate something as an x only when x 
tells us what the thing is supposed to be, and this can be done only by a 
description. Descriptions, unlike proper names, can provide standards. It 
is signifi cant that the philosophers who claim that in the world there is 
no value attempt to ‘describe’ that world by a process more akin to nam-
ing than describing. Th e dichotomy between description and evaluation 
should be called the dichotomy between naming and evaluation.
Another distinction must now be made before we can return to moral 
notions. We must distinguish between the many particular instances of a 
thing when these instances are particulars in the world of space and time, 
and the many instances of higher order notions when these instances are 
other notions. Th e proper fi eld of evaluation is the fi eld of particulars in 
the world of space and time, and only in very theo retical discussions do 
we occasionally evaluate notions as instances of higher order notions. 
Although a higher order notion has several instances of lower order no-
tions, this relationship is radically diff erent from the relationship between 
a notion and its particular instances in the spatio-temporal world. Th e 
relation ship between the notion of furniture and its instances such as the 
notions of table and wardrobe is diff erent from the relationship between 
the notion of a table and particular tables. Again, the relationship be-
tween the notion of viciousness and its instances such as the notions of 
murder or cruelty is diff erent from the relationship between the notion 
of murder and par ticular acts of murder. Only in theoretical discussions 
would we say that tables and chairs are good instances or examples of 
furniture, but this is not why we value tables and chairs.
If we turn now to moral judgments we should observe that in our 
moral life we are not evaluating. We may be performing one of the fi rst 
two activities that I considered as possible candidates for the activity of 
evaluation but not the third. Th at is to say, we may be concerned in one 
way or another with the proper description of situations or acts but we 
are not concerned with evaluation. Of course one is performing particu-
lar acts in one’s moral life, but when I ask whether I should do this or 
that, by ‘this’ or ‘that’ I mean acts of diff erent descriptions and not this or 
that particular act that falls under the same description. When one makes 
a moral decision one does not choose the good instance of an act that 
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falls under a certain description but one works out the proper descrip-
tion of the situation on the basis of the relevant facts, and understands 
the signifi cance of the description. As we have just seen, with regard to 
descriptions evaluation is either redundant or irrelevant. If the proper des-
cription of a situation involves moral notions, notions formed from the 
moral point of view, then evaluation is redundant. If the proper descrip-
tion of a situation does not call for moral notions then evaluation is ex hy-
pothesi irrelevant. Th ere can sometimes be a further problem of choosing 
the particular manner in which one should bring about an act of a certain 
description, but this is not the moral problem, unless in some exceptional 
cases this raises the question whether the end justifi es the means.
Th e fundamental diff erences between evaluation and moral judgments 
did not prevent us from seeing a core of similarity between them, but this 
similarity is exhibited not only between them but between all rational 
human activities that make use of language.
When we evaluate something we can make the following three asser-
tions about our evaluation:
(a) If I say: ‘x is good’ I cannot say ‘y is exactly the same as x except that 
y is not good; this is the only diff erence between them,’ because there is 
no extra quality or property called ‘good.’
(b) If I say ‘x is good,’ I cannot say ‘y is exactly the same as x but y is not 
good,’ because in this case I cancel my reasons for saying that x is good.
(c) If I say ‘x is good’ I must be able to say that any x which has the 
same relevant qualities or properties as x is also good, because we judge x 
to be good for having those qualities or properties.
Parallel to these we can make the following three assertions about our 
moral judgments:
(a) If I say: ‘In situation x I ought to do A’ I cannot say ‘Situation y is 
exactly the same as situation x except that in y I ought not to do A; this 
is the only diff erence between them,’ because there is no extra property 
called ‘obligation.’
(b) If I say ‘In situation x I ought to do A’ I cannot say ‘Situation y is 
exactly the same as x but in situation y I ought not to do A,’ because in 
this case I would cancel my reasons for my obligation in situation x.
(c) If in situation x I ought to do A then anybody else in a situation 
which is the same as x in all relevant respects also ought to do A, because 
my obligation depends on the situation and not on the fact that I am I.
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Th ese assertions however can be made about any rational activity that 
makes use of language; we can, for instance, make these three assertions 
about judging something to be a tulip. But these very same rules have 
diff erent consequences and implications in the diff erent fi elds of our ra-
tional activities: when we engage in everyday conversation, when we do 
science, when we evaluate things and when we act as moral agents. We 
can observe, for instance, in the above parallel assertions that while the 
goodness of something depends on the relevant qualities or properties of 
things, our obligations depend on the relevant facts of situations. In the 
third parallel, (c), we can observe that this results in the one case in the 
fact that our judgment applies to any thing that has the same qualities or 
properties, in the other case in the fact that our judgment applies to any 
one who is in the same situation. A further consequence of this is that 
while in the case of evaluation I am bound to make the same judgment 
when the same qualities or properties are present, in the case of our moral 
life the same rules of rationality result in my being under the same obliga-
tion as anyone else when I am in a certain situation. In order to arrive at 
this practical conclusion about anyone as against a theoretical conclusion 
about any thing, we do not need to turn to additional rules of rationality 
but to a diff erent fi eld of the application of the same rules of rationality. 
Whatever may be the merits of practical syllogisms, their major premisses 
cannot be merely evaluative judgments whether about dry foods or juicy 
straw berries. An evaluative premiss about the inanimate world can result 
in an evaluative conclusion but only a description of a situation can result 
in my being under an obligation.
I am aware that these, like some of my earlier conclusions, may sound 
paradoxical. But when one argues against a theory in a terminology 
which itself embodies the very theory one is arguing against, paradoxical 
remarks cannot be avoided. Right through this study I have been using 
the terminology of contemporary moral philosophy like a Wittgenstein-
ian ladder. Some of these ladders I surreptitiously threw away on the way 
but others I have had to use right to the end. I hope I shall be forgiven 
for the inevitable paradoxical remarks. Th is is also one of the conclusions 
that can be drawn from this study, that it is very diffi  cult to question 
some of the prevailing theories and doctrines of our moral philosophy 
because they have shaped our terminology and are embodied in it. When 
Evaluation and Moral Notions
115
we think we question these theories we merely ask a question within the 
theories, and so each attempt to question them only reaffi  rms them. We 
not only look through a frame that we do not notice but since in this 
case the frame creates what we are discus sing, we are only looking at the 
frame, and this is what we do not realize.
What I have been trying to say in this study is that moral notions do 
not evaluate the world of description; we evaluate that world by the help 
of descriptive notions. Moral notions describe the world of evalu ation. If 
this sounds strange, then we have become aware of the framework within 
which contemporary moral philosophy moves.
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Did Plato Turn Himself Upside Down?1
My story is quite simple. I want to run through some of the most familiar 
passages in three of Plato’s dialogues, in the Parmenides, in the Phaedrus, 
and in the Philebus. Th ey will probably be so well known to you that the 
only excuse for me to recount them is to bring out an outrageous inter-
pretation of their signifi cance. If some of you would say that not only my 
story but also my interpretation of their signifi cance is also familiar and 
old hat then I might be embarrassed, but then I shall be fortifi ed to face 
all the people who until now thought that I have a crazy idiosyncratic 
view of Plato.
Well now, the simple story is this. At the beginning of the Parmenides 
Zeno is trying to show the impossibility of there being a plurality of 
things by arguing that if there are many things then they must be both 
like and unlike. For in order to be many they have to be many somethings 
or other, so they have to be like each other. But they would not be many 
if they would not at the same time be unlike each other. Th is, as Socrates 
points out, is an ingenious way of supporting, in a negative way, Parme-
nides’ claim that there is only the One, and plurality is only a world of 
appearing or seeming.
Socrates’—or Plato’s—way of dealing with this is to point out some-
thing that we might call, without being misleading, a type-fallacy. Th ere 
is nothing surprising, says Plato, in things like sticks and stones, objects 
that come into being and go out of existence, being both like and unlike, 
or being one and many, or in rest and in motion at the same time. What 
would be surprising is if Zeno could show that Likeness is Unlike or Un-
likeness is Like or that Unity is Plurality and Plurality is Unity and so on. 
But particular objects can partake of any number of Forms. For instance 
1. A conference paper presented at the Australasian Association of Philosophy 
annual conference in Canberra in 1978. (All footnotes are by the editors.)
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I am one among all of you, but at the same time I am many for I am a 
complex entity being made up of many parts.
Th e picture we might get from this (and this is not my idiosyncratic 
view) is that here is Plato’s duplicate world, the world of physical objects 
which is rather chaotic—chaotic because he jettisoned it, or abandoned 
it to some of his opponents or to his disputants like Zeno or Heraclitus. 
So this physical world is full of confusing or even contradictory charac-
teristics such as being at the same time both like and unlike, or being in 
a constant fl ux as Heraclitus would have it. But never mind because there 
is another world, the world of Forms where none of these things occur, 
where perfection, order and stability reign. Each of these Forms is just 
what it is, Unity is just Unity, Likeness is just Likeness, and they cannot 
be anything else at the same time.
To complete the picture we should add to this simple view that if 
we want to fi nd Plato’s Th eory of Forms on the map of philosophical 
problems then we fi nd it somewhere where we fi nd the problem of uni-
versals. I say this advisedly because I do not want to commit people who 
hold this view of Plato to anything like or unlike a theory of universals. 
What I do want to say is that the Th eory of Forms is thought to be in 
that part of the philosophical map where we talk about many particular 
tables having or not having something in common or the many par-
ticular games having or not having something in common. What else 
could Plato be worried about when he is worried about the One and 
the Many?
Now people who say this about Plato have to add that Plato had other 
things to say as well beside saying that there are Forms. Most importantly 
Plato also expounded a method and even changed his method from the 
early method of hypothesis to the later method of division. In his book 
on Plato’s Analytic Method Kenneth Sayre, if I understand him rightly, 
says that one of the hypotheses in the Phaedo is that there are Forms.2 
Th is more than implies that the hypothetical method is something diff er-
ent from the Th eory of Forms, so diff erent that the hypothetical method 
is only used to postulate that there are Forms. Now one of the things I 
want to argue for is that the hypothetical method and the method of 
2. Kenneth M. Sayre, Plato’s Analytic Method (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1969), p. 12.
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division are the same method. And, more importantly, that what we call 
the Th eory of Forms is this method.
But now let me continue my simple story and turn to what happens 
at the beginning of the Philebus. Plato claims that in order to handle the 
question whether pleasure or intelligence is the good they have to settle 
fi rst the problem that keeps cropping up, the problem of the one and the 
many.
Do you mean [says Protarchus] the problem when someone says that I am 
by nature one thing and yet there are many me’s, some even opposite to 
each other, like a tall and short me?
Socrates. No. Th ose are very commonplace puzzles about one and 
many; but it is pretty well agreed all round not to bother with them. People 
realize they are child’s play and just a hindrance to discussion. Th e same 
goes for when someone distinguishes the limbs and parts of any given 
thing and then gets agreement that all these things are the one thing he 
started with, then jeers because he has argued one into the monstrous as-
sertion that the one is indefi nitely many things, and the many things one.
Protarchus. Th en what are these other puzzles on this same subject, 
which are not yet commonplace nor have agreed solutions?
Socrates: When the one a person posits is not a generable or perish-
able thing as in these last examples. For it is agreed that about a one of 
that sort, as we said just now, there is no need to waste time arguing. But 
when someone wishes to posit man, ox, beauty, or the good each as one, 
a burning interest in making divisions within this sort of unit is a matter 
for controversy.3
Well now. What happened? In the Parmenides we were told that in the 
world of physical objects, like sticks and stones, things can have contrary 
characteristics, but he would be surprised to fi nd the same thing hap-
pening in the world of Forms. Now in the Philebus Plato, using the same 
example, the example of a person being one in one sense and many in 
another sense, says that these are the childish paradoxes of the one and 
the many, we don’t need to worry about them, the really interesting prob-
lem is when the problem of the one and the many occurs in the world of 
Forms, something that he thought in the Parmenides to be impossible.
3. Philebus, trans. J.C.B. Gosling (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 5, 14d–
15a.
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Th is in itself would not yet be turning himself or his theory upside 
down. But if you consider what happens in the Phaedrus you will see that 
this is turning himself upside down. In the Phaedrus too, Plato is worried 
about the same sort of thing, namely ‘love,’ being both good and bad, as 
in the Philebus he is arguing that pleasure is both good and bad. In the 
fi rst half of the Phaedrus we listen to two very convincing speeches, one 
showing that love is benefi cial, the other showing that love is harmful to 
the beloved. And Plato points out that this happened because we did not 
realise that love is a subclass of madness, and madness again has diff erent 
varieties, some good, some bad. He uses again the example of the body, 
and says that while both of my arms are arms, one is a left arm, the other 
a right arm. In this way though all instances of love are instances of love, 
some are bad, others good. And when you get down to the particular then 
it is either a good sort of love or a bad sort of love. He is doing here the 
same sort of thing as he does in the Philebus, when he divides the varie-
ties of pleasure. And this is turning things the other way round from the 
Parmenides, because here the particulars are either one thing or the other 
and not both and the Forms are mixed, while in the Parmenides the Forms 
were either one thing or the other and not both, but the particulars were 
mixed.
One of the problems that preoccupied Plato, and probably Socrates, is 
what one could regard as a form of moral relativism. What I have in mind 
is not the form of relativism as when one says that fi re burns the same 
way in Persia and in Athens but one’s notions of right and wrong vary 
from place to place. Th ough this too probably concerned both of them, 
the form I mean is when someone says for instance: ‘What’s wrong with 
killing? Th ere are many cases of killing when it’s justifi ed, so sometimes 
it’s right, sometimes it is wrong.’ Or ‘What’s wrong with lying? It isn’t 
always wrong,’ and so on.
One response of many moral philosophers to this type of talk is that 
they try to look for something which is always good without exception, 
to look for that which is good without qualifi cation, or unconditionally 
good or good in itself. Somehow it is assumed sometimes that if we fi nd 
that which is always good, as against that which isn’t always good but 
sometimes good and sometimes bad, then we have found something like 
the foundation of morality. With this pursuit I am not concerned now. 
Th is is not Plato’s way out.
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Another, more sensible response to this type of talk is to observe that 
our terms like ‘killing’ or ‘lying’—or let’s also include terms like ‘pleasure’ 
or ‘mental activity’—bring together a large variety of actions or states 
of aff airs, and these terms do not necessarily bring that variety together 
because they are all alike from the moral point of view. Th ey are alike 
only in that they are all instances of ‘killing’ or of ‘lying’ or of ‘pleasure’ 
or of ‘mental activity’—some of which are also instances of good actions 
or good states of aff airs, while others are not. And many activities and 
states of aff airs, other than some instances of killing, or of lying, or of 
some instances of pleasure or of mental activity, are also good and the 
only thing which is common to all those things is that they are all good; 
nothing else is common to all instances of such actions and states of af-
fairs. Of course there might be some similarities among good things, or 
some similarities among pleasures or some similarities among beautiful 
things, but none of those similarities are the reasons for calling them in-
stances of good things or of pleasant things or of beautiful things. All the 
similarities can be absent in other cases. Th e only thing one can say of all 
pleasant things is that they are pleasant or of all beautiful things that they 
are beautiful. In some cases it is awkwardly expressed by Plato and some 
people assume that he is advocating self-predication when he says that 
the only thing one can say of the beautiful is that it is beautiful.
But, nevertheless some pleasures are good at the same time. And some 
beautiful things are pleasant, some beautiful things are even red or yellow. 
So all such things are both one and many.
Incidentally, Plato was not trying to point out the Naturalistic Fallacy 
when in the Philebus he argued that you cannot identify good with pleas-
ure. He was pointing out that goodness cannot be common to all instances 
of pleasure because only pleasure is common to all instances of pleasure.
So Plato thought he had found the key to the practice of sophists and 
others of his contemporaries who argued that the same thing can be good 
and bad at the same time, or the orators who argued at will that a certain 
policy is good and to be recommended but when asked to do so would 
equally argue that the same policy is bad and is not to be pursued. But the 
art of division and the mixing of the Forms also enables him to deal with 
people like Philebus who would identify goodness with pleasure.
But then Plato had a sort of breakthrough in philosophising, the 
sort of rare happy occasion that we experience from time to time: he 
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realised that the same method solves the problem presented by the 
metaphysical theories of Parmenides and of Zeno. Let me read a bit from 
the Phaedrus.
Socrates. [D]o you tell me, what is it that the contending parties in 
law courts do? Do they not in fact contend with words, or how else should 
we put it?
Phaedrus. Th at is just what they do.
Socrates. About what is just and unjust?
Phaedrus. Yes.
Socrates. And he who possesses the art of doing this can make the 
same thing appear to the same people now just, now unjust, at will?
Phaedrus. Just so.
Socrates. Th en can we fail to see that the Palamedes of Elea [Zeno] 
has an art of speaking, such that he can make the same things appear to 
his audience like and unlike, or one and many, or again at rest and in mo-
tion?
Phaedrus. Indeed he can.
Socrates. So contending with words is a practice found not only in 
lawsuits and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we fi nd 
this single art, if indeed it is an art, which enables people to make out 
everything to be like something else, within the limits of possible com-
parison, and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who disguise 
what they are doing.4
Now this is Plato’s problem, and not the theory of universals. Th e Th e-
ory of Forms is not a theory of universals, it does not even come near to 
it. Th e problem of the One and the Many is not the problem of, for in-
stance, there being many tables here and then we have to fi nd one some-
thing which is the universal in all tables. Th e relationship between ‘table’ 
and the many tables is not Plato’s problem. Th e relationship he is worried 
about is the sort which exists, for instance (to stay with this example) 
between furniture and, say, perhaps kitchen furniture and dining room 
furniture—and then between living room furniture and its varieties such 
as chairs, tables and standing lamps. But then the relationship between 
the table and the many objects does not interest him anymore.
4. Phaedrus, trans. R. Hackforth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1952), p. 124, 261c–e.
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Socrates. You must examine the method I mean.
Protarchus : Tell us what it is, then.
Socrates. As I see it, it was a gift from the gods to men, thrown down 
from the gods in a blaze of light by some Prometheus. Our forefathers, su-
perior beings to us as they lived closer to the gods, passed on this tradition, 
that those things which are from time to time said to be are made up of one 
and many, with a determinant and indeterminacy inherent in them. Since 
this is how things are constituted we should always posit a single form in 
respect to every one and search for it—we shall fi nd one there—and if we 
are successful, then after the one we should look for two, or otherwise for 
three or whatever the number is; each of these ones should be treated in 
the same way, until one can see of the original one not only that it is one, 
a plurality, and an indefi nite number, but also its precise quantity. But 
one should not attribute the character of indeterminate to the plurality 
until one can see the complete number between the indeterminate and 
the one.5
Th e theory was not even designed to deal with the problem of uni-
versals. How can the problem of the One and the Many be about the 
relationship between the many particulars and their corresponding uni-
versal when the Many might be two or perhaps three or four? What sort 
of particular objects are those of which there are only two or perhaps 
three? And then each particular object can be subdivided again into two 
or perhaps three.
And the people who sin against this method are those who delight in 
showing that the one is many and the many is one in an indiscriminate 
manner and without observing all the intermediate steps.
Socrates: As I said, this is the procedure for inquiring, learning, and 
teaching each other that the gods have handed on to us. But present day 
intellectuals are both too quick and too slow in making any one they en-
counter a plurality. From the one they pass straight to the indeterminate 
and the intervening areas slip through their fi ngers—and by these is made 
the diff erence between our arguments with each other being philosophical 
and being sophistical.6
Again, in the Sophist Socrates complains that it is not enough to show 
5. Philebus, trans. Gosling, p. 6, 16c–d.
6. Philebus, trans. Gosling, p. 6, 16d.
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that the one is many; we have to show in what respect it is one and then 
many.
Finally in the Parmenides, just after Parmenides has reduced 
Socrates to tears because the version of the Th eory of Forms 
presented there just does not work, Parmenides asks Socrates:
What are you going to do about philosophy, then? Where will you 
turn while the answers to those questions remain unknown?
Socrates. I can see no way out at the present moment.
Parmenides: Th at is because you are undertaking to defi ne ‘Beautiful,’ 
‘Just,’ ‘Good,’ and other particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a 
preliminary training. . . . [Y]ou must make an eff ort and submit yourself, 
while you are still young, to a severer training in what the world calls idle 
talk and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.7
Now the fact that Plato replaced his version of the One and the Many 
in the Parmenides with the one that we fi nd in the Phaedrus and the 
Philebus indicates for what purpose or for what reason these two versions 
would be alternative or improved versions of the same. Only from the 
point of view of dealing with the problems presented by some sophists 
when they argued that the same thing is both right or wrong, good and 
bad, and dealing with the problems presented by others who say that 
only pleasure is good and the only good is pleasure, and dealing with the 
problem of some Presocratics or contemporaries who would say that the 
same thing is both like and unlike, or at rest and in motion—only from 
this point of view are the two versions of the One and the Many varia-
tions on the same theme.
7. Francis M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1939), pp. 102–3, Parmenides 135c–d.
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THEAETETUS I1
After an introductory section the dialogue is divided into three parts, 
discussing three hypotheses as to what knowledge is. Th e introduction 
lasts to 151d and the three parts are as follows: Discussion of the hypotheses 
that:
Knowledge is perception: 151d–187a
Knowledge is true judgment: 187a–201c
Knowledge is true judgment with an account: 201c–210a
We shall concentrate on the fi rst hypothesis, which takes up about 
half of the dialogue. Th ere are however two important philosophical 
points in the introductory section relevant not only to our dialogue but 
to Plato’s philosophy in general. Th e fi rst concerns the nature of the 
Socratic ‘What is X?’ question, and the second concerns Socrates’ de-
scription of himself as a midwife. I shall deal in this Note only with the 
fi rst of these points.
Th e ‘What is X?’ question. Most of Plato’s dialogues deal with such a 
question. In the Republic the question is ‘What is justice?,’ in the Eu-
thyphro ‘What is piety?’ and in our dialogue [Th eaetetus] the question 
is ‘What is knowledge?’. In each case the person Socrates is questioning 
answers in a manner similar to the way in which Th eaetetus fi rst answers 
him. He gives examples, instances or enumerations of cases of whatever is 
under discussion. For instance Euthyphro’s fi rst answer is roughly: ‘Piety 
is what I am doing now,’ and one of the fi rst answers in the Republic is 
that ‘Justice is returning what you borrowed.’ In each of such dialogues, 
1. Th e second of seven class handouts on Th eaetetus, for philosophy students 
at the University of Western Australia. (All footnotes are by the editors, 
excepting the following one.)
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before Socrates begins the discussion proper, he takes pains to point out 
what type of question he is asking. He does not want enumeration of 
instances but instead wants to investigate what makes X to be what it is. 
Note that he is not rejecting a false answer in favour of a true one. He is 
rejecting one type of answer in favour of another type. When he is given 
the right type of answer that is only the beginning of the real discussion 
of the topic of the dialogue. Socrates would treat the right type of answer 
as a hypothesis as to what makes X to be what it is. Usually the hypothesis 
is rejected after scrutiny and a new one is asked for, which is then treated 
in the same way. Sometimes, as in the Th eaetetus, the whole dialogue ends 
inconclusively. As I mentioned above, in the Th eaetetus three hypotheses 
are off ered in answer to the question ‘What is knowledge?’ and all three 
are found wanting. Towards the end of these lectures I shall indicate how 
in the dialogue the Sophist, which follows on after our dialogue, the prob-
lem of the Th eaetetus is resolved.
Th ere are dialogues where Plato/Socrates explicitly discusses his meth-
od. One of these is the Phaedo from 99d to 102a. He says there, at 101d, 
that in investigating a hypothesis he looks at the consequences of it and 
sees whether they agree with each other or not. What this means precisely 
is not quite clear but in actual practice Plato/Socrates always fi nds some 
kind of contradiction in one way or another as a reason for rejecting the 
hypotheses. In the Republic, for instance, the fi rst hypothesis that ‘justice 
is returning what you borrowed’ is rejected after observing that it would 
follow from this that returning a borrowed knife to a homicidal maniac 
would be just.2
Plato in the Phaedo goes on to say that ‘when the time came for you to 
establish the hypothesis itself, you would pursue the same method: you 
would assume some more ultimate hypothesis, the best you can fi nd, and 
continue until you reached something satisfactory.’ It is as if in solving 
a crossword puzzle you would fi ll in what you think is the right answer 
with a pencil, and then when you have worked out all cross references 
and see how it all hangs together, you fi ll in the answers with a pen. At the 
end of the Euthyphro, for instance, piety, which has instances, was itself 
2. To see how he practises this technique, or rather, how he does not follow 
one set pattern in fi nding contradictions, consult Richard Robinson, Plato’s 
Earlier Dialectic (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1941). 
(Kovesi footnote.)
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claimed to be an instance of a higher concept, the concept of justice. It 
is that part of justice which is concerned with our relations towards the 
gods, while the rest of justice is concerned with our relations towards our 
fellow men.
My reading of Plato is that the successful hypothesis, the one which 
is not rejected, is what he calls the Form. So the ‘What is X?’ question is 
really a request for the appropriate form.
Plato has come under severe criticism, especially in the last few decades, 
for assuming that there is one thing common to all instances of some-
thing. It was even suggested sometimes that he was led to believe that 
there are Forms of things only because of this assumption. Th e most at-
tractive alternative to this assumption is to suggest that instead of some-
thing being common to all things that are referred to by the same word, 
there is rather a family resemblance between them. As in a family, sisters 
A and B might have the same shaped ears but diff erent noses, while sis-
ter B and brother C have the same shaped noses but diff erent ears. Like 
threads in a rope, not one of them goes right through the whole rope but 
they form a series of interconnections. Th e notion of a game is often used 
to illustrate this. Th ere is just no common element shared by all games. 
Th ere is only a family resemblance connecting all examples of games. 
Both tennis and football are played with a ball but one is played by two 
or four people, the other by two teams. Th ough chess is not played with 
a ball, it is played, as tennis sometimes is, by two people.
Th e theory is no doubt more subtle, but no subtlety could make up 
for the fact that it does not provide us with a unifying principle that 
would enable us to say what will and what will not do as a game. It can-
not provide it because it was designed precisely in order to eliminate 
that. Duets are also sung by two people, as chess is played by two; and 
large demolition fi rms use a ball, a heavy iron ball, to knock down brick 
walls. Family resemblances like this do not entitle us to classify duets or 
demolition work as games. With family resemblances we could connect 
the whole universe in a web of relationships. What we would need then is 
some principles of selection, or what we might call formal elements, that 
would enable us to pick out what constitutes what in the web of empiri-
cally similar and dissimilar relationships.
But a more instructive point to make for our purposes is that the ob-
jection [that Plato thinks there is one thing common to all instances of 
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something] completely misses Plato’s point and I raised the objection in 
order to make Plato’s point clearer.
Notice that the family resemblances are resemblances in terms of ob-
servable features and characteristics, and so presumably what the family 
resemblance theory objects to is that no one observable feature or char-
acteristic is to be found in all instances of things that we refer to by the 
same word. Plato is so far from assuming that there is always one observ-
able characteristic common to all instances of a thing that he takes pains 
to argue that they look so diverse from each other that there is not even a 
family resemblance among them.
It is a crucial tenet of Plato’s philosophy that we do not need to postu-
late Forms in cases where an empirically observable characteristic enables 
us to identify and to go on identifying new instances of a thing. In the 
Parmenides he cites hair and mud as such cases. Th ese are just as they are, 
he says. Th ere is an important passage in the Republic where he is asked 
to explain how he would start his philosophical education. He was asked 
in eff ect to give the fi rst tutorial topic for his fi rst year philosophy. He 
said that we must fi nd topics or examples where sense experience does 
give puzzlement to the mind. Glaucon, his interlocutor, asks whether 
he means cases where we see things at a distance or in perspective. Pla-
to rejected this; no, he said, these are not the sort of things he had in 
mind. He does not mean cases where sense experience allegedly cannot 
be trusted. He does not begin his philosophising the way Descartes did. 
He makes Glaucon mention such cases to indicate that he knows about 
them and he explicitly says that this is not the sort of thing he means. He 
knows about such childish tricks as a piece of straight stick immersed in 
water or the round coin which looks elliptical as you look at it sideways. 
Plato always insists that sense perception never lies or deceives us. One of 
his main reasons in the Th eaetetus for rejecting the hypothesis that knowl-
edge is perception is on the ground that one cannot explain the possibil-
ity of a false judgment. After all, a straight stick immersed in water does 
look bent and so it should. Our senses do tell us how it looks. We might 
go wrong only in our inference that therefore it is bent.
So in the Republic Plato asks us to look at three fi ngers right in front of 
us. No possibility of deception. He says that our senses never present us 
with a fi nger as not a fi nger. Just by the help of observable characteristics 
you can go on identifying new and new fi ngers and you never go wrong. 
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We do not get involved in such contradictions as when we give an answer 
to what is justice, or what is piety, or what is a game, in terms of some 
observable characteristics. Th en Plato asks us to compare the ring fi nger 
with the little fi nger with reference to its height and then to the middle 
fi nger. Th e observable length of the ring fi nger did not change but in the 
one case it is taller and in the next it is shorter. Of course, you would say. 
But however obvious this case of comparison is, the point is that you 
cannot go on pointing to new and new instances and say ‘large,’ ‘large,’ 
‘large’ and so on, just on the ground that they all seem to have the same 
size. Th e same size vegetable could be a very large Brussels sprout or a 
rather small cabbage. You might think this is a small example, but what 
do you expect from the fi rst tutorial topic for the fi rst year? Plato’s educa-
tion program for a philosopher would last for about thirty years.
Earlier in the Republic he gives other simple examples. If someone were 
to say that the colour red makes something beautiful we would fi nd that 
the next red thing is not beautiful and that the next beautiful thing is not 
red. You can go through all observable characteristics, whether it is the 
triangular composition or anything else, and you would fi nd contradic-
tory consequences. His suggestion is then that we should give up the 
whole attempt of trying to look for what makes something to be what it 
is in any of the observable characteristics of that thing. So the objection 
to Plato, that he would want to fi nd one such single characteristic as an 
answer to the question ‘What is X?,’ is a misplaced objection. His view is 
even more radical than the alternative suggestion of family resemblances. 
He is not suggesting that there is such a characteristic, with the only 
diff erence that it is invisible. He is suggesting that it is not this type of 
thing that enables us to understand what makes something to be what it 
is. It is the object of knowledge and not of perception, and the object of 
knowledge is not an invisible version of the object of perception. As a fi rst 
step he would give what he calls in the Phaedo a ‘foolish but safe answer,’ 
namely that beauty makes beautiful things beautiful. But this is only the 
fi rst safe step and the real investigation would only then begin. Justice 
makes just acts just, but then it takes the whole of the Republic to investi-
gate what is a proper account of justice, and the whole of the Th eaetetus is 
not suffi  cient to investigate what is a proper account of what knowledge 
is. Furthermore, far from being blind to the possibility that there might 
be diff erent types of knowledge or diff erent subdivisions of justice, his 
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philosophical endeavour is devoted to making precisely these divisions. 
Another dialogue where he gives an explicit account of his philosophical 
method is the Phaedrus where the object of investigation is the notion of 
love. Th is is what he has to say of his method:
Phaedrus. What procedures do you mean?
Socrates. Th e fi rst is that in which we bring together a dispersed 
plurality under a single form, seeing it all together: the purpose being to 
defi ne so-and-so, and thus make plain whatever may be chosen as the topic 
for exposition. For example, take the defi nition given just now of love: 
whether it was right or wrong, at all events it was that which enables our 
discourse to achieve lucidity and consistency.
Phaedrus. And what is the second procedure you speak of Socrates?
Socrates. Th e reverse of the other, whereby we are enabled to divide 
into forms, following the objective articulation; we are not to attempt to 
hack off  parts like a clumsy butcher . . . 3
Th en after doing some divisions Socrates concludes:
Believe me, Phaedrus, I am myself a lover of these divisions and collec-
tions, that I may gain the power to speak and to think; and whenever I 
deem another man able to discern an objective unity and plurality, I follow 
in his footsteps where he leadeth as a god. Furthermore, whether I am right 
or wrong in doing so, God alone knows, it is those that have this ability 
whom for the present I call dialecticians.
I might have dwelt longer on Plato’s method than was necessary for 
our study of the Th eaetetus but it is important to dispel some popular 
misconceptions about Plato before we get down to reading any of his 
dialogues. One of these is that he created a double-decker universe where 
the top deck is populated with objects like our ordinary objects only 
invisible, and it is these objects that he is looking for when he is looking 
for Forms—when he is looking for that which makes something to be 
what it is.
It would be nice if you learnt at least one thing from Plato, the advice 
that when you make conceptual analyses you should not be like a clumsy 
butcher. You should cut at the joints.
3. Phaedrus, trans. Hackforth, p. 125, 265d.
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THEAETETUS VI1
In this last note I would like to say just a few words about Plato’s philoso-
phy in general. What I would mainly like to do is to dispel a widely held 
popular view of Plato, the view that he has introduced a duplicate world 
above our ordinary world that we live in. Th is popular view is also shared 
by some of the best Plato scholars, so you have to read what I have to say 
with a critical attitude. I hope you will go on reading the various dialogues 
of Plato and that you will go on reading books and articles on Plato, and 
after such reading return to the Th eaetetus again. When you study any 
philosopher and you read confl icting views on him, do not be scandalised. 
Th ere can be some very interesting, instructive and illuminating reasons 
for people going wrong in their thinking about each other’s thoughts, and 
‘the others’ include some of the great philosophers. Nor can you suspend 
your reading until you have found the true interpretation of a philoso-
pher’s thoughts. Th ere is no such shortcut to truth. It is you who have to 
struggle through the various twists and turns of arguments, with the help 
of various interpretations that you have to understand and accept and 
reject, then read again and perhaps accept again with a better understand-
ing. It is only through this never-ending process that we can come nearer 
and nearer to a better appreciation of how things are. To return to Plato. 
As I said, there is a widely held view according to which Plato created a 
double-decker universe. Over and above the tables and chairs of the world 
around us he is supposed to have postulated some ideal tables and chairs 
somewhere in an ideal world. I want to give a little antidote to this view 
and to present, briefl y, a more common-sense Plato.
In the dialogue Parmenides we fi nd a young Socrates arguing with a 
young philosopher called Zeno. Zeno’s paradoxes are still being argued 
1. Th e last of seven class handouts on Th eaetetus, for philosophy students at 
the University of Western Australia. (All footnotes are by the editors.)
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about today among mathematicians and logicians. His teacher, Parme-
nides, had good reasons for believing that the real nature of the world 
was that it is a seamless, motionless single being. We cannot discuss his 
reasons for believing this now. His pupil, Zeno, argued for the same view 
in a negative way, by showing that any view to the contrary lands us in 
contradictions. Parmenides was the fi rst philosopher who distinguished 
between what is real and what is appearance by reference to what is ra-
tional. So, whatever involves a contradiction cannot be real, as a square 
circle could not be real. Th is is the original setting of Zeno’s well-known 
paradox that motion cannot be real: a fl ying arrow must be somewhere, 
but if it is at a given place then it cannot be moving. In this dialogue, 
however, his paradox was that there cannot be a plurality of things be-
cause then things must be both like and unlike. If things were not like 
each other, what would there be many of? And if they were not unlike 
each other, how could there be many of them?
Th e young Socrates began to argue with Zeno by saying that there is 
nothing surprising in the fact that things around us are both like and un-
like, things like sticks and stones. Th ey partake of both likeness and un-
likeness. Th e really surprising thing would be if likeness itself were unlike 
and unlikeness itself like. Similarly, I am myself one among the group of 
us who is here talking, says Socrates, but I am also many, because I have 
many parts, arms and legs. But it does not mean that unity is a plural-
ity or that plurality is a unity. Parmenides, who was listening to them, 
broke in at this stage and asked Socrates whether he had thought of this 
distinction himself. Th e dramatic presentation indicates that this is the 
fi rst occasion on which Socrates introduces what came to be called the 
Forms. Th is probably has no historical basis, but it has a more important 
signifi cance, namely that this is the type of occasion on which, and this 
is the purpose for which, Plato thought the Forms had to be introduced. 
But what has been introduced? A common-sense distinction to give a 
common-sense solution to a paradox. Now one of the bases of the para-
dox was that Zeno did not have any notion of predication. He thought 
that when we say that something ‘is like,’ we say that it is like, that is what 
it is, as if it were identical with likeness. So if we also say of that thing 
that it is unlike, we say of it that it is unlikeness, and here is our contra-
diction. Socrates had to distinguish between the notions of likeness and 
unlikeness on the one hand and sticks and stones on the other, which can 
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be both like and unlike at the same time. He was not very fussy about 
their relationship. I quoted a passage in our fi rst note from the dialogue 
Phaedo where he said: ‘ . . . what makes a thing beautiful is nothing other 
than the presence or communion of that beautiful itself—if indeed these 
are the right terms to express how it comes to be there: for I won’t go so 
far as to dogmatise about that’ (100d).2
Before we continue with Parmenides, let me quote a couple of para-
graphs from the dialogue Sophist to indicate what paradoxes were created 
by not having a theory of predication, and how common-sense Plato 
was in meeting them. I say Plato, because Socrates is not present in this 
dialogue.
Stranger. Let us explain, then, how it is that we call the same thing—
whatever is in question at the moment—by several names.
Theaetetus. For instance? Give me an example.
Stranger. Well, when we speak of a man we give him many addi-
tional names: we attribute to him colours and shapes and sizes and defects 
and good qualities; and in all these and countless other statements we say 
he is not merely a ‘man’ but also ‘good’ and any number of other things. 
And so with everything else: we take any given thing as one and yet speak 
of it as many and by many names.
Theaetetus. True.
Stranger. And thereby, I fancy, we have provided a magnifi cent en-
tertainment for the young and for some of their elders who have taken to 
learning it late in life. Anyone can take a hand in the game and at once 
object that many things cannot be one, nor one thing many; indeed, they 
delight in forbidding us to speak of a man as ‘good’; we must only speak 
of good as good, and of the man as man. I imagine, Th eaetetus, that 
you often meet with these enthusiasts, sometimes elderly men who, being 
poorly endowed with intelligence, gape with wonder at these discoveries 
and fancy they have lighted here on the very treasure of complete wis-
dom.3
To return to Parmenides, after asking Socrates whether he had thought 
of this interesting distinction, he used the fateful term ‘separated’ in 
2. Plato, Phaedo, trans. Hackforth, p. 134.
3. Plato, Sophist, trans. F.M. Cornford, in Th e Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. 
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1961), p. 996, 251a–c.
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asking Socrates whether he thought of separating forms on the one hand 
and sticks and stones on the other. Th is use of the word ‘separating’ is to a 
very large extent the reason why one might think that Plato introduced a 
separate world of Forms. It is diffi  cult to say how else this simple distinc-
tion could have been expressed. But however simple we may think the 
distinction is, it was such a new and momentous distinction at the time 
that ever since we assume that it must have been a far more extraordinary 
doctrine than the ingenious invention it was. Parmenides himself went 
on to criticise it as if it had been some extraordinary doctrine, and ever 
since all criticisms of the Platonic Forms are variations on Parmenides’ 
criticisms. He asked, teasingly, whether the Form of largeness is cut up 
into small pieces in order to be distributed among all large things. Th e 
young Socrates could not cope with the criticisms, and there are clear 
indications that it is only Socrates’ inexperience that cannot cope with 
the arguments. At one stage Socrates tries to say that it is like all of us 
being in the same day of the week. Th ere is no need to chop up the day 
for all of us participating in the same day of the week. You mean, says 
Parmenides, like several of us being under the same sail in a boat? Yes, 
says Socrates, and he is tripped and cheated out of a good example. Now 
Plato, who wrote this, must have known that the fi rst example could have 
helped Socrates and that the second example, that he agreed to exemplify 
what he meant, ruined his case. He was showing Socrates to be inexperi-
enced in arguments. And it was Parmenides who said, after fi nishing all 
his objections to Socrates’ theory, that ‘Only a man of exceptional gifts 
will be able to see that a Form, or essence just by itself, does exist in each 
case; and it will require someone still more remarkable to discover it and 
to instruct another who has thoroughly examined all those diffi  culties’ 
(Parmenides, 135b).4
Th en Parmenides goes on to make an even more signifi cant remark 
which indicates that the purpose of introducing the conceptual distinc-
tions which Plato made Socrates introduce was not to create a double-
decker universe but to preserve the signifi cance of discourse.
But on the other hand [Parmenides continued], if, in view of all these dif-
fi culties and others like them, a man refuses to admit that Forms of things 
4. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 100.
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exist or to distinguish a defi nite form in every case, he will have nothing on 
which to fi x his thought, so long as he will not allow that each thing has 
a character which is always the same; and in so doing he will completely 
destroy the signifi cance of all discourse. But of that consequence I think 
you are only too well aware.5
After this Parmenides advises the young Socrates to undertake a more 
severe training to be able to think and argue better, and the second half of 
the dialogue is a long and elaborate training in conceptual analysis.
Parmenides was from a place called Elea, in present day Sicily. In the 
dialogue Sophist the main character has no name; he is just referred to 
as the Visitor from Elea, or the Stranger from Elea. It is with the Eleatic 
logic that Socrates learnt from Parmenides that Plato is resolving the 
problems that we encountered in the Th eaetetus, the problem of false 
judgment, and with the possibility of false judgment the possibility of 
knowledge, the problem of predication, and the question of what a state-
ment or judgment is. Let me quote now another passage from the Soph-
ist. Th e passage comes after Plato had argued that ‘that which is not’ does 
not mean ‘that which does not exist’ but only ‘that which is diff erent.’ 
But that which is diff erent also exists, and so that which in a sense is not, 
in a sense is.
Stranger. And if anyone mistrusts these apparent contradictions, he 
should study the question and produce some better explanation than we 
have now given; whereas if he imagines he has discovered an embarrass-
ing puzzle and takes delight in reducing arguments to a tug of war, he is 
wasting his pains on a triviality, as our present argument declares. Th ere is 
nothing clever in such a discovery, nor is it hard to make; what is hard and 
at the same time worth the pains is something diff erent.
Theaetetus. And that is?
Stranger. What I said before; leaving such quibbling alone as leading 
nowhere, to be able to follow our statements step by step and, in criticising 
the assertion that a diff erent thing is the same or the same thing is diff er-
ent in a certain sense, to take account of the precise sense and the precise 
respect in which they are said to be one or the other. Merely to show that 
in some unspecifi ed way the same is diff erent or the diff erent is the same, 
the tall short, the like unlike, and to take pleasure in perpetually parading 
5. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 100.
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such contradictions in argument—that is not genuine criticism, but may 
be recognised as the callow off spring of a too recent contact with reality.6
You can see how the problem of false judgment we inherited from 
the Th eaetetus is also connected with Zeno’s paradoxes, or rather that 
Plato has hit on a solution that resolved both problems. But Plato must 
have been really excited when he discovered that the same philosophical 
method can solve some paradoxes that preoccupied him even more; the 
paradoxes of sophists and rhetoricians who presented the same things 
as now good, now the reverse of good, now just, now unjust. I cannot 
do more here than to give you a passage from the Phaedrus where Plato 
brings together the two problems.
Socrates. Must not the art of rhetoric, taken as a whole, be a kind of 
infl uencing of the mind by means of words, not only in courts of law and 
other public gatherings, but in private places also? And must it not be the 
same art that is concerned with great issues and small, its right employ-
ment commanding no more respect when dealing with important matters 
than with unimportant? Is that what you have been told about it?
Phaedrus. No indeed, not exactly that: it is principally, I should say, 
to lawsuits that an art of speaking and writing is applied—and of course to 
public harangues also. I know of no wider application.
Socrates. What? Are you acquainted only with the ‘Arts’ or manuals 
of oratory by Nestor and Odysseus, which they composed in their leisure 
hours at Troy? Have you never heard of the work of Palamedes?
Phaedrus. No, upon my word, nor of Nestor either, unless you are 
casting Gorgias for the role of Nestor, with Odysseus played by Th rasyma-
chus, or maybe Th eodorus.
Socrates. Perhaps I am. But anyway we may let them be, and do you 
tell me, what is it that the contending parties in law courts do? Do they not 
in fact contend with words, or how else should we put it?
Phaedrus. Th at is just what they do.
Socrates. About what is just and unjust?
Phaedrus. Yes.
Socrates. And he who possesses the art of doing this can make the 
same thing appear to the same people now just, now unjust, at will?
6. Sophist, trans. Cornford, in Th e Collected Dialogues of Plato, p. 1006, 259b–d.
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Phaedrus. To be sure.
Socrates. And in public harangues, no doubt, he can make the same 
things seem to the community now good, and now the reverse of good.
Phaedrus. Just so.
Socrates. Th en can we fail to see that the Palamedes of Elea [Zeno] 
has an art of speaking such that he can make the same things appear to his 
audience like and unlike, or one and many, or again at rest and in motion?
Phaedrus. Indeed he can.
Socrates. So contending with words is a practice found not only in 
lawsuits and public harangues but, it seems, wherever men speak we fi nd 
this single art, if indeed it is an art, which enables people to make out 
everything to be like everything else, within the limits of possible com-
parison, and to expose the corresponding attempts of others who disguise 
what they are doing.7
Plato wanted to sort out the problems of talking about this world. He 
managed to decode what was wrong with the arguments of a large variety 
of people, both those who were arguing about the physical world and 
those who were arguing about moral matters. It is ironical that Plato, 
who tried to achieve the possibility of sane discussion about the world 
around us, should have the reputation of denigrating the world around 
us compared to some ideal world above us. What happened was, I think, 
a shift of levels, or misidentifi cation of levels in talking and thinking 
about Plato. If we take the three levels:
1.  Th e ideal world of forms
2.  Our ordinary world
3.  Th e Protagorean and Heraclitean world of perception
then Plato was arguing that level 3 is not suffi  cient for us to have knowl-
edge of the world. In order to have knowledge of level 2 we must have 
what he called ideas or forms. It is, however, easy to misunderstand Plato 
as saying that level 2 is not suffi  cient for us to have knowledge, we must 
have level 1 as well. It is easy to make this mistake because in our ordinary 
language we do say that we see post offi  ces, universities, accidents, kind 
acts and murders. But Plato argues that when I look at, say Winthrop 
7. Phaedrus, trans. Hackforth, p. 124, 261a–e.
Moral Notions
140
Hall, I have perceptions of various sorts, but I know that it is part of the 
University.8 Similarly when I look at a kind act or an accident, perception 
alone is not enough to tell us what it is that I see. I know that it is an ac-
cident or a kind act.
You remember how in the Th eaetetus Socrates argued that if the world 
were just the Heraclitean fl ux of constant perceptions we could not even 
say anything about it. I quoted then [in the previous lecture] McDow-
ell’s comment on this. McDowell said that ‘it seems incredible that Plato 
might have been thus prepared utterly to abandon the possibility of sig-
nifi cant discourse about the world of ordinary things.’9 Here is a great 
Plato scholar making the mistake I was trying to argue about. Was Plato 
in the Th eaetetus talking about level 2 or level 3? Read again what Par-
menides said at the end of his criticisms of the forms. ‘If in view of all 
these diffi  culties and others like them, a man refused to admit that Forms 
of things exist or distinguish a defi nite Form in every case, he will have 
nothing on which to fi x his thought, so long as he will not allow that each 
thing has a character which is always the same; and in so doing he will 
completely destroy the signifi cance of discourse.’ Th e language is the same 
as in the Th eaetetus, except there Plato has not yet introduced the solution 
to the problem. But it is the signifi cance of discourse which is at stake. 
And it was Zeno who tried to argue that the world of sticks and stones, 
the world where there are many things, is an illusion because it is full of 
contradictions. Against this Plato wanted to re-establish the signifi cance 
of discourse about level 2. It is however easy to make the shift in levels 
if we do not take empiricism seriously as Plato did in the Th eaetetus and 
assume that perception alone is suffi  cient to account for level 2. What we 
normally do is what you do when you fi rst enter the Reid Library.10 You 
assume that you are on the ground fl oor. Plato, as it were, points out that 
there is a fl oor below the level where we enter our ordinary world, and 
that is the world of sense perception. However, I do not wish to continue 
the analogy and talk about the perceptions of the coff ee shop.
8. Th e main hall at the University of Western Australia.
9. John McDowell, in his ‘Notes’ to his edition of Plato, Th eaetetus (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 181.
10. Reid Library at the University of Western Australia, entry to which is from 
a walkway at fi rst fl oor level. Th e coff ee shop is on the ground fl oor.
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Do continue to read and think about this problem, for, as I said, great 
scholars interpret Plato diff erently. I would like to encourage you, as 
Parmenides encouraged Socrates, to do more thinking and some more 
‘training’ in these matters. So I just leave you with Parmenides’ advice to 
Socrates:
Parmenides. What are you going to do about philosophy, then? Where 
will you turn while the answers to these questions remain unknown?
Socrates. I can see no way out at the present moment.
Parmenides. Th at is because you are undertaking to defi ne ‘Beautiful,’ 
‘Just,’ ‘Good,’ and other particular Forms, too soon, before you have had a 
preliminary training. I noticed that the other day when I heard you talking 
here with Aristoteles. Believe me, there is something noble and inspired in 
your passion for argument; but you must make an eff ort and submit your-
self, while you are still young, to a severer training in what the world calls 
idle talk and condemns as useless. Otherwise, the truth will escape you.11
11. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 102–3, Parmenides 135c–d.
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AFTERWORD
R.E. Ewin and Alan Tapper
Julius Kovesi’s Moral Notions was fi rst published in 1967.1 We are repub-
lishing it in 2004 because it seems to us still to have much to say. It is 
a short book, but a highly original one, and it repays rereading. Moral 
Notions made an immediate impact, and then inexplicably disappeared 
from sight. Bernard Mayo, in his 1969 Critical Notice of the book in 
Mind, described it as ‘a lightning campaign of a mere 40,000 words 
which, I think, decisively and permanently alters the balance of power’ in 
the longstanding debate about fact and value. Mayo was struck by Kovesi’s 
argumentative audacity: ‘Time and again a startling paradox brings us to 
a halt, and we want a recapitulation of the steps in the argument that got 
us there. Nearly always we are driven back to realise that a favourite pre-
conception has been subtly charmed away.’ Today it is almost impossible 
to fi nd even a mention of Kovesi’s contribution to moral philosophy.3 Th e 
book speaks for itself, but in this afterword we will present our view of its 
signifi cance some decades after its fi rst appearance.
Its immediate genesis was a reaction to R.M. Hare’s Th e Language of 
Morals,4 which had attempted to divide moral concepts into ‘indicative’ 
(descriptive) and ‘imperative’ (universal command) components. Kovesi 
rejected everything about Hare’s analysis of moral language. A simple 
example makes part of his point:
We are often told that we cannot move from the statement ‘the cat sat on 
the mat’ to ‘the cat ought to be on the mat.’ Of course we cannot. But why 
we cannot move from the one to the other is not because one is a ‘descrip-
tive statement’ and the other is an ‘ought statement,’ but because the fact 
that the cat is on the mat is not a reason for saying that the cat ought to be 
on the mat. If there are reasons for saying that the cat ought to be on the 
mat they are a diff erent set of facts. (Moral Notions, p. 65 above)
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Kovesi’s reply to Hare developed a theory of concepts and concept-
formation in part suggested by Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin. More 
deeply, he was replying to a much older tendency in moral philoso-
phy—one at least as old as Hume—that divides the world into ‘facts’ 
and ‘values.’ Kovesi rejected that familiar distinction in his account of 
concept-formation. He distinguished not between factual (world-de-
pendent) and value (mind-dependent) elements, but between what he 
called ‘formal’ and ‘material’ elements. Th e formal element is the reason 
(or, sometimes, reasons) why we form the concept; the material ele-
ments (they are usually plural) are the diverse features that are united or 
brought together by the formal element. Concepts thus commonly have 
an internal one–many structure. Th e formal and material terminology 
that Kovesi introduced is suggestive of Aristotle. In fact Kovesi’s model, 
if it is not wholly original, is grounded on his reading of Plato, a point 
we have tried to show by including three of his unpublished writings 
on Plato. We will return to the connection with Plato at the end of this 
discussion.
Our main aim is to show Kovesi’s current relevance. To do this we will 
take an extended example from recent applied ethics, debate about the 
concept of a person, showing how Kovesi’s clarity about conceptual argu-
ment is needed to make sense of the problem. We will then sketch some 
of the main moves in contemporary meta-ethics, showing how Kovesi’s 
position escapes many of the familiar dichotomies—variations usually 
on the fact–value ‘problem’—that still dominate moral philosophy. We 
will conclude with some thoughts on the kind of moral philosophy that 
Kovesi did think worth pursuing.
Formal elements
Th e idea of a formal element is the driving force in Kovesi’s methodology. 
For that reason, a few introductory remarks about the notion will be in 
place before we proceed to a discussion of the signifi cance of this method 
in both applied ethics and theoretical ethics.
It profi ts a man not at all if you give him a stone when he wants bread. 
Come to that, it does not help much if you give him soft white bread 
when he is building a wall to keep his cattle from straying. Discrimina-
tions matter in human life. We need to distinguish between food and 
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rocks, between nutritious foods and poisons, between advertent acts and 
inadvertent acts, between the road that will take us north and the road that 
will take us west. Human life depends on our making discriminations, 
and rationality is a matter of our making the discriminations properly. We 
need food. As social animals, we need various standards and prohibitions 
such as those expressed in a concept such as murder. In particular fi elds of 
activity (mathematics, playing chess, growing vegetables) we need other 
discriminations. Th ese discriminations are not pointless; each of them has 
a function in our lives and various activities, a point Kovesi makes with 
his example of the tak (Moral Notions, pp. 31ff  above). To understand the 
function of one of these discriminations is to see its formal element.
Concepts are the discriminations that we make, and possession of a 
concept can usefully be thought of as a discriminatory ability. Th e formal 
element of the concept is the importance of that discrimination in our 
lives, the function that it serves. Items of diff erent materials, shape, colour, 
and so on can serve the function of a table; reasonable mistake as to fact, 
tripping over a toy a child left on the path, severe illness, or the great dif-
fi culty of a task can serve as an excuse. Th ese are material elements. What 
brings them together, when whatever concept is at issue applies, is that 
they will all fulfi l the same function. Th at is, as material elements they will 
all come under the same formal element and that formal element is what 
they have in common. Th is also helps to explain how there can be open-
textured concepts. Kovesi mentions mathematical concepts as examples of 
concepts that are nearly closed in their textures, but makes the point that 
most concepts are more or less open-textured: we can think of new ways 
of committing murders, can come to recognise new things as food, can see 
new possibilities of modes of transport, and so on. Th e material elements 
will be new, but the formal elements show why they count as examples 
of the same sort of thing as more standard ways of committing murders, 
more standard forms of food, and so on.
Th ere is, of course, much more to the story of concepts than can be, or 
need be, told here. Many things might be thought of as discriminating in 
one sense or another. Sieves discriminate in terms of size; automatic teller 
machines discriminate in terms of the personal identifi cation number on 
cards; plants react diff erently to diff erent weather conditions; and so on. 
But concepts are the discriminatory abilities of beings that are conscious 
and can consider the discrimination and formulate their own purposes. 
Moral Notions
146
Just what sorts of creatures fi t these requirements might be a matter for 
argument; there is no obvious reason to believe that only people do so, or 
that dolphins or dogs do not.
A concept does not exist in isolation from the life in which it plays a 
part or from other concepts. To explain the formal element of the con-
cept of inadvertence, we need to refer to the concept of responsibility: 
the signifi cance of something’s being inadvertent is the bearing it has on 
somebody’s responsibility for the outcome. If we do not think in terms 
of responsibility, then we shall not see why it matters that I was reaching 
for the salt when I knocked over the gravy boat. (Compare what Kovesi 
says about inadvertence, and also his discussion of mistickets [Moral 
Notions, pp. 15ff  and 36ff  above].) We shall not see why a whole range of 
material elements come together and, not judging the material elements 
correctly, will fail in rationality: we shall fi nd it diffi  cult to distinguish, 
for instance, between inadvertence and carelessness. Rational argument 
begins from facts and moves to a conclusion; the facts are used to show 
that something comes under a particular concept, that it is a case of 
murder, or fraud, or benevolence, or that it is a crocodile rather than an 
alligator, or that it is an increase in GDP. In each case, for the argument 
to be rational, the facts we start from have to come within the formal el-
ement of the relevant concept. Th e formal element is what makes those 
facts relevant to the conclusion. Th e point of the discrimination is what 
decides what is relevant to the discrimination, and rationality is a mat-
ter of making our discriminations, or applying our concepts, properly. 
Whether a judge holds shares in insurance companies, and, if so, what 
insurance companies, is a matter of relevance when the judge makes a 
declaration of his or her interests on taking offi  ce. It is, on the other 
hand, irrelevant when the judge is called on to decide whether a fl ying 
boat is a ship or a plane for purposes of insurance.5 What is relevant in 
each case is the point of the discrimination, the formal elements of the 
concepts being called on in making the decision.
To explain the formal element of the concept of murder we must refer 
to the concept of wrongfulness. We must also refer to the concept of 
a person, one of the central concepts in moral argument. As ongoing 
debate about the morality of abortion shows, people can disagree widely 
about what constitutes a person, and the only way to sort that out is to 
go into the issue of the formal element of that concept: what is the point 
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of distinguishing people from other things? Why have we cause to worry 
about whether or not X is a person? And that is a matter of arguing out 
the signifi cance in human life of distinguishing people from other things. 
Th e procedure does not make all problems simple, but it sets out the 
project for moving the debate on.
Formal elements and the concept of a person
Can moral philosophy contribute to the resolution of moral problems? 
Th e idea that it might do so has lain behind most of the interest in 
the subject and behind the idea that the subject is of importance, even 
of enough importance to be worthy of support from the public purse. 
Nevertheless the current state of the discipline in universities might make 
one wonder whether moral philosophy can make such a contribution.
Kovesi never sets out to explain explicitly what the moral point of 
view is. We feel no need for an explanation of the point of view of some-
body playing chess; that seems obvious. Nor do we feel any need for 
an explanation of the point of view of somebody involved in culinary 
activity. (Some cooks, of course, may deliberately cook a meal so as to 
poison their guests, but, given that that is their primary aim, it would 
be a misdescription to say that they are involved in culinary activity.) We 
know the point of those activities. But what are we to take as the moral 
point of view, determining the formal element of moral concepts? As 
Kovesi points out, there are concepts for which we are the subject matter 
as well as the formers of the concepts; moral concepts will fall amongst 
these. And, as he also points out, our concepts are not formed from the 
point of view of some particular person, but from the point of view of 
people in general; they refl ect interests that are, or can be, shared. Perhaps 
nobody else is interested in collecting nineteenth century matchboxes, 
but the classifi cations I employ in pursuing my hobby are classifi cations 
that could be shared with anybody else who developed the interests. Th e 
moral point of view will be the point of view of somebody (anybody) 
who lives in a world they must share with other people. Given that con-
text, the concepts formed from anybody’s point of view will be concepts 
encapsulating the standards and prohibitions that we must have to get 
along with people whose interests and judgments are not always in ac-
cord. Th e concept of murder is an example with which Kovesi deals, and 
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the concept of inadvertence is another. Moral concepts express discrimi-
nations relevant from that point of view.
Th e linguistic analysis movement in philosophy moved away from the 
idea that moral philosophy might actually help in the solving of moral 
problems, and this trend has continued with the treatment of moral phi-
losophy as merely a species of metaphysics. Any idea amongst the general 
public that moral philosophy is important has tended to weaken with 
these moves. Philosophers, too, have worried about the practical irrel-
evance that their subject seemed to have taken on, and the applied ethics 
movement has grown up. Much of the work in applied ethics, though, 
has not been notably philosophical: it has consisted of making liberal or 
Utilitarian assumptions and arguing out what followed from them, or 
even of setting aside any explicit moral theory and simply arguing in an 
entirely substantive way about the matter at issue. Examples of both, we 
shall show, can be found in what Peter Singer has written about brain 
death. At times he employs a piecemeal approach that leads him to as-
sume that heartbeat is the test of human life and death, and at times 
he assumes a Utilitarian stance with the ill consequences that follow 
therefrom. Unsurprisingly, some of the better articles in applied ethics, 
even in professional philosophical journals, have been written by non-
philosophers. Julius Kovesi did not talk about applied ethics and would 
have been puzzled about the idea of unapplied ethics, but he was clear 
that there is a philosophical dimension to morality. If there is to be a 
philosophical ethics of practical signifi cance, what form could it take? An 
example might help to show how this could go.
Th ere are many people working these days in the fi eld of applied ethics 
and there are diff erences amongst them, but none is better known inter-
nationally than Peter Singer, and so part of his work will suffi  ce here as 
an illustration of the fi eld. Th e example that we propose to take is his dis-
cussion of brain death in Rethinking Life and Death.6 Singer’s discussion 
centres on the recognitors for death, assuming that the old recognitors 
in fact mark off  the concept.7 Th is assumption, of course, rather begs the 
question against an argument that new recognitors for the concept are 
available and are preferable in some circumstances, and it leaves Singer 
claiming that the question whether brain criteria can be suffi  cient criteria 
for death is merely a matter for our choice, to be determined as a matter 
of policy (Rethinking, pp. 17 and 35). Argument about what constitutes 
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the death of a person, carried out in terms of the formal element of the 
concept of a person, attempts to pick out recognitors in terms of their 
relevance to the concept of death. Th e formal element picks out the ap-
propriate material elements and shows how they are relevant. Attempts 
to pick out the recognitors in terms of their relevance to social policy and 
the need for more organs to satisfy the demand for transplants is a diff er-
ent thing: taking the organs of criminals sentenced to more than fi fteen 
years might help to achieve that policy purpose, but such people are not 
dead and the policy point does nothing to show that they are dead. Con-
siderations relevant to such policy matters are dealing with quite diff erent 
issues from whether somebody is dead.
Th e concepts that we have are developed in the world we live in. Th at 
is the world in which we need to make our distinctions. Sometimes 
changes in that world leave us with problems about how one of our con-
cepts applies in the new circumstances, or even whether it applies at all. 
We have the concept of a person because people are important in our 
lives. Sometimes, as in extreme cases of anencephalic babies, we might 
be at a loss to determine how the concept applies. Philosophers have 
sometimes invited us to consider a sort of thought experiment in which 
the brain from Smith’s body is transplanted into Brown’s body, and the 
brain from Brown’s body is transplanted into Smith’s body, so that the 
brain of the former scrawny, chess-playing person is now in the body that 
formerly appeared in professional wrestling bouts, and vice versa, with all 
the memories and psychological quirks formerly associated with Brown 
now being associated with Smith’s body and vice versa. In cases of this 
sort, there is no reason to believe that our concept of a person is such that 
there is an answer to the question which person is now Smith and which 
person is now Brown. Our concept did not grow up to deal with that sort 
of problem, and it does not deal with it.
Th e problem about death, or specifi cally about the death of a person, is 
not like the brain-transplant case. Th e issue of whether somebody is alive 
or dead has the same signifi cance now that it had a hundred years ago and 
it arises in the world in which our concepts developed. Th e problem here 
is that the recognitors in terms of which the concept was standardly ap-
plied have come apart. It used to be the case that when somebody’s heart 
stopped beating, their spontaneous breathing also stopped; it was also the 
case that when their spontaneous breathing stopped, their heart stopped 
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beating. Th eir brain also ceased to function. Other things happened, too: 
fairly obvious things such as that they no longer responded to a call to 
come to dinner, no longer wrote replies to letters, and so on. Th ese things 
all went together as far as anybody could see. Faint heartbeats were easy 
to be mistaken about before the invention of the stethoscope, and so the 
usual test of death was whether somebody was breathing, as indicated by, 
say, misting on a mirror held in front of their mouth. With the invention 
of the stethoscope, there was more reliance on heartbeat. But the things 
that all went together can now be separated: Smith’s heart, for example, 
can now beat (in the most obvious case, in somebody else’s body) long 
after Smith is incontestably dead. Heartbeat and respiration can be con-
tinued by use of a ventilator long after the brain has ceased to function. 
Increased use of motor vehicles and the head injuries that can go with 
that use make cases in which the recognitors do not all go together much 
more common than they used to be, though those recognitors do still go 
together in the vast majority of deaths. Th e problem Singer starts from 
might be expressed this way: when the recognitors are separated, how do 
we decide which set will constitute death? But the point to make in re-
sponse is that the recognitors do not constitute death at all. Th e uniform 
might be a recognitor for a police offi  cer, but wearing the uniform does 
not constitute being a police offi  cer; if it did, some fancy dress parties 
might be more restrained than they are.
Singer lists a number of types of problems that have arisen in medicine 
over recent decades: anencephaly and the issue of organ transplants; per-
sistent vegetative state; the status of a newly fertilized embryo in in vitro 
fertilization; and the 1982 ‘Baby Doe’ case in Indiana.
Th e advances in medical technology have forced us to think about issues 
that we previously had no need to face. When there was nothing we could 
do to preserve the lives of fetuses inside the bodies of pregnant women 
whose brains had died, we did not have to make up our minds about the 
status of a fetus whose mother had died months before it could be born. 
(Rethinking, p. 19)
Th e sort of problem raised by the new technology is not like a problem 
such as how to deal with a new strain of ’fl u. It is a problem about what 
the criteria are, or what recognitors should be used in applying a concept. 
Th is is not a problem that can be solved simply by looking for what is 
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common to cases (Singer, Rethinking, p. 20) any more than (to take Ko-
vesi’s example) we could decide whether a novel way of killing somebody 
(by, say, hounding somebody with a bad heart in the hope that increased 
stress would kill him) was murder simply by checking to see whether 
it involved the use of a gun, or a knife, or a poison, or any of the other 
things that more standard cases of murder involve (Moral Notions, p. 7 
above). Despite some misleading remarks that Singer makes, the ques-
tion is whether the state of the brain can properly be used as a recogni-
tor of death of a person. Th e Australian National Health and Medical 
Research Council Draft Discussion Paper number 4, Certifying Death: 
Th e Brain Function Criterion, said: ‘In the context of “brain death,” we 
are concerned with what it is for a human person to be alive or dead.’8 
Th e President’s Commission said in Defi ning Death: ‘Th e death of a hu-
man being—not the “death” of cells, or tissues or organs—is the matter 
at issue.’9 Even those who do write about the issue as one of whether 
the brain is dead clearly recognize that what is at issue is the death of a 
person: it is a matter of whether the heart, say, may be taken from the 
body and transplanted, not of whether the brain can be transplanted. Th e 
argument therefore has to be about whether or not the state of the brain 
can properly be used as a recognitor of the death of a person.
Singer does show a tendency to beg the question about the appropriate 
recognitor for death, taking it several times to be heartbeat. 
For other patients, however, the respirator brought a much more dubious 
benefi t: they remained alive, their hearts continued to beat, but they were 
unconscious, and looked as if they would stay that way. (Rethinking, p. 
23) 
[B]rain-dead patients who would otherwise also have been dead in the clas-
sic sense within a day or two instead lived an average of twenty-three days 
after brain death. (Rethinking, p. 31) 
Th is begging of the question against the brain criterion for death is, we 
think, of some signifi cance in determining just what question Singer is 
really dealing with, and we shall take that matter up later.10
Singer does not always tie the idea of death to heartbeat, though he 
tends to fall back to that when dealing with the deaths of people. He 
makes the point that things other than people live and die, too:
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Human beings are not the only living things in the world. All living things 
eventually die, and we can generally tell when they are alive and when they 
are dead. Isn’t the distinction between life and death so basic that what 
counts as dead for a human being also counts as dead for a dog, a parrot, a 
prawn, an oyster, an oak, or a cabbage? But what is the common element 
here? (Rethinking, p. 20)
And he says, again, ‘Dead, really dead, seems to be the same for every 
living being’ (Rethinking, p. 21). But the point is by no means obvious. 
On the face of it, life is an analogical concept. Th e way an oyster or an 
oak lives is no life for a person, and somebody who had no abilities 
beyond those of an oak (however the blood might fl ow without a beating 
heart) would not obviously be a living person. Nothing simply exists; it 
exists as an X or as a Y, and what is required for it to be true that an X 
exists depends on what the X is: are there roses in existence if the only 
candidates for the position are artifi cial silk roses? Similarly, nothing 
simply lives: it lives as an X or as a Y, and life for a cabbage is quite 
diff erent from life for a person, just as fl ourishing for a cabbage is quite 
diff erent from fl ourishing for a person. Death is the end of life, so one 
would expect the death of a cabbage to be diff erent from the death of a 
person, and one would expect the tests to be diff erent in each of those 
cases.11
What we need in order to argue out whether the brain criterion is 
an appropriate recognitor of the death of a person, then, is an account 
of the formal element of the concept of the life of a person. Th e big 
questions cannot be avoided in philosophy, and they cannot be dealt 
with adequately if trivialized into merely technical issues and taken quite 
apart from the contexts in which the problems arise. We need to consider 
why we have the concept of a person and how these reasons bear on the 
particular problem. Th is question of what a person is underlies a lot of 
issues in moral philosophy and we can hardly expect to argue it out in 
proper detail here, given the limitations on the space that is available.12 
Nevertheless, a sketch can be given. Why do we have the concept of a 
person? Why are people important in our lives? Especially when the 
question is put in the second form, a lot of obvious answers will come to 
mind and those obvious answers will be pertinent: it is fairly obvious, for 
example, why my family and friends are important in my life13 and is not 
diffi  cult to see how friends and families are important to a fl ourishing 
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human life. Humans are a social species, and necessarily so.
Members of some species are born capable of looking after themselves 
immediately. Members of other species depend on their parents (or oth-
ers) for varying lengths of time; in the case of humans it is a considerable 
length of time before the infant human is capable of supplying itself 
with food or even of feeding itself when food is provided. Nor is the de-
pendence simply that of infants on adults. Unlike various other species, 
humans lack great strength, sharp teeth, great speed of foot, the ability 
to fl ap wings and fl y at a sign of danger, and so on; had the earliest 
humans been isolated individuals in a world populated by other beings 
with great strength and speed and strong teeth, our species would not 
have evolved because its earliest members would not have survived long 
enough. Sociality is a necessary part of humanity, and those members of 
the species who are unsociable depend on the rest of us for their early 
upbringing, for the language that they have, and for many other things 
without which they would not be here to live an unsociable life. Were 
it not for the emotional ties that tend to be formed between parent and 
child, the sociable emotional ties that we form with others that widen 
for us our social circle and those with whom we can interact trustingly, 
the anger that leads us to defend our group when it is improperly at-
tacked—were it not for these emotions of social signifi cance, then we 
could not have human life at all. Sociality is at the core of humanity. We 
are certainly not always angry, and we do not always form warm social 
relations with everybody else, but the capacity for the emotions of social 
signifi cance is necessary to human life (and to the evolution of the spe-
cies). Th e chance to exercise those capacities is what makes our lives, to 
a greater or lesser extent, fl ourishing human lives.
It is true, as Singer says, that the brain can largely be replaced by a 
ventilator in maintaining bodily integrity, but that is only a matter of 
keeping an organism ticking over and not at all a matter of maintaining 
a life as a person (Rethinking, p. 30). Th e life of the person has ended 
when the ventilator must permanently replace the brain. Singer does, 
indeed, pick consciousness out as the most important consideration, but 
he hedges the point:
 . . . if our kidneys are destroyed, and we continue to survive as an integrated 
organism only because we are put on a machine that replaces the functions 
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of our kidneys, we would never consider that our life is over. But if our 
brain is destroyed, and we continue to survive as an integrated system only 
because we are put on a machine that replaces the functions of our brain 
(but does not restore our consciousness) we would consider our life to be 
over. Th ere is no ‘fact of the matter’ here. If we choose to mark death at any 
moment before the body goes stiff  and cold (or to really be on the safe side, 
before it begins to rot) we are making an ethical judgment. (Rethinking, p. 
32)
It is, perhaps, a little odd that a Utilitarian should think that the fact 
that something involves an ethical judgment means that ‘there is no “fact 
of the matter” here,’ but, setting that aside, Singer’s position is that we 
simply make a choice about where to draw the line. Th e claim that there 
is no fact of the matter simply excludes the need to argue the claim that 
we simply make a choice. Any choice made here is made for reasons, and 
the formal element of the concept of a person determines which facts are 
relevant and thus constitute reasons. In the absence of consideration of 
the formal element, as so frequently happens in the disputes about abor-
tion, the two sides lack common premisses and the argument makes no 
headway. Consideration of the formal element of a human life, and thus 
of a human death, does give a way of arguing the point out.
We pointed out earlier that Singer does at times give question-begging 
descriptions, describing the brain-dead as being alive and assuming that 
heartbeat is a proper criterion for human life and death. Th at question-
begging shows a looseness in Singer’s concern with death. In the absence 
of consideration of the formal element, his discussion comes down to one 
about whether, on a Utilitarian calculation, more good would be done 
by transplanting organs from people in a certain condition, and that is 
not the same question as whether they are dead.14 He treats permanent 
and irreversible loss of consciousness, and thus of all social capacity, as 
though it were simply a matter of very low quality of life. If the issue is, 
rather, one of whether the people are alive or dead, there will be related 
questions about such matters as whether they have rights and, if so, what 
those rights are. Th at does mean taking the question of whether the per-
son is alive or dead seriously, and that means arguing out the formal 
element of the concept of a human death and what that shows about 
the acceptability of various possible recognitors.15 Th e idea of death is 
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prognosticatory; it is not concerned simply with whether the person is 
currently inert and incapable of social relations, but whether they will 
remain in that state. Th e recognitors standardly used are simply predic-
tors of that. In the case of most human deaths, absence of heartbeat and 
respiration are perfectly adequate; in more complicated cases the brain 
criterion is called upon, and it is widely recognized in the medical world 
as the most accurate predictor available so far.
Facts, values and meta-ethics
Th e fact/value framework
At around the same time as ‘applied ethics’ was being invented, the sub-
discipline of ‘meta-ethics’ was also coming into prominence. And just as 
applied ethics often contains little philosophical content, so too meta-
ethics has been largely misconceived. In this latter case, however, the mis-
conception has a long history, and it is derived from the very framework 
that Julius Kovesi was trying to dismantle. Moral Notions concludes with 
an apparent paradox. 
What I have been trying to say in this study is that moral notions do not 
evaluate the world of description; we evaluate that world by the help of 
descriptive notions. Moral notions describe the world of evaluation. If 
this sounds strange, then we have become aware of the framework with-
in which contemporary moral philosophy moves. (Moral Notions, p. 115 
above) 
Over three decades later, it still sounds strange, because contemporary 
moral philosophy—or at least that branch of it known as meta-ethics—
still moves within that framework.
Kovesi saw himself as arguing from within that framework in order 
to fi nd a way out of it. Th e framework assumes a massive dichotomy, 
variously described as between matters of fact and matters of value, as 
between ‘is’ and ‘ought,’ and as between description and evaluation. Th e 
language of science stands on one side of the dichotomy, the language of 
morals on the other. Given this framework, the task for moral philosophy 
would seem to be either to show how to bridge the dichotomy, by means 
of valid inference from facts to values, or else to give the values side some 
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independent nonfactual standing, by equating values with sentiments or 
intuitions or prescriptions or imperatives. Kovesi rejected both of these 
strategies. He rejected the second because he took morality to be an enter-
prise with its own inherent rationality. Nor did he try to show how ‘values’ 
can be derived from ‘facts.’ Bridge-building of this sort would assume the 
framework he aimed to demolish. Nevertheless, the fact/value framework 
has remained fi rmly in place in much subsequent moral philosophising.16
Mackie and queerness
Ten years after Moral Notions, and with no apparent awareness of Kovesi’s 
work, the fact/value framework was reasserted infl uentially in J.L. Mack-
ie’s Ethics. Inventing Right and Wrong. Mackie’s famous ‘queerness’ objec-
tion was that ‘objective moral values,’ if they existed, would be metaphys-
ically peculiar, ‘utterly diff erent from anything else in the universe,’17 and 
suspect for just this reason. He allowed that there might be values other 
than moral values—mathematical values, for instance—but he thought 
that these could be reduced to empirical matters, though if not they too 
should be stigmatised as ‘queer.’
Taken by itself, Mackie’s ‘queerness objection’ merely says that moral 
values are radically diff erent from facts; that facts are not queer; so moral 
values are queer. Th e inference seems invalid, and the premisses are ob-
scure. Elephants are radically diff erent from oranges, but that fact hardly 
makes elephants queer. Elephants would be a queer sort of fruit, but the 
queerness arises only in trying to so classify them. So stated, Mackie’s 
argument simply rests on the underlying fact/value dichotomy.
Further argument to reinforce that dichotomy is provided by four oth-
er contentions. Th e fi rst three are that objective values would be unknow-
able, that we can’t see how such values could motivate action, and that we 
can’t see how they can supervene on natural facts. Mackie’s fourth claim 
is that ordinary moral terminology (terms such as ‘unjust’ and ‘mean’) 
is not ‘queer,’ but this is so only because ‘the objective prescriptive-
ness’ of supposedly objective values ‘is not yet isolated in these forms of 
speech.’ Rather, it is mixed up with ‘desires and feelings, reasoning about 
the means to desired ends, interpersonal demands, the injustice which 
consists in the violation of accepted standards of merit, the psychologi-
cal constituents of meanness, and so on.’ Separate out these emotional 
and social components from our moral terminology and what remains 
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(Mackie thinks) is the supposed ‘objective prescriptiveness’ which when 
thus exposed is seen to be queer and thus irrational (Mackie, Ethics, p. 
49).
In Mackie’s account the fact/value dichotomy becomes the normal/
queer dichotomy, but it remains the same framework. Th e choices are as 
before: accept a world of values that is rationally unintelligible and inex-
plicably supervenient on the normal factual world, or show how values 
can be derived from that world, or—Mackie’s own view—give up all 
claim to objective values and settle for what he dubbed an ‘error theory,’ 
in which we treat values as though they were objective even though we 
know they are not. (One other possibility, abandoning moral discourse, 
is not countenanced.) Mackie’s arguments, minimal though they are, 
have been very infl uential.18 Before responding to them, we need to look 
at some later developments for and against the position he sketched.
Realism and anti-realism
After Mackie, meta-ethics cast itself as a debate for and against ‘moral re-
alism.’ Realists contend that there are real moral properties and that they 
are just like natural properties (the properties discovered by the natural 
sciences) except that they are moral, not natural. Anti-realists such as 
Mackie contend that moral phenomena do not resemble natural phe-
nomena and that our tendency to behave as though moral properties are 
real is a product of a systematic (though perhaps harmless) error in our 
mental make-up. In this long-running debate the fact/value framework 
has remained fi rmly in place.
Th e supposition that ethics is a form of error raises the obvious 
question of how a non-erroneous view of the world might look. Since 
neither Mackie nor other anti-realists have been able to abolish the error 
and replace it with something non-illusory, the explanatory credentials 
of error theory itself have come into question. To strengthen the anti-
realist position Simon Blackburn proposed that it should be modifi ed. 
It might be claimed that all our shared moral concepts both originate in 
widely shared sentiments and acquire the appearance of objectivity by 
being unknowingly projected onto the factual world. Th is is the thesis 
of Blackburn’s ‘quasi-realism,’ sometimes known also as projectivism and 
sometimes as expressivism. Th e implicit analogy is with colours: just as 
our sensory apparatus projects colours onto the world, so too our moral 
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dispositions project moral qualities onto an otherwise neutral world. Th is 
is an old project, one going back to Hume, who contrasted the diff erent 
‘offi  ces of reason and taste.’ It is taste that provides ‘the sentiment of 
beauty and deformity, vice and virtue.’ Its mode of operation is that of 
‘gilding or staining all natural objects with colours borrowed from internal 
sentiment.’19 On this account, moral propositions have no independent 
truth value. Th eir appearance of truth or falsity arises from the operation 
of our sentiments; if our sentiments were diff erent, what we take to be 
true in morals would be correspondingly diff erent. But there is no ‘error’ 
involved, since our judgments refl ect our sentiments.
In his 1994 Th e Moral Problem and in later writings,20 Michael Smith 
presents a ‘realist’ reply to Mackie’s position. Smith sees moral philoso-
phy as having to tackle three interconnected diffi  culties (Th e Moral Prob-
lem, pp. 4–13). Ethics, fi rstly, is either objectivist or expressivist about the 
reality of moral rightness. Second, ethical theory must solve a motivation 
problem, since if ‘rightness is objective’ then we can’t see how it supplies 
reasons for action, whereas if it is expressive (based on desires) then mo-
tivation is built into the characterization of morality. Th ird, moral phi-
losophers must choose between two accounts of motivation: the standard 
Humean model in which all actions arise from a combination of beliefs 
and desires, and a non-standard version which has actions arising from 
beliefs alone. Smith’s version of moral realism aims to combine objectiv-
ity and motivation without recourse to a non-standard psychology of 
action.
Smith tries to make sense of this three-part problematic by grounding 
ethics in an account of reason. Moral rightness, he contends, ‘is that fea-
ture, whatever it is, that we would desire our acts to possess if our desires 
formed a set that is maximally informed, coherent and unifi ed.’21 Moral 
facts are the sort of facts by means of which we are able to critically assess 
our desires. Th ese facts (whatever they are) are real, so moral realism is a 
coherent theory. Smith divides moral realism into two schools, external-
ist and internalist. Th e externalists claim there is a naturalistic equivalent 
to ‘rightness,’ but they contend that the existence of this equivalent does 
not guarantee that someone who believes an act to be right will desire to 
perform that act. Th e internalists (of whom Smith is one) claim that the 
naturalistic equivalent of rightness does guarantee the appropriate sort 
of desire (‘at least absent the eff ects of depression, weakness of will and 
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the like’ [‘Moral Realism,’ p. 34]). Moral behaviour is thus explained as 
a branch of rational behaviour, and on this account it would be inexpli-
cable otherwise.
Smith’s ‘moral realism’ can be seen as the fact/value dichotomy ex-
tended into psychology. What Smith and Blackburn agree on is that 
moral actions are inexplicable if they are not motivated by something 
other than moral beliefs and attitudes. Th ey therefore employ either 
non-moral desires or non-moral rationality to supply the missing mo-
tivation, both of which are seen as ‘factual’ and ‘natural’ rather than 
‘value-laden.’ Both thus accept one version or another of the fact/value 
dichotomy. All agree that a coherent account of ethics has to be con-
structed out of ‘outer’ factual features of the world or ‘inner’ psychic 
features of individual minds.
Kovesi’s rejection of the framework
Kovesi’s account, in rejecting the fact/value framework, in eff ect rejected 
all sides of this debate. He rejected both the realist’s attempt to ground 
moral values in natural facts—except insofar as the formal element of 
morality shows which material elements of the situation are support for 
the conclusion—and the anti-realist’s attempt to derive them from non-
moral sentiments.22 Rejection of the sentimentalist or expressivist move 
seems to put him in the ‘objectivist’ camp. But he located the objectivity 
or rationality of ethics not in inferences from naturalistic non-moral facts 
but in the process of concept-formation. In fact he thought the proc-
ess of moral concept-formation more objective than that by which we 
form scientifi c concepts, on the grounds that the subject matter of eth-
ics—people and their behaviour—is not passive (as is the subject-mat-
ter of natural science) but is itself rational and argumentative.23 Moral 
Notions puts forward a general theory of meaning, leading to an account 
of the formation of moral concepts, from which account it explains the 
nature of moral reasoning. Before sketching how he might have replied 
to Blackburn’s projectivism or to Smith’s moral realism, we can start by 
presenting some short Kovesian answers to Mackie’s four contentions 
outlined above.
(1) Objectivity. How can moral values be objective? Th e term is notori-
ously slippery. However, if by ‘objectivity’ we mean rationality then Kove-
si’s short answer is that moral values are embodied in moral concepts, and 
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moral concepts are objective in just the same way that our other various 
sorts of concepts are objective. Concept-formation is an interpersonal 
rational activity, and it is this interpersonal rationality that generates con-
ceptual meaning, which Kovesi called the ‘formal element’ of concepts. 
Possessing the formal element of a concept C is being able to see what 
diff erent things counts as instances of C, and being able to do that is 
understanding the reasons behind the formation of C.
Of course our various kinds of concepts serve many diff erent kinds of 
purpose. Th ose purposes are not reducible to the two supposed by the 
fact/value dichotomy. Some concepts serve to explain the natural world; 
some serve to explain the social world; others express values (moral and 
non-moral); some are specifi cally dedicated to embodying our moral 
and social interests; others are functional and prudential. In all cases, 
it is at the level of the formal element of the concept that objectivity 
operates. Given that we have concept C (quark, tomato, carburettor, as-
sassination), we can debate whether this phenomenon we encounter in 
experience should be called a C (a quark, a tomato, a carburettor, an act 
of assassination). Th e capacity to debate this depends upon our grasp 
of the formal element of the concept in question, and the process of 
understanding formal elements is the same whatever the purpose served 
by our concepts.
But what about so-called ‘metaphysical’ objectivity? Of course moral 
values are not metaphysically objective, if by that we mean that such val-
ues would exist in a world containing no human life or anything like it. 
On the other hand, if we allow that the metaphysically objective world 
includes human beings and their actions and characters and social rela-
tions then morality is as metaphysically real and objective as sub-atomic 
particles, brontosauri, carburettors and dictionaries.
(2) Supervenience. How do moral values supervene on the factual nat-
ural world? Th e concept of supervenience has been much debated by 
metaphysicians, but the term itself was put into circulation by R.M. Hare 
and—to some degree—by Kovesi. In ‘Supervenience as a Philosophical 
Concept,’ Jaegwon Kim remarks in a footnote that ‘Julius Kovesi points 
to the same characteristic of “good” that [R.M.] Hare called superveni-
ence, but without using the supervenience terminology. Kovesi mentions 
that this characteristic is had by many nonethical expressions as well, e.g. 
“tulip”; however he did not develop this point in any detail.’24 Th is is 
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somewhat misleading. Moral Notions does in fact discuss the concept of 
supervenience (p. 9 above). Much of the book is a discussion of the rela-
tion between levels of description. But Kim’s comment is correct, in the 
sense that Kovesi preferred his own terminology of formal and material 
elements to Hare’s supervenience terminology. He is also correct to note 
that Kovesi thought that what Hare called supervenience is in no way 
peculiar to moral values. In fact he thought it to be a universal feature of 
language.
In general Kovesi’s argument is about language rather than about meta-
physics. Right from the start he makes it clear that his usage of the formal/
material terminology is not a commitment to an Aristotelian ontology. 
As he says, ‘By introducing these terms I am not going to introduce any 
metaphysical entities.’25 Rather, his interest is in how one level of descrip-
tion relates to another. What Kovesi calls ‘Argument A’ asserts that no two 
objects or actions or situations can be the same in every respect except that 
one is describable as X and the other not. He thinks that Hare’s idea of su-
pervenience—the ‘gap’ between levels of description—is a general feature 
not just of ‘many nonethical expressions’ but of ‘any rational activity that 
makes use of language,’ with the possible exception of the special case of 
colour words (p. 114 above).
Th e key reason why Kovesi preferred his terminology of formal and ma-
terial elements to Hare’s terminology of supervenience is that he needed 
to make the point that concepts are rational instruments. Moral concepts 
do not supervene automatically (as it were) on non-moral descriptions. 
‘Murder’ doesn’t supervene on ‘killing,’ nor ‘theft’ on ‘taking,’ or ‘assault’ 
on ‘hitting.’ (Similarly, ‘tulip’ does not supervene on ‘plant with a bell-
shaped fl ower.’) Killing is a material element of murder, not a formal ele-
ment. If we think of murder as the category of killings that come under 
the prohibitions that are necessary if social life is to be possible, then the 
idea of murder doesn’t supervene on that description either, since the two 
are conceptual equivalents, the longer description being a statement of 
the formal element of the idea of murder.
In general, the formal elements of concepts do not supervene on their 
material elements. Th e case of the concept of murder here illustrates not 
just the workings of moral concepts but of all concepts. Th e argument 
rests on Kovesi’s general theory of meaning. When we attempt to explain 
a concept we can do so either at the formal level or at the material level. 
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Th e second approach will work only when we give a diverse set of mate-
rial elements but such a diverse set can be selected only if we have some 
higher order concept in mind that governs the selection and only insofar 
as the set of material elements succeeds in suggesting the formal element 
(Moral Notions, pp. 9ff  above).
(3) Motivation. How can objective moral values motivate action? Th e 
problem seems to arise because whatever is ‘objective’ and ‘naturalistic’ 
seems to be motivationally dead and in need of some sort of psychological 
supplementation. Th us Smith tries to motivate morality by supplement-
ing it with an account of reason, and Blackburn motivates it with senti-
ments projected onto the world. Neither will allow that morality might 
be self-motivating—that, for instance, I might simply care about being 
just or be spontaneously responsive to the suff erings of others. To allow 
that move seemingly would leave morality as inexplicably ungrounded in 
non-moral facts, to leave it as ‘queer.’
Kovesi’s answer to this problem is that motivation is built into our 
moral concepts—but also, although in diff erent ways, into all our other 
concepts. A concept like murder presupposes that people care about 
their own self-preservation and that they have social dispositions. Given 
these very general kinds of motivation, both social life and moral con-
cepts become possible. But these general motivations are not directly 
relevant to the question of whether a particular action is an act of mur-
der. And the fact that a particular person—a suicidal psychopath, for 
instance—lacks these motivations, doesn’t make his brutal killings less 
than murder. Th e general motivations explain the moral concept; the 
morality of particular acts is settled in terms of the concept, not in terms 
of the motivations.
(4) Concept-splitting. Mackie also contends that everyday moral con-
cepts (such as ‘unjust’ and ‘mean’) can be split into ‘factual’ and ‘prescrip-
tive’ components. Kovesi’s theory of meaning rejects this claim, but his 
reply on this point can be saved until we have made out more fully his 
case against both realism and anti-realism.
Against anti-realism
Th e anti-realist, convinced that the realist has failed to account for moral 
motivation and objectivity, looks elsewhere to explain the origins of mo-
rality. It was Hume who set this trend. But, as Kovesi argues, Hume’s 
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sentimental introspection can’t take the place of moral concepts like 
‘murder’ (pp. 52–54 above). Deciding whether an act is a murder de-
pends upon public criteria. I might fi nd in myself feelings of sympathy 
but those feelings are no guide unless I have some way of directing them 
to the victim and not to the murderer. I might feel resentment towards 
the aggressor but that he is the aggressor has to be determined by some-
thing more than my feelings. In both cases the feelings I happen to have 
must answer to the demands of our shared moral concepts. As Kovesi 
put it, ‘Th e relevant sense of feelings, etc., is the one in which these are 
anyone’s feelings, including those of the murderer, the murdered and the 
observer’ (p. 54 above).
Anti-realism also denies the ‘truth aptness’ of moral statements. But 
moral statements such as ‘Action X is murder’ have quite determinate 
(though perhaps complex) truth conditions. And other statements of the 
form ‘Murder is wrong’ have truth conditions similar to the propositions 
‘Chairs are a kind of furniture,’ ‘Dictionaries give the meanings of words’ 
and ‘Watches keep time.’
Th e fact/value framework drives Blackburn’s form of anti-realism as 
much as it does Mackie’s error theory and Smith’s moral realism. In the 
fi rst place, the metaphor of projection is as misleading as Mackie’s ‘error’ 
thesis. ‘Projected onto what?’ is the obvious question. Projection onto 
a screen of natural facts, the world as it would be if human beings did 
not exist? Th at is, presumably, onto the world of fact that makes up one 
half of the fact/value dichotomy. But a world without human life (or 
anything like it) has itself no need for morality and has no means of sup-
plying us with the makings of ethics.
Th e second question about Blackburn’s position is that it standardly 
explains morality as arising out of the sentiments of individuals. Morality 
is then a matter of how each of us feels. Th is being so, there can be no 
scope for moral argument and reasoning. Faced with a member of the 
Taliban who thinks that women should not be educated, all I can say is 
that I don’t feel this and that I feel disapproval of his feelings. In such a 
case, Blackburn suggests, we might be able to persuade the Taliban zealot 
that he is wrong. ‘We may be able to increase his experience of women, 
to undermine the delusive authorities on which he relies, to enlarge his 
sympathies, and so on.’ But we will not be able to do more than off er 
him the experience and hope that in time his sympathies come to match 
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ours.26 In fact, however, we have moral concepts by means of which we 
can argue about such issues. Th e usual objection to depriving women of 
education is that it is unjust (as distinct from being cold-hearted or eco-
nomically wasteful or whatever else), and the Taliban will employ con-
cepts like justice that suffi  ciently resemble our concepts to make such 
argument possible. (If they lacked such a concept they would be unable 
to stake a moral claim for confi ning education to men.) Th e argument 
would be a slow one, but it would be an argument, and not just an exhi-
bition of opposing sympathies.
Th irdly, Blackburn’s (and Hume’s) sentiments have themselves to be 
non-moral in their make-up, if they are to serve the purpose of the anti- 
or quasi-realist. Th ey can’t be sentiments of the form ‘murder is unjust,’ 
for instance—otherwise they might as well be fully-fl edged beliefs that 
murder is unjust or something similar. But many sentiments themselves 
contain moral elements (shame and pride, sympathy and resentment), 
and they can’t be split into factual and evaluative components. Th ose 
sentiments that are entirely disconnected from morality are ipso facto 
irrelevant to morality.
Against realism
Th e general aim of moral realism is to fi nd some non-moral description 
on which moral description supervenes, without however eliminating the 
need for moral language. Th e anti-realist thesis is that no such attempt 
can succeed, and that since it fails and since only non-moral factual claims 
can be true or false, it follows that moral claims are neither true nor false. 
Th e quasi-realist (such as Blackburn) thinks that moral claims can be 
true or false but they arise not from the world but from our sentiments, 
which we project onto the world. All sides assume the intelligibility of 
the idea of a ‘natural fact.’ Kovesi however denies the coherence of that 
idea when it is employed to form half of the fact/value dichotomy. It is 
the idea of description without a formal element, reasonless description, 
description as it were ‘from the descriptive point of view.’ All description 
is purposive. Only purposes give us reasons by means of which we form 
concepts.
‘Natural facts’—that water is H2O, for instance—make sense only 
given that we have very general explanatory purposes. ‘Moral facts’—that 
this action is murder, and murder is wrong—make sense, and can be 
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true or false, given that we have very general moral purposes. Th e sort 
of arguments by which we show that water is H2O are the appropriate 
arguments given those explanatory purposes. If we lacked any interest in 
explanation we would see no reason to link the chemical concept of H2O 
and the everyday concept of water. Th ey would at best be just curiously 
constantly conjoined. Th e concept of water has more than one formal 
element. In a restaurant, where ‘water’ acts as a food concept, a glass of 
ice cubes is not a glass of water, for the underlying composition of water 
is not the relevant formal element. Th e sort of argument by which we de-
bate whether this killing is murder or show that murder is wrong are the 
appropriate sorts of argument given the needs that we have that govern 
moral life. (Likewise, legal facts are governed by legal reasons, which in 
turn rest on the general purposes of law; and similarly for technological 
facts, etc.) Both moral realism and moral anti-realism are misconceived 
because they take for granted this incoherent idea of description.
Th e impossibility of purely descriptive concepts—concepts suppos-
edly formed ‘from the descriptive point of view’—is shown by Kovesi’s 
discussion of the concept ‘tak.’ A tak is a classroom concept, defi ned as 
a certain shape, that shape being demonstrated by a blackboard draw-
ing. Kovesi’s claim is that this exercise in defi nition fails to convey any 
meaning. Th e supposed concept has been given no point; because of this 
we cannot tell what will count as other taks; and if we can’t know the 
range of the concept, the term ‘tak’ can at best serve merely as a name 
of the shape given on the blackboard. ‘Pure’ description, then, is merely 
naming. Concept-formation, by contrast, is rational classifi cation.27 It is 
classifi cation driven by explanatory, or moral, or legal, or prudential, or 
technological, or aesthetic, or other human purposes.28
Kovesi held that ‘whenever we use a term composed of formal and ma-
terial elements we describe—but never from the descriptive point of view’ 
(p. 105 above). Th ere are many points of view but there is no ‘descriptive 
point of view.’ Simple description is not a purposive activity. It becomes 
so only when guided by human needs and interests, which are what give 
meaning, the ‘formal element,’ to our concepts. Th ese needs and interests 
are of course not value-neutral. All concept-formation is ‘value-laden.’ 
Without values we would have no reason to classify and thus our clas-
sifi cations would be meaningless. Of course human values include an 
interest in how the world is independent of human intervention, and it 
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is that world that the natural sciences seek to describe. Th e enterprise is 
an explanatory and predictive one, one in which ‘description’ is driven by 
the need to understand. Just as the scientifi c urge is the formal element 
of the concepts formed by physics, chemistry and biology, so too our 
moral needs and interests—that is, our needs and interests as social be-
ings—shape the concepts we form to govern human interaction. Th ere is 
no dichotomy between description and prescription, or between fact and 
value. Th ere are many diff erent sorts of human purposes, all of which are 
concept-forming, and all shaped by our general rationality.
To summarise Kovesi’s overall position it is simplest to quote one cen-
tral passage. Moral notions diff er from other concepts in three ways:
(a) moral notions have to be public twice over: they not only have to 
be formed from the point of view of anyone, but they also have to be about 
those features of our lives that can be the feature of anyone’s life; 
(b) they provide not only the rules for our thinking about the world 
but also the rules for our behaviour, while other notions are not at the same 
time rules for the behaviour of their subject matter; 
(c) partly as a consequence of (b), if other notions did not exist those 
events that are their subject matter would still go on happening, but with-
out moral notions there would be nothing left of their subject matter. 
(p. 106 above)
Concept-splitting
Return now to Mackie’s contention that concepts can be split into their 
factual and evaluative components. Take for example the concept of mur-
der, though any other moral concept would serve the purpose. All mur-
ders are killings, but not all killings are murder. What then is the rela-
tion between murder and killing? To answer this we need to think about 
why we need these terms. We need the concept of murder in order to 
mark out the class of socially prohibited killings. Murder is (very crudely, 
with plenty of room left for refi nements) wrongful or unjust killing, and 
wrongful or unjust killing can be viewed from two angles. As killings, 
murders stand alongside suicides, assassinations, acts of euthanasia, kill-
ings in war, executions, abortions and accidental killings—these are all 
equally killings. In fact the term ‘killing’ is even broader: it extends to the 
killings of animals, plants, and microbes. Th us, qua killings, murder is 
on a par with, say, the use of antibiotics. From the moral angle, however, 
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none of these descriptions at all resemble the notion of murder. Taken 
as a moral concept, murder resembles such things as assault, theft, fraud, 
dishonesty, slander and cheating, none of which involves killing, but each 
of which involves wrongfulness. Whether we view what could properly 
be described as a murder as a type of killing or as a type of wrongfulness 
or injustice depends upon the sort of question that on any given occasion 
we wish to answer.
Th is account of the concept of murder can be refi ned, of course. Man-
slaughter is wrongful killing but not murder. Murder is more like theft 
and assault than it is like manslaughter, because, unlike manslaughter, all 
three involve injustice. Murder is thus unjust, and not simply wrongful, 
killing. We can make the same sort of conceptual clarifi cations on the 
killing side. If we narrow ‘killing’ to human killing, then suicide and mur-
der will concern us but microbicide will not. If we narrow it to criminal 
homicide, then manslaughter and murder will remain but suicide will be 
of no interest.
But, allowing for these refi nements, murder remains a species of wrong-
ful killing. Th at murder is wrong is built into the concept, in just the 
same way as killing is built into the concept. Mackie wished to drive the 
fact/value wedge into our everyday moral terminology, splitting it into 
moral and factual components. Th is can’t be done. Subtract the moral 
component and all that is left is killing. Subtract the killing and all we 
have is wrongness. Concepts like murder might be made up of two com-
ponents, but they are not separable into those components. Split them 
apart and nothing of the original concept remains.
Nor can other concepts be so split. All concepts have two kinds of con-
stituents—their formal and material elements—but these are both part 
of what makes the concept what it is. And the formal element determines 
how arguments involving the concept should work. Certainly killing is a 
material element of murder, but the formal element is something diff er-
ent and without that the case would remain simply one of killing.
Of course, murder and manslaughter can look similar. Somebody ob-
serving the world might puzzle about whether a particular killing was a 
murder or manslaughter but is not likely to puzzle about whether it was 
a murder or a theft or a fraud. Murders and manslaughters often share 
many of their material elements. But murder, as murder, is more like 
theft than it is like manslaughter—from the moral point of view, mur-
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der and theft share features that they do not share with manslaughter. 
A jury would be precisely in the business of establishing whether that 
moral dimension was present in a given case of homicide, so arguably 
this particular homicide case does not become at all like theft until all 
the relevant facts have been taken into account. Th e jury has to examine 
the case to see whether it contains injustice, and only then can it decide 
whether the case is one of murder as distinct from manslaughter. It is the 
formal elements of those concepts that guide them in deciding which 
facts are relevant.
A concept does not exist in isolation from the human activities in 
which it plays a part, nor from other concepts. To explain the formal 
element of the concept of murder we shall need to refer to the concept of 
vice. If we cannot see the connection between murder and wrongfulness, 
then we shall not use the concept of murder properly and will be unable 
to discriminate between murders on the one hand and accidental killings, 
killings in justifi able self-defence, and so on, on the other. We shall not 
be able to judge the material elements properly and will therefore fail in 
rationality. Th e formal element determines the relevance of the possible 
material elements, so it is in terms of the formal element of the concept 
of murder that we argue out whether the facts in a given case show it to 
be a case of murder or a case of something else. Th is does not provide us 
with an algorithm that turns diffi  cult cases into easy cases, but it struc-
tures the arguments that we have to go through in diffi  cult cases such as R 
v. Dudley and Stephens.29 Rational argument is argument proceeding from 
facts to a conclusion in accordance with the relevant formal element. 
Formal elements are what bring the material elements together; they are 
what explain why this set of material elements in this case constitute a ta-
ble and why that set of material elements in that case constitute a murder. 
Th at is to say, it is the formal element of the concept of X that explains 
why these facts are relevant to whether or not we can properly reach the 
conclusion that this is a case of X and why those facts are not. It is, there-
fore, the test of the correctness of an inference. Rationality is a matter 
of making our discriminations, or applying our concepts, properly, and 
the formal element, as the point of the discrimination, determines what 
counts as making the discrimination properly. And this is how philoso-
phy contributes to practical morality. It is the proper methodology for 
applied ethics.
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After Moral Notions
In her Foreword to this edition of Moral Notions, Philippa Foot speaks 
of Kovesi as one member of ‘a small band of guerrillas fi ghting the pre-
vailing orthodoxy of anti-naturalist emotivism and prescriptivism in 
ethics, and challenging the Humean doctrine of the gap between “is” 
and “ought.”’ She also observes of Kovesi’s moral philosophy—we think 
correctly—that it is ‘radically diff erent from anything else on the scene, 
either then or now.’ Kovesi’s contemporaries included Mary Midgley, 
Elizabeth Anscombe, Alasdair MacIntyre, Bernard Williams, Charles 
Taylor, and Philippa Foot herself. It is not easy to say what these diverse 
thinkers have in common. All in various ways rejected the fact/value di-
chotomy, though none have done quite what Kovesi did in taking the 
problem back to the theory of meaning. All took seriously the point that 
philosophical ethics has a complex history, and rejected ahistorical ethical 
theories and simplistic versions of applied ethics. All were sympathetic to 
the revival of virtue ethics.
Kovesi’s arguments belonged to this general tendency in moral phi-
losophy, but he was conscious of his failure to write the sort of ethics that 
he felt was needed. In the 22 years of his life after Moral Notions he pro-
duced four papers that further developed his main argument. In three of 
these—‘Valuing and Evaluating,’ ‘Against the Ritual of “Is” and “Ought”’ 
and ‘Descriptions and Reasons’—he argued against those of his colleagues 
who sought to explain the status of moral concepts in terms of a com-
parison with functional artefact concepts. As he had also argued in Moral 
Notions, he contended that ‘evaluation’ is an activity that has no role in 
ethics, so the assumed dichotomy of ‘description’ and ‘evaluation’ makes 
no sense (see also Moral Notions, Chapter Five). In a fourth paper on 
G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica he presented an interpretation of Moore’s 
ethics on which Moore’s views were radically unlike Hume’s—contrary 
to those who see them both as critics of the ‘naturalistic fallacy.’30
Valuable though these papers are, the sort of moral philosophy he 
wished to see done remained largely undone. Moral philosophy remained 
largely divided between metaphysicians trapped in the fact/value conun-
drum and applied ethicists failing to examine central conceptual issues. 
Kovesi’s main and distinctive contribution to how we can progress beyond 
this stalemate is his account of formal elements, the central topic of Moral 
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Notions. Had he lived longer he would have elaborated his thinking by 
showing—probably with a book on the subject—how he derived it from 
his lifelong reading of Plato. In this edition we have included three unpub-
lished pieces to suggest the direction this might have taken. Th e fi rst, ‘Did 
Plato Turn Himself Upside Down?,’ is a conference paper presented at the 
Australasian Association of Philosophy annual conference in Canberra in 
1978. Th e other two are class notes on the Th eaetetus from the 1980s. Th ese 
pieces were unpublished for good reason: they were only the beginnings 
of a long-term project. But, like much of his work and teaching, they are 
original and provocative, and they deserve careful consideration.
If Kovesi’s thought has a source, it is Plato, or perhaps we should say 
Socrates. Th ose who knew him will appreciate this best. He was always 
quick to see paradox, always argumentative, and always both playful and 
serious. His interpretation of Plato is typically unorthodox and refresh-
ing. He took Plato’s Th eory of Forms to be a more formal expression of 
Socrates’ method of argument. According to this interpretation, ‘the hy-
pothetical method and the method of division are the same method. And, 
more importantly, what we call the Th eory of Forms is this method’ (‘Did 
Plato Turn Himself Upside Down?,’ p. 122 above). He thus rejects the 
common view that the Th eory of Forms expresses a metaphysical dualism 
between an unchanging ideal world and an ever-changing chaotic world 
of particulars. Modern interpretations that read back into Plato the so-
called problem of universals are also discounted. Kovesi’s demythologised 
non-metaphysical ‘common-sense’ Plato is mainly concerned to shed light 
on the complex and contested concepts that are central to our shared life, 
which are mainly our moral concepts, and his method of argument is the 
method of fi nding the formal elements—the reason why we have these 
concepts. To discover the true Form of a concept we have to disentangle 
it from other concepts. And the point of seeking the true Form of the 
concept is to permit us to speak and think rationally and lucidly about our 
ordinary aff airs. It is so we can ‘know what we are talking about,’ to put 
it colloquially. Whatever the specialists may think of this as an interpreta-
tion of Plato, it is certainly important to keep it in mind if we wish to 
understand Kovesi himself. One way of thinking of Moral Notions is that 
it is Kovesi’s Socratic cross-examination of modern moral philosophy.
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